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Over  the  last  decades,  worldwide  economic  activity  and  interaction  have  been 
considerably increasing to unprecedented levels. The consequence has not only been 
an overall growth in the number of firms but also an expansion of their respective 
operational perimeter. A look at the development of the average size of all US-
based, non-financial companies listed in COMPUSTAT as measured by total assets, 
revenues and the number of employees in figure 1.1 clearly confirms this trend
1. 
Between  the  beginning  of  the  1980s  and  middle  of  the  1990s,  total  assets  and 
revenues remained at almost the same level before markedly increasing until 2009 
by 136% and 110%, respectively. With some decline in the 1980s, the number of 
employees  underwent  a  closely  comparable  development,  increasing  by  67% 
between the mid 1990s and 2009. An end to this upward trend is not yet in sight. 
As  firms  expand,  the  need  to  set  up  and  operate  well-functioning  internal 
management  structures  to  support  the  organization  increases.  Procedures  to 
internally allocate financial resources within the firm for capital investments in fixed 
assets are of particular importance: Corbett and Jenkinson (1997) indicate that from 
1970 to 1994 between 70% and 96% of new physical investments in the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Japan and the United States were financed out of internal funds 
instead of tapping external debt or equity markets. The recent crisis in the financial 
sector peeking in 2008-2009 further stresses the importance of internal financing, as 
firms were facing a sharp decline in the liquidity of external sources of finance. 
Indeed,  Kuppuswamy  and  Villalonga  (2010)  find  evidence  that  firms  with  the 
capacity  to  efficiently  finance  investments  internally  have  gained  more  in  value 
during this crisis than comparable firms that are more dependent on the external 
financial market. In this dissertation I analyze these internal financing structures, 
how inefficiencies can arise in these processes and how they can be resolved. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Total assets and revenues are adjusted for inflation and fixed at the average consumer price index level 
of 1982-1984. 
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1.1  Internal capital allocation 
 
Internal financing processes are of particular interest in firms that hold a diversified 
portfolio  of  distinct  business  units.  In  these  firms,  corporate  headquarters  are 
typically the sole interface with the external financial market, such as banks or the 
stock  market,  to  raise  capital  for  investment  within  the  firm.  Headquarters  also 
centrally collect the funds that each of the firm’s units generates and then decide 
how both external and internal funds are allocated among the business units. This 
capital  allocation  process  can  be  used  as  part  of  the  firm’s  cash  management, 
ensuring that each unit is endowed with the financial means to meet its short-term 
liquidity requirements. Such cash pooling transactions are frequently automated and 
constitute only a small portion of the capital transfers between units. The larger, and 
more important share of capital allocations concerns the financing of investment 
projects in fixed assets that each business unit proposes.  
A continuing debate among both practitioners and academics revolves around 
the  benefits  and  drawbacks  of  these  allocation  processes  to  finance  capital 
investments, also referred to as internal capital markets. This debate addresses not 




















1979  1984  1989  1994  1999  2004  2009 
Assets  Revenues  Employees (right-hand scale) 
Figure 1.1 Development between 1979 and 2009 of assets and revenues (in 
million  USD)  as  well  as  employees  (in  ‘000)  of  US  firms  as  listed  in  the 
COMPUSTAT database, excluding the financial sector. 
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value  of  the  entire  diversified  firm.  Central  to  this  discussion  is  the  role  of 
information asymmetry during investment decisions. Proponents of internal capital 
allocation processes argue that corporate management can more efficiently allocate 
capital to its units than an external provider of capital because management has 
inside  information  about  the  prospects  of  a  unit,  i.e.  faces  lower  information 
asymmetries (Stein 1997). Raising external funds centrally for internal distribution 
can  also  be  less  costly  compared  to  each  unit  contracting  individually  with  the 
external financial market. Moreover, internal capital allocation can be particularly 
valuable when external capital is costly due to weak financial market conditions. 
Firstly, this can be the case if an established financial market is severely disrupted as 
in the recent financial crisis (Kuppuswamy & Villalonga 2010). Secondly, it can be 
the case in emerging economies that lack an established financial market and a legal 
system that ensures reliable financial contracting. Several studies indeed show that 
diversified firms with the capacity to efficiently reallocate capital are more valuable 
in  less-developed  economies  (cf.  Khanna  &  Palepu  2000;  Fauver,  Houston  & 
Naranjo 2003). 
Contrasting these advantages, various arguments have been raised that internal 
capital  allocations  are  bound  to  be  inefficient  and  reduce  corporate  value.  The 
common denominator of these arguments is the fact that even though allocations in 
diversified firms are referred to as internal capital markets, they lack the market 
component. More specifically, it is not a price mechanism, but the discretion of 
corporate management that determines the distribution of capital within the firm. 
Given that business units have an interest to execute as many of their investment 
projects as possible, they have an incentive to influence corporate management to 
lobby  for  a  more  favorable  allocation  of  capital  beyond  the  economic  optimum 
(Rajan  et  al.  2000;  Scharfstein  &  Stein  2000).  These  self-interested  influence 
activities are costly for the firm for at least three reasons. Firstly, capital is not 
necessarily reaching the unit that holds the best investment projects but that is most 
successful in lobbying. Secondly, managers spend time on lobbying rather than their 
assigned productive activities. Thirdly, a business unit that starts lobbying for more 
capital can provoke more lobbying from other units that would otherwise refrain 
from doing so. The lobbying process can therefore be self-reinforcing. Berger and 
Ofek (1995) show that diversified firms on average trade at a discount compared to 
the  sum  of  their  individually  valued  business  units.  This  finding  is  frequently 
referred to as a consequence of the inefficiency of internal allocations.  
More  recent  studies  have  contested  this  conclusion,  showing  that 
diversification  is  not  necessarily  related  to  a  discount  of  the  firm’s  value  when 
controlling for endogeneity (Campa & Kedia 2002) or when using more detailed 
data  that  allow  to  more  precisely  value  business  units  of  diversified  firms 
(Villalonga  2004).  However,  regardless  of  whether  diversified  firms  trade  on 
average at a more or less pronounced discount, the preceding arguments illustrate 
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that internal capital allocation processes not always operate efficiently. Given that 
firms face potential inefficiencies, it is interesting to note that the majority of the 
existing literature is silent on how firms can react to contain these inefficiencies. 
These reactions are analyzed in the first and the second study of this dissertation. 
More  specifically,  the  first  study  considers  adjustments  to  the  firm-wide 
compensation structure, whereas the focus of the second study is on changes in the 
organizational design of diversified firms to reduce inefficient allocations. The first 
two studies are based on publicly available financial data of a cross-section of firms. 
This is the predominant approach that authors of related studies have taken, but this 
method has clear limitations when trying to more thoroughly examine the mechanics 
of  internal  capital  allocations.  The  third  study  of  this  dissertation  addresses  this 
shortcoming and analyzes detailed data from the capital allocation process of a large 
diversified  company.  The  third  study  specifically  focuses  on  how  delegating 
authority  over  investment  projects  within  the  firm  affects  the  way  in  which 
managers renegotiate the initially requested capital budget to their own advantage. 
All  three  studies  of  this  dissertation  provide  new  insights  about  internal  capital 
allocations that have not yet been addressed in the existing literature. The following 
sections provide a more detailed overview of each of these studies. 
 
 
1.2  Divisional rent-seeking, stock options and the quality of internal capital 
allocations 
 
The first study of this dissertation in chapter 2 investigates how capital misallocation 
problems  can  arise  in  diversified,  multi-divisional  firms  and  how  compensation 
contract  design  can  help  to  reduce  these  inefficient  allocations.  Inefficient 
allocations are triggered by division managers that attempt to obtain more capital 
than would be economically justified by the performance and outlook of the division 
they are heading. This lobbying for money is possible because the allocation of 
capital is largely a discretionary decision taken by the CEO, rather than driven by a 
market  mechanism  between  two  independent  parties.  Information  asymmetries 
within diversified firms furthermore facilitate lobbying because division managers 
typically  have  better,  more  detailed  knowledge  about  their  investment  prospects 
than  the  CEO.  Division  managers  exploit  this  information  asymmetry  to  obtain 
excess allocations because their goals do not necessarily coincide with those of the 
firm, as they are primarily concerned with their own division rather than the entire 
firm. Additionally, the information asymmetry as well as the specificity of tasks 
require the CEO to delegate and hire division managers. Due to the necessity to 
delegate the CEO cannot simply ignore influence activities or centralize all activities 
but has to make concessions, as division managers could otherwise threaten to leave 
the firm. 
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The CEO faces two alternatives how to react to this type of lobbying within the 
firm. One response is to allocate more capital to the lobbying division, at the cost of 
foregoing more profitable investments elsewhere within the firm. Alternatively, the 
CEO can increase the lobbying manager’s compensation and pay him directly to 
refrain from his influence activities. Directly paying the division manager is less 
costly for the firm because the capital budget is not distorted, but it reduces the 
firm’s  funds  that  the  CEO  could  otherwise  spend  on  perquisites  to  his  personal 
benefit
2.  The  CEO  will  consequently  rather  distort  the  capital  budget  to  the 
detriment of capital allocation efficiency instead of reducing his own consumption. 
Excess allocations should therefore be inversely related to a division manager’s total 
compensation and coincide with a decline in allocation efficiency. Scharfstein and 
Stein (2000) describe this two-stage agency conflict between divisional managers, 
CEO and the owners of the firm but do not discuss how firms can respond to resolve 
this conflict. Adjusting the compensation contracts of the involved agents by tying 
their personal pay-off function closer to the value of the firm can in fact help to 
resolve  this  problem  as  any  value-reducing  behavior  consequently  affects  their 
personal  wealth.  Issuing  equity  incentives  should  therefore  be  associated  with  a 
higher quality of internal capital allocations. 
The  expected  positive  relation  between  incentives  and  allocation  quality  as 
well as the inverse relation between compensation and allocation are tested using 
public financial reporting data of US firms and their segments from 1998 to 2004, 
augmented with hand-collected data on equity compensation as published in 10-k 
forms filed with the SEC. The sample starts in 1998 because US reporting rules 
require  financial  segments  to  be  reported  according  to  the  internal  divisional 
structure from that year onwards, which is important to correctly estimate allocation 
efficiencies among divisions. The results confirm the predictions developed in this 
study. Excess allocations are found to decrease the capital allocation quality and are 
indeed inversely related to division manager compensation, i.e. the CEO resorts to 
the  capital  budget  to  pay  lobbying  managers  rather  than  directly  raising  their 
compensation. The findings furthermore indicate that these excess allocations are 
lower when more firm-wide equity incentives are issued to employees within the 
firms. The results continue to hold under various robustness checks. 
 
 
1.3  Organizational design and the efficiency of internal capital allocations in 
diversified firms 
 
Whereas  the  first  study  of  this  dissertation  considers  compensation  contracts  to 
contain misallocations, the second study in chapter 3 analyzes whether changes in 
                                                 
2 To a certain degree, this aspect can be illustrated with loss-making, government-subsidized farming: 
paying the farmer a wage directly is cheaper than indirectly subsidizing his farming activities. 
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the organizational design of firms are an alternative response to misallocations in 
internal capital markets. Several theoretical papers on the causes of inefficiencies in 
internal capital allocations argue that division managers engage in non-cooperative 
lobbying for excess allocations as a result of the economic profile of the division 
that  they  are  in  charge  of.  For  instance,  Scharfstein  and  Stein  (2000)  present 
arguments that the extent to which a manager engages in non-cooperative behavior 
to  obtain  excess  resources  is  defined  by  the  relative  returns  of  productive  and 
lobbying activities. A division manager will thus be more likely to spend time on 
lobbying when returns from his division are comparatively low. In addition, Rajan et 
al.  (2000)  conjecture  that  the  degree  of  non-cooperative  behavior  leading  to 
misallocations is an increasing function of the diversity of the relative returns of 
each  division  within  a  firm.  The  underlying  rationale  is  that  divisions  are  less 
willing to generate profits when they know in advance that they have to cede part of 
their surplus to worse performing divisions in the same firm. In consequence, the 
CEO reallocates funds between divisions in an effort to reduce return discrepancies. 
While this can stimulate divisions to refrain from non-cooperative behavior, these 
cross-subsidies are costly because of the lost returns that the diverted funds would 
have generated with the first-best investment among the portfolio of divisions. 
In equilibrium, firms have set up an optimal divisional organization in line 
with  their  operating  environment  that  keeps  non-cooperative  behavior  causing 
misallocations as low as possible. The operating environment is however subject to 
changes over time, as markets expand and shrink. The economic profile of each 
division  can  therefore  develop  differently  over  time,  changing  the  division 
managers’  incentives  to  engage  in  lobbying  and  changing  the  extent  of 
misallocations within the firm. To reduce increasing misallocations, firms can adjust 
the divisional layout of the firm to alter the economic profile, considering that the 
latter is the root cause of inefficient allocations. More specifically, firms can change 
the composition of operations that each division manager supervises, i.e. adjusting 
their decision rights, so that their portfolio of operations reduces the incentive for 
non-cooperative actions. For instance, a strong and a low performing division may 
be combined to be supervised by one division manager so that the joint return of 
both units is closer to that of other divisions in the same firm. Misallocations among 
firms that change their divisional layout in an attempt to increase efficiency should 
therefore be more pronounced than among comparable firms without such changes. 
Furthermore, allocation efficiencies should improve among firms that change their 
organizational design, if this is indeed the intended purpose. 
These expectations are tested using a sample of US multi-divisional firms in 
the  period  1998-2007.  Similar  to  the  first  study  of  this  dissertation,  this  paper 
exploits  the  fact  that  the  reported  financial  segments  have  to  be  aligned  to  the 
internal divisional structure in this time frame. Changes in the financial segments 
can thus be an indication that the divisional layout has been modified. 10-k forms 
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filed with the SEC are used to verify that this is indeed the case, as companies report 
the underlying reasons for any segment change in these forms. This verification 
procedure  therefore  filters  out  unrelated  reasons  for  segment  changes  such  as 
mergers, acquisitions or divestments. The resulting sample provides evidence that 
confirms the expectations developed in this study. Firms are indeed more likely to 
adjust their organizational design when capital allocations in prior years have been 
relatively  inefficient.  Furthermore,  the  findings  indicate  that  both  allocation 
efficiency  and  shareholder  wealth  improve  after  the  organizational  layout  is 




1.4  Capital budget renegotiations and the adverse consequences of delegating 
investment decision rights 
 
Almost all empirical studies on internal capital markets and the associated allocation 
problems resort to externally reported financial data, which requires approximating 
capital allocations that are not directly observable, rather than studying data from 
the capital budget process directly. One of the reasons for using publicly available 
reports is that many firms do not wish to provide access to internal allocation data 
for  reasons  of  confidentiality.  In  the  light  of  the  limitations  that  external  data 
imposes,  many  questions  about  the  actual  allocation  process  and  the  factors 
surrounding inefficient capital allocations remain unanswered. 
Using  a  proprietary  dataset  on  the  capital  budgeting  process  of  a  large 
diversified firm, the third study of this dissertation in chapter 4 aims in this direction 
and  specifically  focuses  on  budgetary  slack  that  is  incorporated  during  capital 
allocations  in  multidivisional  firms.  Slack  is  the  share  of  capital  allocated  by  a 
principal to a requesting agent beyond the necessary amount an investment in fact 
requires. It arises when the agent’s motivation is to obtain excess allocations for 
private,  perquisite  consumption  (Antle  &  Eppen  1985),  similar  to  lobbying  for 
higher  capital  budgets  as  described  in  the  internal  capital  markets  literature. 
Incorporating slack is possible when an information asymmetry between principal 
and  agent  renders  it  too  costly  for  the  former  to  verify  the  exact  nature  of  the 
proposed project.  
Most studies on budgetary slack are based on either experimental or analytical 
settings with a single negotiation round between principal and agent during which 
the  latter  incorporates  slack  (e.g.  Chow  et  al.  1988;  Arya  et  al.  2000).  Actual 
budgeting processes however frequently offer the agent the possibility to renegotiate 
part of the allocated budget due to the longer-term nature and inherent uncertainty 
about exact costs of most capital investments that span several investment periods. 
For instance, an agent may request more funds if contingencies arise throughout the 
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project that the initial proposal and allocation did not cover. Moreover, the decision 
if and how much capital each proposed investment is being allocated is in many 
cases not entirely centralized as processing constraints would make it impossible for 
the  principal  to  decide  on  all  projects  entirely  himself.  Instead,  some  of  these 
investment decision rights are decentralized, reducing the workload for the principal 
but also lowering the control of the decisions taken.  
The  third  study  of  this  dissertation  investigates  the  effect  of  decentralizing 
these  decision  rights  on  budgetary  slack  when  agents  have  the  possibility  to 
renegotiate budgets. One of the predictions is that agents exploit the renegotiation 
possibility to incorporate more slack when the principal’s control is lower, i.e. when 
the decision rights on an investment project are more decentralized. Furthermore, 
investment projects are uncertain and may develop differently than even the agent 
expected.  The  agent  may  therefore  wish  to  discretionally  reallocate  the  already 
incorporated  slack  between  the  project’s  different  investment  periods  to  fit  his 
consumption preferences, i.e. postpone slack to a later period or conversely advance 
future slack for more immediate consumption. Consequently, another prediction of 
this  study  is  that  agents  use  renegotiations  to  shift  slack  between  a  project’s 
investment  periods  to  a  higher  extent  when  the  delegation  of  decision  rights  is 
comparatively high, i.e. when the principal’s control is low. 
The predictions are tested with a detailed, internal dataset directly obtained 
from the capital allocation process of a globally operating, multidivisional firm that 
is listed in the index of a major European stock exchange. The findings confirm that 
incorporating and shifting slack are more pronounced the more the decision rights of 
a project are delegated. The results also show that agents tend to incorporate more 
slack when it is more difficult for the principal to detect these excess allocations. 
Shifting of slack is additionally found to be more pronounced when the agent faces 
less uncertainty about how a project will develop, i.e. when the agent is more able to 




1.5  Contribution 
 
The first study of this dissertation in chapter 2 contributes in several ways. The first 
contribution  is  of  methodological  nature:  Most  existing  measures  to  estimate 
allocation efficiencies are based on only very few factors and heavily rely on a 
presumed comparability of a division in a diversified firm with single-segment firms 
in the same industry. While validated against these measures, this study offers a new 
approach that jointly takes more factors into consideration, is less reliant on the 
comparability  assumption  and  offers  a  simple  way  to  determine  over-  and 
underallocations. Second, this study is the first to provide empirical evidence that 
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allocation  and  division  manager  compensation  are  indeed  substitutes.  Third,  the 
results show that providing firm-wide equity incentives can be useful even when 
there are few operational interdependencies between divisions. Fourth, Oyer and 
Schaeffer  (2005)  propose  that  stock  options  issued  to  employees  below  top 
executive  level  are  not  used  for  incentive  purposes.  In  line  with  Gerakos  et  al. 
(2007), this study shows that firm-wide equity plans do have incentive effects that 
realign the goals of division managers and CEO with those of the owners of the 
firm. 
The  contribution  of  the  second  study  in  chapter  3  is  twofold.  First,  the 
literature on internal capital markets is to a large part defined by analyses of static, 
cross-sectional allocation settings. In contrast, this study focuses on the dynamic 
dimension of misallocations, illustrating a yet undocumented way in which firms 
contain  inefficient  allocations.  Second,  the  majority  of  the  literature  on 
organizational design focuses on the question when decisions are delegated (e.g. 
Baiman et al. 1995; Moers 2006). Mookherjee (2006) notes however that very few 
studies analyze the determinants of the horizontal scope of authority within firms 
once  the  decision  to  delegate  has  already  been  taken.  This  study  aims  in  this 
direction, providing evidence that internal capital allocations affect the divisional 
layout, i.e. the way that investment decision rights are repartitioned among division 
managers. 
The third study in chapter 4 contributes firstly by investigating how agents 
exploit budget renegotiations in order to increase excess allocations under varying 
degrees of delegation, which has not been studied empirically in the extant literature 
on budgetary slack. Secondly, this chapter provides unique evidence that agents use 
renegotiations to shift slack between budget periods, which has not been explicitly 
analyzed before. Thirdly, this study contributes to the literature on internal capital 
markets, offering a more detailed perspective on how agents operate to obtain more 
capital during the allocation process. It shows that allocation quality varies not only 
between but also within companies since budgetary control is not necessarily the 
same for all investment projects. Fourth, this research stresses the importance to be 
aware  of  the  multi-period  nature  of  investment  projects  as  agents  change  their 
behavior to obtain excess funds depending on the stage of an investment, which 
should affect how firms implement control in their capital budget processes. 
 
 
1.6  Outline of the dissertation 
 
Each of the following chapters describes one of the aforementioned three studies of 
this dissertation in detail. The autonomous structure of each chapter allows the three 
studies  to  be  read  separately  or  in  different  order  than  presented  in  this  book. 
Chapter 2 presents the effect of firm-wide equity incentives on internal allocation 
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quality, whereas chapter 3 illustrates the role of organizational design to contain 
allocation  inefficiencies.  Chapter  4  focuses  on  a  more  specific  aspect  of  these 
internal  allocation  processes,  namely  how  agents  take  advantage  of  budget 
renegotiations  during  multi-period  investments  to  obtain  and  discretionally  shift 
excess  capital  allocations  to  their  own  benefit.  Chapter  5  summarizes  the  main 
findings of all three studies, discusses their implications and provides directions how 



















Abstract:  We  empirically  investigate  to  what  extent  firms’  resource  allocation 
decisions are affected by the CEOs’ response to division-managers’ rent-seeking 
activities and whether equity incentives throughout the firm, i.e., Employee Stock 
Option Plans (ESOPs), can mitigate this problem. We argue that the CEO is herself 
an agent and prefers to use the capital budget as a substitute for increased take-home 
pay to compensate the division manager for his influence activities. Consistent with 
this  argument,  we  empirically  find  that  excess  capital  allocation  is  negatively 
associated with division-managers’ take-home pay. We further argue and find that 
equity incentives throughout the firm alleviate this problem by increasing the quality 
of internal capital allocation. 
 
 
                                                 
3 This chapter is based on a working paper co-authored with Frank Moers and Alexander Brüggen.  
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2.1  Introduction 
 
The allocation of resources within a firm is one of the most important decisions 
made by its management. Examples of such decisions are the allocation of funds for 
capital expenditures and R&D expenditures at the divisional level. These allocations 
are organized in so-called internal capital markets; individual divisions of a firm 
generate cash, which is transferred to the firm’s headquarters, who then decides if 
and how to allocate the funds back to individual divisions.
4 An important question 
with respect to internal capital markets is how resource allocation decisions that are 
taken internally differ from those taken in a marketplace. Both Alchian (1969) and 
Williamson (1975) indicate that the benefit of allocating capital internally is that 
investment projects are less troubled by information and incentive problems than 
would be the case with external financing. The main reason for this is that a firm’s 
headquarters does a better job of monitoring and information production, which is 
driven by headquarters having all the ‘control rights’ (Stein 1997). The literature on 
the diversification discount, however, critically questions the efficiency of internal 
capital  markets.  In  this  paper,  we  empirically  examine  to  what  extent  potential 
inefficiencies  are  driven  by  the  CEO  misusing  the  capital  budget  to  respond  to 
division-managers’ rent-seeking activities and whether equity incentives alleviate 
this behavior. 
Economic theory states that, for the allocation of capital to be efficient, the 
marginal  return  to  investment  should  be  equal  across  every  investment  project. 
However,  efficient  capital  allocation  gets  undermined  as  soon  as  there  are 
information asymmetry and agency problems. For example, investors in the external 
capital market are aware of the informational advantages and divergent preferences 
of  CEOs,  which  leads  to  more  costly  financing  and  thus  reduced  efficiency. 
Similarly, division managers in an internal capital market have better information 
about divisional prospects and have preferences that do not necessarily coincide 
with those of the firm. Previous research shows that internal capital allocation has 
socialist tendencies, where weaker divisions get cross-subsidized by stronger ones. 
Following  Scharfstein  and  Stein  (2000)  we  focus  on  one  explanation  for  this 
“socialism”, being that the CEO is herself an agent and the distortion in internal 
capital  allocation  is  the  result  of  division-managers’  successful  rent-seeking 
behavior. 
Division managers have an incentive to rent-seek as soon as the benefits of this 
outweigh the costs of directing time away from productive effort. Managers of high-
productive divisions are thus less likely to engage in rent-seeking than managers of 
low-productive  divisions  because  of  the  costs  of  this  effort  reallocation.  If  rent-
seeking  occurs,  then  the  CEO  can  respond  to  these  activities  by  increasing  the 
division manager’s take-home pay or by allocating a larger share of a fixed capital 
                                                 
4 Note that we use the terms ‘division’ and ‘segment’ interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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budget  to  the  division  manager’s  division.  Increasing  take-home  pay  leaves  the 
efficiency  of  internal  capital  allocation  unaffected,  but  reduces  the  resources 
available to the CEO. In contrast, using the capital budget to pay rents allows the 
CEO  to  ‘keep’  the  resources  for  her  own  consumption,  but  distorts  the  internal 
allocation of capital and thus investment decisions. The CEO thus faces a trade-off 
in which he sees the capital budget and take-home pay as substitutes. Given that the 
outcome of this trade-off is very likely to vary in a cross-section, the empirical 
implication  is  that  we  should  observe  this  substitution  in  a  cross-section.  We 
therefore expect that a division’s ‘excess’ capital allocation is negatively associated 
with the division manager’s total pay. 
Firm-wide equity incentives can play an important role in the efficiency of 
internal capital markets. These incentives not only affect the outcome of the above 
described trade-off, but also the necessity of making the trade-off. Equity incentives 
for the CEO increase the attention of the CEO to firm value, which makes the option 
to distort the capital budget less attractive. Further, a wider use of equity incentives 
for  division  managers  helps  division  managers  to  internalize  the  impact  of  their 
actions  on  other  divisions.  In  addition,  since  firm-wide  equity  incentives  have 
retention effects, they make it more costly for the division manager to “threaten to 
leave”.  Unproductive  efforts,  such  as  rent-seeking,  thus  become  less  attractive, 
which decreases the need for the CEO to respond and distort the capital budget. 
Consequentially, we expect firm-wide equity incentives to increase the quality of a 
firm’s internal capital allocation. 
To  test  our  expectations,  we  use  segment  data  from  the  COMPUSTAT 
segment filings, compensation data from EXECUCOMP, and hand collected data on 
Employee Stock Option Plans (ESOPs) from 10-K forms, all over the time period 
1998-2004. We choose fiscal year 1998 as the starting point of our sample period 
because this is the first fiscal year in which FASB Statement No. 131, Disclosure 
about  Segments  of  an  Enterprise  and  Related  Information  (SFAS  131)  became 
effective  (FASB  1997).  SFAS  131  requires  firms  to  report  disaggregated 
information in a way consistent with the way management internally evaluates the 
performance of individual operating segments, which allows users to make the same 
assessments.  Previous  research  shows  that  SFAS  131  has  led  to  a  significant 
improvement in the information environment (e.g., Berger & Hann 2003) and we 
exploit this improvement in our sample selection. 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we estimate a benchmark 
model of within-firm capital allocation in which the allocation of capital to division 
i  in  year  t  is  based  on  the  division’s  relative  size,  profitability,  and  growth 
opportunities in year t-1. We extract the division-year specific residual from this 
model to proxy for a division’s excess capital allocation; then take the firm-year 
specific variance of the residuals to proxy for the quality of a firm’s internal capital 
allocation. Second, we validate the benchmark model by showing that the proxy for 
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the quality of a firm’s internal capital allocation is positively associated with a firm-
level proxy of ex-post internal capital market efficiency. Third, we show that, at the 
divisional level, excess capital allocations are negatively associated with division 
managers’ total pay, after controlling for standard economic determinants of total 
pay. We interpret this finding as evidence of the CEO using the capital budget as a 
substitute  for  increased  take-home  pay  to  compensate  rent-seeking  divisional 
managers, which is consistent with our expectations. Fourth, we show that, at the 
firm  level,  the  incentives  provided  by  ESOPs  are  positively  associated  with  the 
quality of internal capital allocation, also consistent with our expectations. Finally, 
we re-run our analyses using numerous alternative specifications and also test the 
robustness of our results to sample selection problems and endogeneity concerns. 
We find that our results are robust to all these tests. 
Our  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  in  several  ways.  First,  we  provide 
evidence that inefficiencies in internal capital markets are, at least in part, driven by 
a  two-layer  agency  problem  (cf.  Scharfstein  &  Stein  2000).  We  find  that,  on 
average, CEOs distort internal capital allocation by using the capital budget as a 
substitute for increased take-home pay to adjust the overall compensation package 
of rent-seeking divisional managers. Second, we show that the design of incentive 
systems  can  mitigate  the  problem  of  misallocation.  Although  Wulf  (2002)  finds 
results consistent with firms designing firm-level incentives in an attempt to reduce 
influence  activities,  she  acknowledges  that  her  results  are  also  consistent  with 
arguments  unrelated  to  issues  of  rent-seeking  in  internal  capital  markets.  We 
contribute to the literature by empirically making an explicit link between the use of 
employee stock option incentives and the quality of internal capital allocations and 
show that ESOPs are used to align the interests of employees with those of the firm. 
Third, while the informativeness principle has been used to predict that firm-level 
incentives for divisional managers are less useful when there are few operational 
interdependencies between divisions (e.g., Bushman et al. 1995), we show that these 
incentives can actually be beneficial in these settings once investment decisions and 
issues of rent-seeking are taken into account. Finally, we add to the literature on 
whether stock options for employees other than the top executives have incentive 
effects. While Oyer and Schaeffer (2005) reject the incentive purpose of employee 
stock options in favor of the retention purpose, Gerakos et al. (2007) find that broad-
based equity plans are used by firms whose compensation objective is incentives. 
Whatever the intended purpose, our model predicts that “on the job behavior” will 
be affected by these plans, either directly (incentives) or indirectly (retention), and 
consistent  with  this  we  provide  empirical  evidence  that  employee  stock  options 
increase the quality of an internal capital market. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop our theory and 
derive hypotheses. In section 2.3, we describe our research method, and in section 
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2.4, we describe the results of our empirical models. We discuss the results and 
conclude this study in section 2.5. 
 
 
2.2  Model and hypotheses 
 
2.2.1  Internal capital markets 
Building on Grossman and Hart (1986), Stein (1997) shows that internal capital 
markets can be superior to external capital markets and centralized financing (bank 
lending).  In  contrast  to  a  bank  or  an  external  shareholder,  the  CEO  has  all  the 
control rights and thus the rights to decide on how to allocate capital internally. 
These control rights, which are absent in external (centralized) financing, provide 
the CEO with greater incentives to monitor and engage in a process called “winner-
picking”. That is, the CEO can actively shift capital from one division to another 
based on the expected returns of the divisions. The internal capital market can be 
more efficient than the external capital market because of this reallocative power of 
the CEO. 
Despite the benefits of internal capital markets versus external capital markets, 
there is a huge debate in both the academic and more practice-oriented literature 
about the value of diversified firms (e.g., Villalonga 2004; Lins & Servaes 1999; 
Rajan et al. 2000; Stowe & Xing 2006). Several studies have investigated the use 
and effects of diversification of a firm and in particular the question whether internal 
capital markets are efficient. Studies by, for example, Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger 
and Ofek (1995), and Servaes (1996) find that diversified firms trade at a discount 
relative  to  non-diversified  firms.  Although  recent  studies  claim  that  this 
diversification discount is the result of measurement error and biased samples (e.g., 
Whited 2001; Villalonga 2004), a more fundamental question is why internal capital 
markets would be inefficient. 
The main reason why an internal capital market might be inefficient is related 
to the same reason why it might be efficient, i.e., the reallocative power of the CEO. 
The CEO of a diversified firm might do a poor job in allocating the funds that are 
generated  by  some  divisions.  Scharfstein  and  Stein  (2000)  argue  that  such 
inefficiencies  are  driven  by  a  two-layer  agency  problem  where  the  CEO  might 
misuse the capital budget to compensate a division manager for his rent-seeking 
activities. To explain the argument more fully, we repeat the main features of their 
model and use it to develop a number of cross-sectional empirical implications. 
 
2.2.2  The Scharfstein and Stein (2000) model 
The model is a two-period model with periods labeled 1 and 2. At time 1, the CEO 
of a two-division firm hires two new managers, each of whom manages the assets in 
place of one division. The division manager can spend time on productive effort ei 
Thesis_JF Andre_v06.pdfChapter 2 
  16 
and/or  on  non-productive,  rent-seeking  activities  ri.  He  does,  however,  need  to 
allocate his time, given that he has a time constraint of h = ei + ri. The productive 
effort  translates  into  output  of  the  division  at  time  1  of  θi f(h-ri),  where  θi  is  a 
measure of productivity and  f(⋅)  is an increasing concave function. The division 
manager receives private benefits from the output of his own division of γθi f(h-ri) 
and the CEO receives private benefits of φθi f(h-ri) from each division. 
Any rent-seeking activities by the division manager are personally costly at 
time  1,  as  they  direct  time  away  from  productive  effort  and  reduce  output. 
Specifically, the costs amount to γθi [f(h) – f(h-ri)]. The benefit of the rent-seeking 
activities is, however, an increase in his outside options at time 2 equal to g(ri), 
where g(⋅) is an increasing concave function with g(0) = 0. Note that, for simplicity, 
the outside options for the division managers at time 1 are normalized at zero. 
At time 2, all assets are depreciated and production depends solely on newly 
invested  capital.  The  CEO  decides  on  the  allocation  of  a  fixed  capital  budget 
(  =    +   ) and any wages (wi) to be paid by her to the division manager. If the 
division manager remains on the job, then output at time 2 equals θi f(Ii), where k(⋅) 
is an increasing concave function with k´(0) = ∞. If the division manager is replaced, 
then the CEO incurs replacement costs of X and output will drop to θi k(Ii) – X.
5 The 
private benefits at time 2 for the division manager remain γ times the output of his 
own division and that of the CEO φ times the output of each division. It is assumed 
that the CEO has all the bargaining power at time 2 and that she is always better off 
retaining the division manager (formally, φX > g(ri)). 
Before examining the impact of rent-seeking on the allocation of capital, it is 
important  to  first  examine  what  happens  in  a  first-best  scenario.  The  first-best 
allocation of capital (   =   
∗), labeled “efficient allocation”, is achieved when the 
marginal return to investment is equal across every investment project, which in this 
case implies 
  !
! ! ! ""
!
#$=!
% ! ! ""
%
#$.  (2.1) 
Based  on  this  characterization  of  efficient  capital  allocation  and  the  set-up 
described above, we can now analyze when rent-seeking occurs and what impact it 
has on the efficiency of capital allocation. In particular, the above implies that a 
division manager rent-seeks if 
  g(r i)>!"i[k(Ii
*)+ f(h)! f(h!r i)].  (2.2) 
That is, any benefits from a rise in outside options due to rent-seeking must be 
higher than the private benefits received from an efficient allocation of capital plus 
                                                 
5 The replacement costs are caused by, for example, valuable acquired firm-specific capital leaving the 
firm. 
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the cost of rent-seeking.
6 The rent-seeking condition thus shows that, even though 
all division managers have the opportunity to rent-seek, not all of them will do so 
because some are so productive that they incur too much cost from directing time 
away  from  productive  effort  and/or  derive  sufficient  utility  from  the  efficient 
allocation of capital at time 2. 
If  the  rent-seeking  condition  holds,  then  the  equilibrium  amount  of  rent-
seeking is given by 
  ! g (r i
*)=!"i ! f (h"r i
*) .  (2.3) 
If the rent-seeking condition does not hold, then the division manager does not 





* if g(r i
*)>!"i[k(Ii






  (2.4) 
To determine the optimal wage and allocation of capital, we maximize the 





s.t. w1+#"1k(I1)" g(r 1)





We solve this model for the setting that best reflects the essence of the story, 
which is a setting where the manager of division 1 always rent-seeks, while the 
manager of division 2 never rent-seeks even though he knows that the manager of 
division 1 will.











where  λ1  is  the  Lagrange  multiplier  for  the  retention  constraint  of  division  
manager 1.
8 Equation (2.9) shows that there will always be some distortion in the 
                                                 
6 Alternatively, any net benefits of rent-seeking should be higher than the private benefits associated with 
the efficient allocation of capital, i.e.,  
  g(r i)!!"i[f(h)! f(h!r i)]>!" k(Ii
*) . 
7 Technically, we assume 
g(r 1
*)>!"1[k(I1








8 The Lagrange multiplier for the retention constraint of division manager 2, λ2, equals 0, since it is never 
binding. 
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optimal  allocation  of  capital.  Given  that  λ1θ1k´(I1)  is  strictly  positive,  
     ´    −    ´(  −   )  must be strictly negative, which implies that    >   
∗.
9 
Even  though  there  will  always  be  some  misallocation,  the  extent  of 
misallocation depends on how much the CEO prefers to use the fixed capital budget 
as opposed to wages to compensate the rent-seeking division manager. Specifically, 
it depends on whether the marginal cost of distortion to the CEO is outweighed by 
the marginal reduction in wage made possible by an increase in I1, i.e., 
  !["2 ! k (I "I1)""1 ! k (I1)]<#"1 ! k (I1)  (2.10) 
Assume  that  there  is  a  capital  allocation    =   
  that  solves  the  retention 
constraint of division manager 1 with w1 = 0, i.e., 
  !"1k(I1
A)= g(r 1
*)  (2.11) 
If equation (2.10) holds for    =   
 , then the optimal wages and allocation of 
capital are:   
  =   
  = 0;   
  >   
∗;   
  <   
∗.
10 If equation (2.10) does not hold for 
   =   
 , then a reduction in I1 is necessary to make it hold (due to concavity of f(⋅)), 
which  leads  to    =   
  with   
  >   
 .  However,  with    =   
  <   
  the  retention 
constraint (equation (2.11)) is violated and the CEO must thus use the wage to solve 
the  constraint.
11 In  this  case,  the  optimal  wages  and  allocation  of  capital  are: 
  
  > 0; ﾠ  
  = 0; ﾠ  
  >   
∗; ﾠ  
  <   
∗. 
 
2.2.3  Empirical implications 
The  above  analysis  indicates  two  mutually  exclusive  solutions  to  the  CEO’s 
problem. Assuming that these two solutions are both observed in a cross-section, as 
well  as  variation  in  the  extent  of  the  problem  per  se,  then  the  model  has  the 
following cross-sectional empirical implications, where we use subscript i for the 
division and j for the firm: 
 
i.  Cov(wij,Iij)< 0  for  Iij > Iij
* . 
 












                                                 
9 Remember that the efficient allocation of capital requires that    ´   
∗ =    ´(  −   
∗) in which case 
  
   
would be strictly positive. 
10 In this case, λ1 < 1 satisfies equation (2.9), which implies w1 = 0. 
11 This implies that λ1 = 1. 
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> 0 , where!ˆ rj =| ˆ r ij " ˆ r l#i,j |. 
 
The first two implications lead to the following two hypotheses, respectively: 
 
H1:  Ceteris paribus, the extent of overallocation at the divisional level 
(    −    
∗ > 0) is  negatively  associated  with  division  manager’s 
total pay. 
H2:  Ceteris  paribus,  the  extent  of  underallocation  at  the  divisional 
level (    −    
∗ < 0) is not associated with division manager’s total 
pay. 
 
We  interpret  the  third  and  fourth  implication  as  a  problem  of  divergent 
preferences and that incentive mechanisms can potentially mitigate this problem. In 
particular, equity incentives for division managers can help to reduce inefficiencies 
of an internal capital market as they focus the attention also on the other division 
and not only ones own. Consequently, power struggles and lobbying for capital are 
reduced (Δ    decreases), since the division managers get penalized if they engage in 
such  activities  (cf.  Milgrom  and  Roberts  (1992)).  Furthermore,  once  equity 
incentives have retention effects for division managers, as proposed by Oyer (2004), 
it becomes less likely that the retention constraint is binding and thus Δ    decreases. 
In addition, by providing equity incentives to the CEO (φj increases), her marginal 
cost of distorting capital allocation increases and she is thus less likely to use the 
capital  budget  to  respond  to  influence  activities.  As  a  result,  equity  incentives 
throughout the firm help to increase internal capital market efficiency by improving 
the quality of the internal allocations. This argument is summarized in the following 
hypothesis. 
 
H3:  Firm-wide  equity  incentives  are  positively  associated  with  the 
quality of a firm’s internal capital allocations (-1⋅σj). 
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2.3  Sample, data, and econometric design 
 
2.3.1  Sample and data 
The sample of firms for this study is gathered via the COMPUSTAT segment filings 
from the years 1998 until 2004. We start our sample period in fiscal year 1998 
because this is the year in which SFAS 131 became effective. SFAS 131 basically 
requires firms to disclose disaggregated information in a way consistent with their 
internal organization. As such, outsiders can make assessments in a way consistent 
with insiders’ assessments, which allows us to make use of segment disclosures to 
infer the inner workings of the firm. 
We use a sampling procedure similar to Berger and Ofek (1995) and Billett 
and Mauer (2003). Sampled firms are required to have at least two segments as well 
as two years of subsequent years of data. We exclude firms with segments in the 
financial  sector.  Further,  sampled  firms  should  have  at  least  $20  million  in 
consolidated firm sales, and the sum of segment sales (assets) should be within one 
(25)  percent  of  consolidated  firm  sales  (assets).  This  data  collection  procedure 
results in an initial sample of 297 firms with 1,190 firm-year and 2,474 division-
year observations over a period of seven years from 1998 until 2004. 
We augment this dataset with manually collected data on company-wide stock 
option compensation plans using 10-k forms filed with the SEC. More specifically, 
we record details on the number of options outstanding per sample year and the 
change in outstanding options due to grants, exercises, and forfeitures. Further, we 
collect the average option price as disclosed in the 10-k forms. In the firm-level 
models, various missing data reduce the sample to 291 firms with 801 firm-year 
observations. 
To  investigate  the  substitution  effect  between  division  manager  pay  and 
division capital allocation, we match the segment data with the EXECUCOMP files, 
which provide details on the compensation of the firms’ highest paid executives. 
Besides CEO, CFO and other corporate-level functions, the job title descriptions at 
times reveal these executives to be heading one of the firm’s divisions. Based on 
these job title descriptions and the firm’s division names, we are able to manually 
trace  691  division-years  (370  division  managers)  to  individual  division  manager 
compensation data in EXECUCOMP. 
 
2.3.2  Econometric design 
The design of our econometric analysis is composed of four steps, which we explain 
below. First, we discuss the benchmark model that we use to develop our proxy for 
excess capital allocation at the divisional level (   vs.   
∗) and the quality of internal 
capital  allocation  at  the  firm  level  (-1⋅σj).  Subsequently,  we  describe  a  model 
validating our proxy for the quality of internal capital allocation. We then describe 
the model used to test hypotheses 1 and 2, which links a division manager’s total 
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pay to excess capital allocation. Finally, we present our model that tests hypothesis 
3, which links equity incentives to the quality of internal capital allocation. 
 
Model 1: Benchmark model 
We  first  estimate  a  benchmark  model  to  evaluate  the  transactions  taking  place 
within  the  internal  capital  markets  of  our  sampled  firms.  Using  insights  from 
standard investment regressions based on q-theory, we specify a model that explains 
a division’s share of a fixed capital budget using variables that reflect the division’s 































CAPXijt is the capital expenditure of segment i in firm j at time t, as reported in 
COMPUSTAT,  and  n  the  number  of  segments  in  firm  j.  NRDIVjt  signifies  the 
number of segments in firm j. As the number of segments increase, the allocation 
share of each individual segment will, all else equal, decrease by construction and 
we control for this effect. To adjust for the influence of differences in segment size, 
we include the relative size of the division (RELSIZEij,t-1), with DIVASSETSij being 
total identifiable segment assets. We adjust segment return on assets (ROA) for the 
respective (two-digit) industry ROA (AROAij,t-1). A segment with an ROA in excess 
of its concomitant industry level is expected to be allocated more internal funds and 
thus to invest more relative to other segments. The inverse holds for the impact of 
industry-adjusted ROA of the firm j’s all other segments, i.e., siblings: the higher 
the sibling ROA, the less investment should take place in segment i. To incorporate 
this  effect,  we  include  the  average  industry-adjusted  sibling  ROA 
(SIBLINGAROAkj,t-1). 
HIGH_GOij, t-1 is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the segment has the 
highest  growth  opportunities  (lowest  book-to-market  ratio)  of  all  of  a  firm’s 
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segments and equal to 0 otherwise. We expect that segments with the highest growth 
opportunities  receive  a  larger  share  of  the  capital  budget  to  exploit  these 
opportunities.  To  control  for  potential  size  effects  in  this  relationship,  we  also 
include the interaction between HIGH_GOij, t-1 and RELSIZEij,t-1. Since segments are 
not publicly traded, we impute the book-to-market ratio for each segment using a 
procedure similar to Billett and Mauer (2003). In particular, we regress the book-to-
market ratio on firm assets, return on assets, and sales-to-assets ratio for a sample of 
single-segment firms. We separately estimate this regression for every two-digit SIC 
code for every year. We then fit the book-to-market ratio of each segment in each 
year  using  that  year’s  estimated  parameters  for  the  industry  of  interest  and  the 
segment’s assets, return on assets, and sales-to-assets ratio. 
For all variables other than NRDIV, we consider values from the preceding 
period, as allocation decisions are assumed to take place at the beginning of each 
year on the grounds of preceding end-of-period information. The benchmark model 
furthermore controls for inter-temporal correlation by including the lagged segment 
share of the firm’s total capital expenditures. The model is specified to control for 
year  and  industry  fixed  effects  and  corrects  for  potential  within-firm  error  term 
correlation. 
We use the benchmark model to develop a number of proxies associated with 
the misallocation of capital that are in line with the theoretical model. First, we use 
the division-year specific residual εijt as a proxy for      −     
∗ , i.e., excess capital 
allocation at the divisional level in a given year (EXCESSCAPXijt). Second, to test 
hypotheses 1 and 2, we separate the overallocation of capital (     >     
∗ ) from the 
underallocation  of  capital  (     <     
∗ )  by  creating  two  variables  based  on 
EXCESSCAPXijt.  OVERALLOCATIONijt  (UNDERALLOCATIONijt)  equals 
EXCESSCAPXijt (-1*EXCESSCAPXijt) if EXCESSCAPXijt is positive (negative) and 
zero  otherwise.  Finally,  we  use  the  firm-year  specific  standard  deviation  of  the 
residual of the benchmark model STDjt(εijt), as a proxy for σjt, i.e., the (lack of) 
quality of a firm’s internal capital allocation. We multiply this variable with -1 to 
make sure that higher values are associated with higher quality (ICA_QUALITYjt). 
 
Model 2: Validation 
To validate the proxy for the quality of internal capital allocation identified in the 
benchmark model (ICA_QUALITYjt), we examine the extent to which this proxy is 
related to a proxy for the efficiency of the internal capital market after the fact. We 
define the following firm-level model: 
 
ICM _EFFjt =!0 +!1ICA_QUALITYjt +!2NRDIVjt +!3DIVERSIFICATION jt
+!4DIVERSBTM jt +!5FIRMBTM jt +!6FIRMSIZEjt
+!7GO_EMPLjt +YearControls+IndustryControls+"jt,
  (M2) 
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where  ICM_EFFjt  is  the  Billett  and  Mauer  (2003)  end-of-the  year  efficiency 
measure based on industry-adjusted ROA. We include several additional variables 
assumed to influence internal capital market efficiency: the number of segments 
NRDIVjt;  the  degree  of  diversification,  using  the  entropy  measure  described  in 
Bushman,  Indjejikian  and  Smith  (1995)  (DIVERSIFICATIONjt);  the  diversity  in 
growth opportunities among segments (DIVERSBTMjt), measured as the firm-year 
specific  standard  deviation  of  the  imputed  book-to-market  ratios  of  a  firm’s 
segments (cf. Rajan et al. 2000); the firm’s book-to-market ratio (FIRMBTMjt); firm 
size, measured as the log of the firm’s total assets (FIRMSIZEjt); the importance of 
human  capital  (GO_EMPLjt),  measured  as  the  firm’s  growth  opportunities  per 
employee, i.e. the difference between the firm’s market and book value of equity, 
divided by the number of employees (cf. Core and Guay 2001); and dichotomous 
variables  for  both  year  as  well  as  type  of  industry.  The  model  controls  for 
potentially clustered errors at firm level. 
 
Model 3: Hypotheses 1 and 2 
We first specify a division-level model that investigates in how far excess capital 
allocations explain the overall level of the respective divisional manager’s total pay: 
 
LN _TOTALPAYijt =!0 +!1EXCESSCAPXijt +!2ROAijt +!3SIZEijt
+!4BTMijt +!5GO_EMPLjt +YearControls
+IndustryControls+"ijt,
  (M3a) 
 
where LN_TOTALPAYijt is the log of the individual segment manager’s total (take-
home) pay; this pay includes salary, bonus, the total value of both restricted stock, 
as well as stock options granted using Black-Scholes (1973) valuation, long-term 
incentive payouts, and all other compensation items such as pension contributions. 
To specifically test hypotheses 1 and 2, we then run the analysis after replacing 
EXCESSCAPXijt by OVERALLOCATIONijt and UNDERALLOCATIONijt, i.e., 
 




  (M3b) 
 
The  rent-seeking  argument  assumes  that  providing  a  rent-seeking  manager 
with additional capital implies a reduction in the capital allocated to a manager that 
has no incentive to rent-seek. As explained in section 2.2.2, this incentive arises 
when the pay-off of productive activities is relatively higher than of rent-seeking 
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activities.  The  CEO  can  therefore  reduce  the  allocation  to  this  manager  without 
having to compensate him for the loss in resources (underallocation). As a result, we 
expect that the substitution effect between capital and pay takes place with respect 
to the overallocation of capital, but not the underallocation of capital, i.e., α1a < 0 
and α1a = 0. 
Previous  compensation  research  shows  that  the  entity’s  performance,  size, 
growth opportunities, and importance of human capital have an influence on the 
total level of pay. We therefore incorporate variables representing segment size as 
measured by the segment’s ROA (ROAijt), the log of total segment assets SIZEijt, 
imputed  book-to-market  ratio  (BTMijt),  and  growth  opportunities  per  employee 
(GO_EMPLjt).  Further,  we  control  for  year  and  industry  effects  as  well  as 
potentially clustered errors at the firm level.  
 
Model 4: Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 states that equity incentives are positively associated with the quality 
of internal capital allocations. To test this hypothesis, we define the following firm-
level empirical model:  
 
ICA_QUALITYjt =!0 +!1ESOPINCjt +!2DIVERSIFICATION jt
+!3DIVERSBTM jt +!4FIRMSIZEjt +!5GO_EMPLjt
+YearControls+IndustryControls+µjt,
  (M4) 
 
where ESOPINCjt measures all equity incentives (excluding the ones provided to the 
CEO) by computing the sensitivity of the firm-wide option plans to a one percent 
change in stock price, as in Core and Guay (2001). We also replace ESOPINCjt with 
ESOPINC_ALLjt,  which  additionally  contains  CEO  stock  option  incentives,  and 
report results separately. All other variables are defined above. We control for year 




2.4  Results 
 
2.4.1  Descriptive statistics 
Tables  2.1-2.3  present  selected  summary  statistics  for  divisional  and  firm  level 
variables. To reduce the effect of outliers, we winsorize the continuous variables at 
the 1% and 99% level. Table 2.1 provides statistics for the entire sample of division-
year  observations  (n=2,474).  The  sample  divisions’  size  in  assets  (DIVASSETS) 
ranges from USD 6 million to 10.9 billion with a mean (median) of USD 1.1 billion 
(USD 407 million). The average division has a return on assets (ROA) and return on 
assets above industry average (AROA) of 15.7% and 6.8%, respectively. 
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Table  2.2  displays  division  level  statistics  for  the  subset  of  division-year 
observations  (n=691)  that  could  be  matched  to  individual  compensation  data. 
Average  division  CEO  total  pay  amounts  to  USD  1.2  million  annually 
(TOTALPAY), ranging from USD 218k to USD 6.3 million. A cursory inspection of 
the key descriptive statistics in table 2.1 and 2.2 reveals that the divisions in the 
subset are, on average, slightly larger and more profitable in terms of assets and 
return on assets, respectively, and receive a larger share of the capital budget. In a 
robustness check, we correct for a potential sample selection bias using a Heckman 
procedure (see section “2.4.2.4 Robustness checks and additional tests” for details). 
The  firm-level  variables,  presented  in  table  2.3,  show  that  the  number  of 
divisions within the sampled firms ranges from 2 to 6 (NRDIV), with 3 divisions for 
the  median  firm.  The  measure  for  the  ex-post  efficiency  of  the  internal  capital 
market  (ICM_EFF)  shows  that  the  average  firm  exhibits  inefficiency,  while  the 
median firm does not exhibit inefficiency, as in the original study by Billet and 
Mauer (2003).  The  sample  firms’  size  in  assets  (ASSETS)  ranges  from  USD  13 
million to 48.3 billion with a mean (median) of USD 3.6 billion (USD 1.4 billion). 
Further, the mean change in the logarithm of the value of options held by non-
executives  excluding  (including)  the  CEO  for  a  1%  change  in  stock  prices 
Table 2.1 
Descriptive statistics – Division-year observations 
 
  Mean  Median  Std.dev.  Min  Max 
CAPXSHARE  0.343  0.262  0.287  0  1 
DIVASSETS ($ millions)  1,131  407  1,898  6  10,920 
SIZE  6.030  6.009  1.514  1.729  9.298 
ROA  0.157  0.154  0.162  -0.568  0.744 
AROA  0.068  0.060  0.163  -0.625  0.651 
SIBLINGAROA  0.071  0.063  0.115  -0.625  0.651 
BTM  0.875  0.743  0.549  0.033  2.956 
This table reports descriptive statistics on all divisions (n=2,474) across all sampled firms. Divisions are 
business segments as disclosed according to SFAS No. 131. CAPXSHARE is the division’s share of 
capital expenditures in total firm capital expenditures DIVASSETS are total identifiable segment assets. 
SIZE  is  the  natural  logarithm  of DIVASSETS.  ROA  is  the  segment’s  return  on  assets,  calculated  as 
segment net income divided by segment total assets. AROA is the segment’s return on assets less the 
segment’s respective (two-digit) industry return on assets. SIBLINGAROA is the average AROA of all 
other segments in the same firm. BTM is the segment’s book-to-market ratio, with imputed market 
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(ESOPINC and ESOPINC_ALL) is 6.152 (6.388), i.e., an average change of USD 
470k (USD 595k). 
We  present  Pearson  correlations  among  the  independent  variables  of  the 
division-level  models  in  table  2.4  and  2.5,  and  the  correlations  among  the 
independent variables of the firm-level models in table 2.6. From a multicollinearity 
perspective, only the correlations between the equity incentive variables (ESOPINC 
and  ESOPINC_ALL)  and  FIRMSIZE  are  relatively  high.  Specification  tests, 
however, show that the Variance Inflation Factors are mostly at or below 2.00 with a 
maximum of 4.97, which indicates that none of our empirical models are troubled 
by multicollinearity problems.  
 
   
Table 2.2 
Descriptive statistics – Division-year observations with matched compensation data 
 
  Mean  Median  Std.dev.  Min  Max 
TOTALPAY ($ ‘000)  1,244  839  1,113  218  6,285 
LN_TOTALPAY  6.834  6.733  0.738  5.384  8.746 
CAPXSHARE  0.439  0.408  0.288  0  1 
DIVASSETS ($ millions)  1,354  573  2,155  6  10,920 
SIZE  6.363  6.351  1.317  1.729  9.298 
ROA  0.176  0.162  0.133  -0.568  0.744 
AROA  0.088  0.074  0.134  -0.625  0.651 
SIBLINGAROA  0.067  0.061  0.116  -0.522  0.651 
BTM  0.813  0.697  0.532  0.033  2.956 
This table reports descriptive statistics on the subset of divisions across all sampled firms that could be 
matched to individual compensation data of the responsible division manager. This matching procedure 
led to a sub-sample of n=691 of the entire division-year sample of n=2,474. Divisions are business 
segments as disclosed according to SFAS No. 131. TOTALPAY is the segment manager’s total pay, 
comprising salary, bonus, restricted stock and stock options grants at Black-Scholes (1973) value, long-
term incentive payouts, and any other compensation item, e.g. pension contributions. LN_TOTALPAY 
is the natural logarithm of TOTALPAY. DIVASSETS are total identifiable segment assets. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of DIVASSETS. ROA is the segment’s return on assets, calculated as segment net 
income divided by segment total assets. AROA is the segment’s return on assets less the segment’s 
respective  (two-digit)  industry  return  on  assets.  SIBLINGAROA  is  the  average  AROA  of  all  other 
segments in the same firm. BTM is the segment’s book-to-market ratio, with imputed market values 
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Table 2.3 
Descriptive statistics – Firm-year observations 
 
  Mean  Median  Std.dev.  Min  Max 
ICM_EFF  -0.004  0.000  0.016  -0.112  0.002 
ICA_QUALITY  -0.117  -0.090  0.095  -0.497  -0.005 
ESOPINC  6.152  6.194  1.938  0.000  9.888 
ESOPINC_ALL  6.388  6.386  1.759  0.693  9.939 
NRDIV  2.886  3.000  1.003  2.000  6.000 
DIVERSIFICATION  0.384  0.341  0.377  0.000  1.340 
DIVERSBTM  0.283  0.233  0.204  0.009  0.936 
FIRMBTM  0.594  0.511  0.408  -0.115  2.338 
ASSETS ($ millions)  3,585  1,401  5,646  13  48,263 
FIRMSIZE  7.433  7.245  1.161  5.439  10.305 
GO_EMPL  157  83  238  -106  1,293 
This table reports descriptive statistics on the firm-level observations (n=801). ICM_EFF is the ex-post 
internal  capital  market  efficiency  measure  developed  by  Billett  and  Mauer  (2003.)  ICA_QUALITY 
proxies the quality of internal capital allocations; it is measured as the standard deviation of the error 
terms  of  a  benchmark  model  that  distinguishes  abnormal  capital  allocations  from  those  based  on 
economic determinants such as growth opportunities. ESOPINC are the incentives provides by employee 
stock option plans to all employees but the CEO as in Core and Guay (2001), i.e., the sensitivity of firm-
wide option plans to a one percent change in stock price. ESOPINC_ALL is measured as ESOPINC and 
captures the incentives provided to all employees including the CEO. NRDIV is the number of divisions 
in the firm. DIVERSIFICATION is the entropy measure as in Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995), 
capturing the firm’s degree of diversification. DIVERSBTM is the diversity in growth opportunities of 
the firm’s segments, based on the standard deviation of the segments’ imputed book-to-market ratios. 
FIRMBTM  is  the  firm’s  book-to-market ratio.  ASSETS are the firm’s total assets. FIRMSIZE  is  the 
natural logarithm of ASSETS. GO_EMPL captures the importance of human capital and is measured as 
the difference between the firm’s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees. 
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2.4.2  Econometric analysis 
2.4.2.1 Benchmark model and validation 
Table 2.7 presents the results of our benchmark model. The explanatory power of 
this benchmark model is very high (Adjusted R-square = 82.54%), which indicates 
that the allocation of internal capital is strongly associated with the variables of our 
model.  In  particular,  internal  capital  allocation  (CAPXSHAREt)  is  significantly 
positively  associated  with  lagged  relative  segment  size  (RELSIZEt-1),  lagged 
segment  industry-adjusted  return  on  assets  (AROAt-1),  lagged  highest  growth 
opportunity  interacted  with  lagged  relative  size  (HIGH_GOt-1*RELSIZEt-1),  and 
lagged  internal  capital  allocation  (CAPXSHAREt-1).  Internal  capital  allocation  is 
significantly  negatively  associated  with  the  number  of  divisions  (NRDIVt)  and 
lagged  sibling  industry-adjusted  return  on  assets  (SIBLINGAROAt-1).  All  these 
findings are in line with our expectations. Interestingly, the findings for AROA and 
SIBLINGAROA  indicate  that  there  is  an  almost  perfect  relative  performance 
evaluation, in the sense that the impact of own division performance and sibling 
performance  on  capital  allocation  is  symmetric  (0.070,  p<0.01;  -0.075,  p<0.01, 
respectively). 
 
   
Table 2.4 
Pearson correlation statistics among independent variables – Division-year 
observations 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
1:  NRDIVt  1         
2:  RELSIZEt-1  -0.401***  1       
3:  AROAt-1  -0.046**  0.028  1     
4:  SIBLINGAROAt-1  -0.011  0.004  0.139***  1   
5:  HIGH_GOt-1  -0.230***  0.195***  0.007  -0.013  1 
This  table  reports  Pearson  correlation  statistics  across  all  sampled  divisions  and  years  (n=2,474). 
Divisions are business segments as disclosed according to SFAS No. 131. NRDIV is the number of 
divisions in the firm. RELSIZE is the division’s total identifiable assets divided by total firm assets. 
AROA is the segment’s return on assets less the segment’s respective (two-digit) industry return on 
assets. SIBLINGAROA is the average AROA of all other segments in the same firm. HIGH_GO is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for the division with the lowest imputed book-to-market ratio (highest 
growth opportunities) within the firm, and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. 
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Before  proceeding,  we  first  test  whether  the  assumption  of  the  benchmark 
model  that  capital  allocation  is  a  linear  function  of  the  explanatory  variables  is 
empirically valid. For this purpose, we use the regression specification error test 
(RESET) proposed by Ramsey (1969). The results of this test, whether based on the 
F-test or LM-test (see Wooldridge 2002), cannot reject the null-hypothesis that the 
benchmark  model  is  correctly  specified.  As  a  result,  there  is  no  evidence  of 
functional form misspecification.  
We  use  the  firm-year  specific  standard  deviation  of  the  residual  of  the 
benchmark model as a proxy for the quality of a firm’s internal capital allocation 
and multiply this measure, as indicated earlier, by -1 to ensure that higher values are 
associated with higher quality. Table 2.8 presents the results of our validation test 
for  this  measure.  The  coefficient  for  ICA_QUALITY  is  positive  and  significant 
(p<0.10), which provides evidence that the quality of internal capital allocation is 
positively associated with the efficiency of a firm’s internal capital market. Given 
that  the  distribution  of  ICM_EFF  shows  clustering  of  negative  and  nonnegative 
values, we also replace this continuous measure of internal capital market efficiency 
Table 2.7 
Benchmark model of internal capital allocation 
 
     




sign    Marginal effect  Prob.  
           
NRDIVt  -    -0.004  0.003 *** 
RELSIZEt-1  +    0.300  0.000 *** 
AROAt-1  +    0.070  0.000 *** 
SIBLINGAROAt-1  -    -0.075  0.004 *** 
HIGH_GOt-1  ?    -0.005  0.460  
HIGH_GOt-1*RELSIZEt-1  +    0.026  0.078 * 
CAPXSHAREt-1  +    0.654  0.000 *** 
           
Adjusted R-square      0.825     
Segment-year observations      2,474     
           
This  table  reports  the  regression  results  from  estimating  the  benchmark  model  of  internal  capital 
allocation  using  n=2,474  division-year  observations.  Divisions  are  business  segments  as  disclosed 
according  to  SFAS  No.  131.  Intercept,  year  controls,  and  industry  controls  are  included  but  not 
separately reported. The dependent variable is the division’s share of capital expenditures in total firm 
capital expenditures, CAPXSHARE. Several determinants are specified to explain this share. NRDIV is 
the number of divisions in the firm. RELSIZE is the division’s total identifiable assets divided by total 
firm assets. AROA is the segment’s return on assets less the segment’s respective (two-digit) industry 
return on assets. SIBLINGAROA is the average AROA of all other segments in the same firm. HIGH_GO 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the division with the lowest imputed book-to-market ratio (highest 
growth  opportunities)  within  the  firm,  and  0  otherwise.  P-values  in  parentheses  are  based  on 
heteroskedasticity-robust,  firm-clustered  standard  errors  (one-tailed  for  predictions,  two-tailed 
otherwise). ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.8 
Validation of proxy of quality of internal capital allocation         
         
  Ex-post Internal Capital Market Efficiency 
      (1) OLS model 
(ICM_EFFt) 




sign   
Marginal 
effect  Prob.     
Marginal 
effect  Prob.  
                  
ICA_QUALITYt  +    0.013  0.090 *    1.484  0.010 *** 
NRDIVt  ?    -0.002  0.013 ***    -0.498  0.000 *** 
DIVERSIFICATIONt  ?    0.003  0.058 *    0.375  0.048 ** 
DIVERSBTMt  -    -0.009  0.025 **    -0.772  0.010 *** 
FIRMBTMt  ?    0.000  0.997     -0.418  0.007 *** 
FIRMSIZEt  ?    0.002  0.042 **    0.145  0.029 ** 
GO_EMPLt  -    -0.007  0.114     0.019  0.476  
                   
Adjusted R-square      0.076        0.148     
Segment-year 
observations      801        801     
                   
This table reports the results from the estimation of the model used to validate the measure of internal 
capital allocation quality. It links internal capital allocation quality with the ex-post internal capital 
market  efficiency  measure  developed  by  Billett  and  Mauer  (2003),  ICM_EFF,  using  ordinary  least 
squares. For a Probit version of the model, ICM_EFF is recoded into the binary variable ICM_IND, with 
1 for nonnegative values of ICM_EFF and 0 otherwise. Intercept, year controls, and industry controls 
are  included,  but  not  separately  reported.  Internal  capital  allocation  quality  is  captured  by 
ICA_QUALITY; it is measured as the standard deviation of the error terms of a benchmark model that 
distinguishes abnormal capital allocations from those based on economic determinants such as growth 
opportunities. NRDIV is the number of divisions in the firm. DIVERSIFICATION is the entropy measure 
as  in  Bushman,  Indjejikian,  and  Smith  (1995),  capturing  the  firm’s  degree  of  diversification. 
DIVERSBTM is the diversity in growth opportunities of the firm’s segments, based on the standard 
deviation of the segments’ imputed book-to-market ratios. FIRMBTM is the firm’s book-to-market ratio. 
FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. GO_EMPL captures the importance of 
human capital and is measured as the difference between the firm’s market and book value of equity, 
divided by the number of employees (coefficient multiplied by 1,000). P-values in parentheses are based 
on  heteroskedasticity-robust,  firm-clustered  standard  errors  (one-tailed  for  predictions,  two-tailed 
otherwise). ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
by an indicator variable. We construct ICM_IND, which equals 1 for nonnegative 
values of ICM_EFF (efficient), zero otherwise (inefficient), and run a probit model. 
The results of this analysis corroborate our findings for the continuous measure and 
show that the quality of internal capital allocation is positively associated with the 
probability that the internal capital market is efficient (p=0.01). In sum, both the 
OLS and probit results provide evidence of the validity of our benchmark model.  
Regarding the control variables, we find that the continuous measure of the 
efficiency of a firm’s internal capital market (ICM_EFF) is positively associated 
with  the  level  of  diversification  (DIVERSIFICATON)  and  the  size  of  the  firm 
(FIRMSIZE) and negatively associated with the number of divisions (NRDIV) and 
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the diversity in divisions’ growth opportunities (DIVERSBTM). Similar results are 
found for the probability of efficiency, with the exception that also firm growth 
opportunities are negatively associated with the probability of efficiency. 
 
 
2.4.2.2 Hypotheses 1 and 2 
Table 2.9 presents the results of our model that links excess capital allocation at the 
divisional  level  to  division  manager’s total pay. The coefficient for the variable 
Table 2.9 
Substitution between excess capital allocation and division manager total compensation 
         
 
Segment manager’s total compensation 
(LN_TOTALPAYt) 
      (1)    (2) 
Independent variables 
Predicted 
sign   
Marginal 
effect  Prob.     
Marginal 
effect  Prob.  
                   
EXCESSCAPXt  -    -0.409  0.002 ***        
OVERALLOCATIONt  -           -0.840  0.001 *** 
UNDERALLOCATIONt  ?           -0.088  0.787  
ROAt  +    0.622  0.004 ***    0.616  0.004 *** 
SIZEt  +    0.362  0.000 ***    0.360  0.000 *** 
BTMt  -    -0.107  0.057 *    -0.106  0.060 * 
GO_EMPLt  +    0.408  0.039 **    0.390  0.046 ** 
                   
Adjusted R-square      0.504        0.506     
Segment-year 
observations      691        691     
                   
This  table  provides  the  estimates  from  a  model  examining  the  substitution  effect  between  capital 
allocation and division manager total compensation. The model is applied to 691 observations of a full 
sample of n=2,474 division-years that could be matched to data on division manager compensation. 
Intercept, year controls, and industry controls are included but not separately reported. LN_TOTALPAY 
is the natural logarithm of the segment manager’s total pay, comprising salary, bonus, restricted stock 
and stock options grants at Black-Scholes (1973) value, long-term incentive payouts, and any other 
compensation item, e.g. pension contributions. EXCESSCAPX represents excess capital allocations, i.e. 
is the residual of a benchmark capital allocation model. EXCESSCAPX is used as a determinant in 
Model 1. In Model 2, EXCESSCAPX is replaced by OVERALLOCATION and UNDERALLOCATION, 
where  OVERALLOCATION  (UNDERALLOCATION)  equals  EXCESSCAPX  (-1*EXCESSCAPX)  if 
EXCESSCAPX  is  positive  (negative)  and  zero  otherwise.  ROA  is  the  segment’s  return  on  assets, 
calculated as segment net income divided by segment total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
identifiable segment assets. BTM is the segment’s book-to-market ratio, with imputed market values 
based  on  matching  segments  to  samples  of  single-segment  firms  with  corresponding  two-digit  SIC 
codes. GO_EMPL captures the importance of human capital and is measured as the difference between 
the firm’s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees (coefficient multiplied 
by 1,000). P-values in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust, firm-clustered standard errors 
(one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. 
 
Thesis_JF Andre_v06.pdfChapter 2 
  34 
EXCESSCAPX is negative and statistically significant (p<0.01), which implies that 
there is a negative relationship between the division manager’s total pay and the 
excess allocation of capital. This finding is consistent with the argument that the 
allocation  of  internal  capital  acts  as  a  substitute  for  increased  take-home pay in 
compensating rent-seeking divisional managers. To specifically test hypotheses 1 
and 2, we split excess capital allocation into overallocation (OVERALLOCATION) 
and underallocation (UNDERALLOCATION) of internal capital. The results of this 
analysis, also presented in table 2.9, reveal that overallocation is negative and highly 
significant (p<0.01), whereas underallocation is not significant (p=0.79). Given that 
the opportunity costs to rent-seek are too high for non-rent-seeking managers who 
receive less capital (underallocation), there is no need to compensate these managers 
Table 2.10 
Firm-wide equity incentives and the quality of internal capital allocation 
         
 
Internal capital allocation quality 
(ICA_QUALITYt) 
      (1)    (2) 
Independent variables 
Predicted 
sign   
Marginal 
effect  Prob.     
Marginal 
effect  Prob.  
                   
ESOPINCt  +    0.008  0.012 ***        
ESOPINC_ALLt  +           0.011  0.006 *** 
DIVERSIFICATIONt  ?    0.002  0.801     0.002  0.826  
DIVERSBTMt  -    0.054  0.003 ***    0.056  0.002 *** 
FIRMSIZEt  ?    0.012  0.007 ***    0.010  0.041 ** 
GO_EMPLt  -    -0.020  0.145     -0.024  0.104 * 
                   
                   
Adjusted R-square      0.107        0.110     
Segment-year 
observations      801        801     
                   
This table provides the estimates from a model examining the impact of stock option incentives on the 
quality of internal capital allocation using n=801 firm-level observations. Intercept, year controls, and 
industry controls are included but not separately reported. ICA_QUALITY proxies the quality of internal 
capital allocations; it is measured as the standard deviation of the error terms of a benchmark model that 
distinguishes abnormal capital allocations from those allocations based on economic determinants such 
as growth opportunities. Model 1 and Model 2 differ in the variable representing equity incentives, using 
ESOPINC and ESOPINC_ALL, respectively. ESOPINC are the incentives provides by employee stock 
option plans to all employees but the CEO as in Core and Guay (2001), i.e., the sensitivity of firm-wide 
option plans to a one percent change in stock price. ESOPINC_ALL is measured as ESOPINC and 
captures the incentives provided to all employees including the CEO. DIVERSIFICATION is the entropy 
measure as in Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995), capturing the firm’s degree of diversification. 
DIVERSBTM is the diversity in growth opportunities of the firm’s segments, based on the standard 
deviation of the segments’ imputed book-to-market ratios. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s  total  assets.  GO_EMPL  captures  the  importance  of  human  capital  and  is  measured  as  the 
difference between the firm’s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees 
(coefficient multiplied by 1,000). P-values in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust, firm-
clustered  standard  errors  (one-tailed  for  predictions,  two-tailed  otherwise).  ***,  **,  and  *  denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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for  their  loss  in  resources.  Both  the  negative  significant  coefficient  for 
overallocation  and  the  insignificant  coefficient  for  underallocation  are  consistent 
with this argument and provide support for hypotheses 1 and 2.  
Regarding  the  control  variables,  we  find  in  both  models  that  division 
manager’s total pay (LN_TOTALPAY) is positively associated with the division’s 
level of performance (ROA), the size of the division managed (SIZE), the division’s 
growth opportunities (inverse of BTM), and the importance of human capital to the 
firm (GO_EMPL). All these results are consistent with our expectations.  
 
2.4.2.3 Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis  3  states  that  equity  incentives  for  employees  increase  the  quality  of 
internal  capital  allocation.  To  test  this  hypothesis,  we  examine  whether  the 
incentives inherent in employee stock option plans are positively associated with our 
proxy  for  the  quality  of  internal  capital  allocation.  The  results  of  this  analysis, 
presented in table 2.10, show that stock option incentives for employees (ESOPINC) 
are significantly positively associated (p=0.012) with the quality of internal capital 
allocation  (ICA_QUALITY).  Including  CEO  options  in  employee  stock  option 
incentives (ESOPINC_ALL) yields similar results, showing a positive relationship 
with the quality of internal capital allocation (p<0.01). Hence, our results strongly 
support hypothesis 3. In particular, the more employees own options of their firm, 
the better the quality of internal capital allocation. Employee stock option plans thus 
help to align incentives of employees with firm objectives. 
Regarding the control variables, we find that the quality of internal capital 
allocation is positively associated with the size of the firm (FIRMSIZE). Contrary to 
expectations,  diversity  in  divisions’  growth  opportunities  (DIVERSBTM)  is 
positively associated with the quality of internal capital allocation. We examine this 
unexpected finding further in the next section. 
 
2.4.2.4 Robustness checks and additional tests 
Our benchmark model of the division’s share of firm capital expenditures includes 
the lag of the division’s share. Although this inclusion logically controls for a lagged 
effect,  it  also  runs  the  risk  of  including  division  manager  rents  in  the  predicted 
value, if these rents are persistent. That is, we potentially underestimate the extent of 
misallocation. To examine this potential effect, we run the benchmark model after 
dropping lagged capital allocation. The explanatory power of the model is still very 
high  (Adjusted  R-square  =  71.86%).  Subsequently,  we  use  the  residuals  of  this 
model and re-run all models and tests discussed above. The results of these analyses 
show that the inferences drawn in this paper are robust to the exclusion of the lag 
effect in the benchmark model. 
We further check the robustness of our results when we allow the coefficients 
of  our  benchmark  model  to  either  vary  by  year  or  vary  by  firm-level  industry 
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classification. In the latter case, data requirements reduce the total sample size of the 
benchmark model to 2,410 observations, while the number of observations available 
to test hypotheses 1 and 2 (3) reduces to 684 (775) observations. We also run our 
benchmark model allowing the intercept to be firm-specific using firm fixed effects. 
The results for using each of these three alternative specifications are quantitatively 
similar to those presented in the tables in this paper and thus do not change our 
inferences.  
Table 2.11 
Heckman sample selection correction for availability of EXECUCOMP data 
         
 
Segment manager’s total compensation 
(LN_TOTALPAYt) 
      (1)    (2) 
Independent variables 
Predicted 
sign   
Marginal 
effect  Prob.     
Marginal 
effect  Prob.  
                   
EXCESSCAPXt  -    -0.371  0.003 ***        
OVERALLOCATIONt  -           -0.661  0.007 *** 
UNDERALLOCATIONt  ?           0.039  0.898  
ROAt  +    0.771  0.001 ***    0.761  0.001 *** 
SIZEt  +    0.396  0.000 ***    0.393  0.000 *** 
BTMt  -    -0.127  0.028 **    -0.125  0.029 ** 
GO_EMPLt  +    0.400  0.038 **    0.388  0.043 ** 
    ?    0.380  0.002 ***    0.365  0.003 *** 
                   
Adjusted R-square      0.519        0.520     
Segment-year 
observations      691        691     
                   
This  table  provides  the  estimates  from  a  model  examining  the  substitution  effect  between  capital 
allocation  and  division  manager  total  compensation  after  controlling  for  potential  sample  selection 
problems using a Heckman procedure. In the first stage of this procedure, we include the number of 
divisions  in  the  firm  and  the  relative  size  of  the  division  as  instruments  and  these  variables  are 
individually and jointly significant. Intercept, year controls, and industry controls are included but not 
separately  reported.  LN_TOTALPAY  is  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  segment  manager’s  total  pay, 
comprising salary, bonus, restricted stock and stock options grants at Black-Scholes (1973) value, long-
term incentive payouts, and any other compensation item, e.g. pension contributions. EXCESSCAPX 
represents  excess  capital  allocations,  i.e.  is  the  residual  of  a  benchmark  capital  allocation  model. 
EXCESSCAPX  is  used  as  a  determinant  in  Model  1.  In  Model  2,  EXCESSCAPX  is  replaced  by 
OVERALLOCATION and UNDERALLOCATION, where OVERALLOCATION (UNDERALLOCATION) 
equals EXCESSCAPX (-1*EXCESSCAPX) if EXCESSCAPX is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. 
ROA is the segment’s return on assets, calculated as segment net income divided by segment total assets. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total identifiable segment assets. BTM is the segment’s book-to-market 
ratio, with imputed market values based on matching segments to samples of single-segment firms with 
corresponding  two-digit  SIC  codes.  GO_EMPL  captures  the  importance  of  human  capital  and  is 
measured as the difference between the firm’s market and book value of equity, divided by the number 
of employees (coefficient multiplied by 1,000).   ﾠis the Inverse Mills Ratio. P-values in parentheses are 
based on heteroskedasticity-robust, firm-clustered standard errors (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed 
otherwise). ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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As a final robustness check related to the benchmark model, we test whether 
the  predicted  divisional  shares  of  the  capital  budget  aggregated  at  the  firm-year 
level,  i.e.,                    
    ,  is  close  to  1.  The  abundant  use  of  relative 
measures in the benchmark model should ensure that this is very likely to be the 
case.  Indeed,  for  approximately  97%  of  the  firm-years  associated  with  the 
benchmark model                    
     ranges from 0.90 to 1.10 and for more 
than 90% it ranges from 0.95 to 1.05. Despite this observation, we re-run all of our 
analysis after dropping segment-level and firm-level observations associated with 
firm-years for which                    
     is outside the 0.90-1.10 or 0.95-1.05 
range. Our results are robust to dropping these observations. 
In linking excess capital allocation at the divisional level to the compensation 
of divisional level managers, we can only include those division managers who are 
among the five highest paid executives included in EXECUCOMP. This potentially 
introduces  a  sample  selection  problem.  To  control  for  this  problem,  we  run  a 
Heckman sample selection model. In particular, we model the probability that the 
divisional  manager  is  included  in  EXECUCOMP,  where  we  use  the  number  of 
divisions  within  a  firm  (lower  probability)  and  the  relative  size  of  the  division 
(higher  probability)  as  instruments  in  the  first  stage  to  avoid  multicollinearity 
problems in the second stage. 
Table 2.11 shows that, although the inverse Mills ratio is significant, the main 
findings presented in table 2.9 are unaffected. Two noteworthy differences are the 
following. First, the coefficients for EXCESSCAPX and OVERALLOCATION both 
become smaller in an absolute sense, but they remain highly significant and keep 
pointing  in  the  expected  direction.  Second,  the  coefficients  for  ROA  and  BTM 
become larger in an absolute sense and the coefficient for BTM also becomes more 
significant. Overall, our results related to hypotheses 1 and 2 are robust to potential 
sample selection problems. 
Another potential problem, more precisely an endogeneity concern, arises in 
examining the  impact  of  equity  incentives  on  the  quality  of  internal  allocations. 
Although this concern is valid, the most likely bias that would be introduced is a 
bias that works against finding the results presented in table 2.10 (see also Stein 
2003).  For  example,  reversed  causality  implies  a  negative  association  between 
equity incentives and the quality of internal capital allocation. This is a direction 
opposite  to  that  hypothesized  and  thus  most  likely  works  against  finding  our 
expected result. Despite this, we run a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) analysis using 
four  instruments  based  on  the  findings  from  Core  and  Guay  (2001),  i.e., 
idiosyncratic risk, R&D to sales, number of employees, and a firm’s book-to-market 
ratio.  The  first-stage  exclusion  restriction  test,  partial  R-square,  and  the 
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overidentifying restrictions test indicate that these instruments satisfy the relevance 
and exogeneity criterion.
13 
The results of the 2SLS analysis, presented in table 2.12, show that equity 
incentives have a significant positive effect on the quality of internal allocations, 
consistent with the inferences drawn based on table 2.10. Also consistent with the 
most likely endogeneity story, the 2SLS coefficient and Hausman test indicate that 
the bias introduced is significant and works against finding the result presented in 
table 2.10. More specifically, the 2SLS coefficient for ESOPINC is more than 3 
times larger than the OLS coefficient and is also more significant. As a result, the 
data continue to support hypothesis 3. 
In addition to changes in the coefficient for ESOPINC, there are also changes 
in the coefficients and significance levels for FIRMSIZE and GO_EMPL. In contrast 
to  the  positive  and  significant  coefficient  for  FIRMSIZE  in  the  OLS  model, 
FIRMSIZE is no longer significant in the 2SLS model. Further, the coefficient for 
GO_EMPL remains negative in the 2SLS model, but is larger in magnitude in an 
absolute sense and now also statistically significant. 
Finally, contrary to expectations, we find in both the OLS model and 2SLS 
model that the quality of internal capital allocation is positively associated with the 
diversity in divisions’ growth opportunities. A potential explanation for this result 
might be that it is important to rank divisions on a relative basis when allocating a 
fixed capital budget. Stein (1997) argues that the quality of the ranking of projects 
depends  on  the  extent  of  diversification,  where  a  focused  strategy,  i.e.,  less 
diversification, increases this quality. However, to be able to make such a ranking, 
some diversity in growth opportunities is needed. Thus, although diversity in growth 
opportunities creates incentives to rent-seek, it also allows a ranking of projects, the 
benefits  of  which  are  higher  the  lower  the  level  of  diversification.  To  examine 
whether there is an interaction between the diversity in growth opportunities and 
diversification on the quality of internal capital allocation, we re-run equation (2.4) 
after including this interaction. 
The results, shown in table 2.13, indicate that the main effect for the diversity 
in  growth  opportunities  (DIVERSBTM)  is  significantly  positive,  while  the 
interaction effect is significantly negative. To examine the implication of this, we 
use the estimates from model (1) in table 2.13 to determine the partial derivative of 




= 0.099"0.139#DIVERSIFICATION   (2.12) 
                                                 
13 The first-stage exclusion restriction test is significant (p<0.01) and the partial R-square equals 12 
percent, which provides evidence of relevance. The test of the overidentifying restrictions indicates that 
the null-hypothesis of exogenous instruments cannot be rejected. 
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This partial derivative reflects the impact of diversity in growth opportunities 
on the quality of a firm’s internal capital allocation as a function of diversification. 
It shows that, in the presence of a focused strategy (DIVERSIFICATION = 0), the 
partial derivative is positive (0.099) and more diversity in growth opportunities is 
thus  beneficial  in  terms  of  a  higher  quality  of  internal  capital  allocation.  The 
negative coefficient on DIVERSIFICATION in equation (2.12) indicates that this 
effect diminishes and eventually reverses. In particular, the coefficients predict that, 
at  the  average  level  of  diversification  observed  in  the  sample,  i.e., 
Table 2.12 
2SLS analysis of the impact of endogenous firm-wide equity incentives 
         
 
Internal capital allocation quality 
(ICA_QUALITYt) 
      (1)    (2) 
Independent variables 
Predicted 
sign   
Marginal 
effect  Prob.     
Marginal 
effect  Prob.  
                   
ESOPINCt  +    0.026  0.004 ***        
ESOPINC_ALLt  +           0.027  0.003 *** 
DIVERSIFICATIONt  ?    0.001  0.892     0.001  0.936  
DIVERSBTMt  -    0.057  0.003 ***    0.059  0.002 *** 
FIRMSIZEt  ?    -0.007  0.539     -0.006  0.565  
GO_EMPLt  -    -0.053  0.013 ***    -0.052  0.013 *** 
                   
                   
Adjusted R-square      0.111        0.112     
Segment-year 
observations      797        797     
                   
This table provides the 2SLS estimates from a model examining the impact of stock option incentives on 
the quality of internal capital allocation using n=797 firm-level observations. In the first stage, we use 
idiosyncratic risk, R&D to sales, number of employees, and a firm’s book-to-market ratio as instruments 
for  stock  option  incentives.  The  first-stage  exclusion  restriction  test,  partial  R-square,  and  the 
overidentifying  restrictions  test  indicate  that  these  instruments  satisfy  the  relevance  and  exogeneity 
criterion. The Hausman test indicates significant endogeneity of stock option incentives in the second 
stage (p<0.05 two-tailed). Intercept, year controls, and industry controls are included but not separately 
reported. ICA_QUALITY proxies the quality of internal capital allocations; it is measured as the standard 
deviation of the error terms of a benchmark model that distinguishes abnormal capital allocations from 
those allocations based on economic determinants such as growth opportunities. Model 1 and Model 2 
differ in the variable representing equity incentives, using ESOPINC and ESOPINC_ALL, respectively. 
ESOPINC are the incentives provides by employee stock option plans to all employees but the CEO as 
in Core and Guay (2001), i.e., the sensitivity of firm-wide option plans to a one percent change in stock 
price. ESOPINC_ALL is measured as ESOPINC and captures the incentives provided to all employees 
including the CEO. DIVERSIFICATION is the entropy measure as in Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith 
(1995),  capturing  the  firm’s  degree  of  diversification.  DIVERSBTM  is  the  diversity  in  growth 
opportunities of the firm’s segments, based on the standard deviation of the segments’ imputed book-to-
market ratios. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. GO_EMPL captures the 
importance of human capital and is measured as the difference between the firm’s market and book 
value of equity, divided by the number of employees (coefficient multiplied by 1,000). P-values in 
parentheses  are  based  on  heteroskedasticity-robust,  firm-clustered  standard  errors  (one-tailed  for 
predictions, two-tailed otherwise). ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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DIVERSIFICATION = 0.384, the partial derivative equals 0.046, which is close to 
the coefficient for DIVERSBTM reported in table 2.10. Further, at higher levels of 
DIVERSIFICATION,  i.e.,  values  that  range  from  approximately  0.713  to  the 
maximum of 1.340, the partial derivative is negative and more diversity in growth 
opportunities is detrimental in terms of a lower quality of internal capital allocation. 
In sum, the unexpected result observed in the main analysis can be explained by the 
fact that there exists an interaction between the level of diversification within the 
firm and the diversity in divisions’ growth opportunities. 
Table 2.13 
Interaction between diversity in growth opportunities and diversification 
         
 
Internal capital allocation quality 
(ICA_QUALITYt) 
      (1)    (2) 
Independent variables 
Predicted 
sign   
Marginal 
effect  Prob.    
Marginal 
effect  Prob.  
                   
ESOPINCt  +    0.008  0.013 ***        
ESOPINC_ALLt  +           0.010  0.007 *** 
DIVERSIFICATIONt  ?    0.035  0.039 **    0.033  0.048 ** 
DIVERSBTMt  ?    0.099  0.000 ***    0.098  0.000 *** 
DIVERSIFICATIONt × 
DIVERSBTMt  -    -0.139  0.015 **    -0.134  0.019 ** 
FIRMSIZEt  ?    0.013  0.004 ***    0.010  0.026 ** 
GO_EMPLt  -    -0.024  0.095 *    -0.028  0.069 * 
                   
                   
Adjusted R-square      0.113        0.116     
Segment-year 
observations      801        801     
                   
This  table  provides  the  estimates  from  a  model  examining  the  impact  of  the  interaction  between 
diversification and the diversity in growth opportunities on the quality of internal capital allocation using 
n=801  firm-level  observations.  Intercept,  year  controls,  and  industry  controls  are  included  but  not 
separately reported. ICA_QUALITY proxies the quality of internal capital allocations; it is measured as 
the standard deviation of the error terms of a benchmark model that distinguishes abnormal capital 
allocations from those allocations based on economic determinants such as growth opportunities. Model 
1 and Model 2 differ in the variable representing equity incentives, using ESOPINC and ESOPINC_ALL, 
respectively. ESOPINC are the incentives provides by employee stock option plans to all employees but 
the CEO as in Core and Guay (2001), i.e., the sensitivity of firm-wide option plans to a one percent 
change in stock price. ESOPINC_ALL is measured as ESOPINC and captures the incentives provided to 
all  employees  including  the  CEO.  DIVERSIFICATION  is  the  entropy  measure  as  in  Bushman, 
Indjejikian,  and  Smith  (1995),  capturing  the  firm’s  degree  of  diversification.  DIVERSBTM  is  the 
diversity  in  growth  opportunities  of  the  firm’s  segments,  based  on  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
segments’ imputed book-to-market ratios. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. 
GO_EMPL captures the importance of human capital and is measured as the difference between the 
firm’s market and book value of equity, divided by the number of employees (coefficient multiplied by 
1,000). P-values in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust, firm-clustered standard errors 
(one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. 
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2.5  Discussion and conclusion 
 
A large stream of literature compares internal capital markets with external capital 
markets to assess efficiencies. The peculiarity of internal capital markets  is  that 
capital allocations might not only be driven by performance criteria and growth 
opportunities,  but  also  by  the  way  divisional  and  executive  managers  are 
compensated, an aspect that is still scarcely considered in the empirical literature. In 
this  paper,  we  examine  to  what  extent  firms’  resource  allocation  decisions  are 
affected by the CEOs’ response to division-managers’ rent-seeking activities and 
whether equity incentives mitigate this problem. 
The results of this study show that compensation and incentives do play an 
important role in the allocation process of internal capital. Internal capital that is 
allocated in excess of a benchmark serves as a substitute for increased take-home 
pay in the overall compensation package of rent-seeking divisional managers. When 
a capital budget is used to pay rents, less capital is available in other divisions for 
promising and value-adding investments, which potentially harms firm value. In line 
with this argument, our results show that misallocations are associated with ex-post 
inefficiencies. 
Further, paying rents indicates that the firm suffers from a two-layer agency 
problem, i.e., not only divisional managers but also the CEO act opportunistically 
and  create  agency  costs.  Whereas  this  is  a  major  problem  for  many  (multi-
divisional) firms, our results show that stock options help to align the incentives of 
divisional managers, the CEO, and the firm. Providing divisional managers and the 
CEO with equity incentives via ESOPs penalizes rent-seeking activities and rent 
payments, while value-adding activities and decisions are rewarded. 
These  findings  have  direct  implications  for  the  management  of  diversified 
firms.  A  conventional  controllability  argument  is  that,  in  the  absence  of 
interdependencies, firms should base compensation of division managers solely on 
the performance of their respective organizational unit. Such a contract, however, 
does not prevent divisional rent-seeking. We show that even or maybe especially in 
the absence of interdependencies in multi-divisional firms, firm-wide incentives are 
a  necessary  tool  to  prevent  using  the  capital  budget  to  compensate  rent-seeking 
managers.  Designing  compensation  contracts  beyond  standard  controllability 
considerations  to  include  firm-level  performance,  for  example  using  ESOPs, 
improves the quality of internal capital allocations and thus investment efficiency. 
This study is subject to a number of limitations. First, even though we take 
great care in developing and validating our benchmark model, and in testing the 
robustness of the results associated with this model, we cannot rule out that other 
factors  play  a  role  in  capital  expenditure  decisions.  Second,  we  use  publicly 
available disclosures to observe internal capital markets. The reporting environment 
under SFAS 131, which is part of our study, is a significant improvement over 
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SFAS 14, but we still have to rely on circumstantial indicators that point to the 
existence  of  and  behavior  in  internal  capital  markets.  Third,  we  impute  growth 
opportunities of non-listed segments using comparable single-segment listed firms, 
which  is  –  despite  being  a  widely  applied  technique  –  subject  to  considerable 
subjectivity. 
Despite the above limitations, our study contributes to the literature in several 
ways. First, by showing that the capital budget acts as a substitute for increased 
take-home pay of divisional managers, we provide empirical evidence that a two-
layer  agency  problem  exists  and  plays  a  major  role  in  inefficiencies  in  internal 
capital markets. Second, our research design makes a direct link between the use of 
employee stock option incentives and the quality of internal capital allocations. We 
provide strong support for the argument that broad-based equity plans mitigate the 
problem of misallocation and show that ESOPs are used to align the interests of 
employees with those of the firm. Related to this point, our results indicate that the 
benefits of firm-level incentives, i.e., measures at a higher level of aggregation than 
the  own  division,  can  be  high  even  when  there  are  few  operational  inter-
dependencies between divisions. Finally, our study adds to the discussion in the 
literature whether stock option plans are incentive relevant only for executives or for 
employees  in  general.  Our  findings  show  that  ESOPs  do  provide  important 
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Abstract: Numerous studies document inefficient capital allocations in diversified 
firms,  whereas  only  little  is  known  about  how  firms  react  to  counter  these 
misallocations. I argue that changing the divisional structure to reassign decision 
rights among managers can help to reduce inefficient allocations by altering the 
incentive to lobby as well as by redistributing bargaining power in the firm. Using a 
unique  database  on  reconfigurations  of  the  divisional  layout,  I  confirm  the 
hypothesis  that  firms  are  reacting  to  inefficient  allocations  by  adjusting  their 
organizational design. Moreover, results demonstrate that the efficiency of capital 
allocations  as  well  as  shareholder  wealth  rise  considerably  following  the 
reassignment of decision rights. Some evidence also suggests that firms are less 
likely to rearrange their organizational design in response to capital misallocations 
when the cost of these misallocations is low, but this result does not continue to hold 
under  all  robustness  tests.  The  role  of  divisional  reorganizations  in  relation  to 
misallocations has not been studied empirically in this detail before, contributing to 
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3.1  Introduction 
 
This  paper  examines  whether  diversified  firms  respond  to  inefficiencies  in  the 
internal allocation of capital among its constituent operating units by changing the 
organizational  layout  of  the  firm.  The  process  of  allocating  funds  in  diversified 
firms – referred to as internal capital markets – is critically studied in an expanding 
body of literature. This process is also of growing importance for the management 
of diversified companies in an economy that is more and more characterized by 
large,  multi-divisional  firms  that  internalize  transactions  that  are  otherwise 
organized in external markets between independent parties. A crucial component in 
managing these diversified operations is an organizational design that appropriately 
allocates  decision  rights  within  the  firm,  thereby  defining  the  boundaries  of 
authority between its divisions14. Setting these boundaries inevitably also influences 
the internal capital allocations that take place between them, and is bound to affect 
the  efficiency  of  these  transfers.  This  link  between  organizational  design,  more 
specifically  the  change  to  the  horizontal  scope  of  authority  by  divisional 
reorganizations,  and  the  efficiency  of  internal  capital  allocations  has  not  been 
analyzed thus far. 
A recurrent theme in the extant literature on internal capital markets is whether 
and under what circumstances they deliver net benefits, i.e. if they are more or less 
efficient  than  external  financing  mechanisms  (cf.  Stein  2003;  Maksimovic  & 
Phillips  2006).  Advantages  from  internal  capital  markets  can  arise  if  units  can 
collectively borrow at lower cost or if internal transfers of funds are subject to lower 
information asymmetries than between individual units and external providers of 
capital  (Stein  1997;  Matsusaka  &  Nanda  2002).  Conversely,  a  widely  held 
counterargument  proposes  that  inefficiencies  can  arise  in  this  process  due  to 
influence  costs  when  agents  within  the  firm  lobby  for  a  larger  allocation  than 
economic performance of their respective unit would justify (Meyer, Milgrom & 
Roberts 1992; Scharfstein & Stein 2000). Inefficient allocations may further arise 
from  internal  power  struggles  within  the  firm  due  to  uneven  distributions  of 
investment  prospects  between  divisions  (Rajan,  Servaes  &  Zingales  2000).  A 
common denominator in these theories is that the profile of a division, as defined by 
for instance size and performance of all operations in the division, are the root cause 
of inefficient allocations. For instance, unprofitable operations or large disparities 
between a firm’s divisions provide the division manager with incentives to engage 
in lobbying and other non-cooperative behavior. Changing a division’s profile by 
reorganizing the portfolio of operations under each division manager’s supervision – 
                                                 
14 There is no uniformity in the literature in using the notion of divisions, business units, segments, or 
investment  centers  to  describe  organizational  units  below  corporate  level  that  have  distinct  fields  of 
operation  with  specifically  assigned  management  personnel  taking  investment  decisions.  To  avoid 
confusion, I refer to these units as divisions throughout this paper. 
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i.e. changing his decision rights – will therefore influence the efficiency of internal 
allocations. 
Based on this observation, I propose that firms seeking to contain inefficient 
capital  allocations  can  change  the  distribution  of  decision  rights  among  division 
managers  in  a  way  that  division  managers  abstain  from  lobbying  and  non-
cooperative behavior. Major determinants of the extent of non-cooperative activities 
or lobbying are the relative returns of productive and influence activities in each 
division (Scharfstein & Stein 2000) as well as the diversity of these relative returns 
between divisions (Rajan et al. 2000). A firm can alter these relative returns and 
their distribution among divisions by changing how decision rights over the firm’s 
operations  are  bundled  in  each  division  such  that  the  firm’s  aggregate  capital 
allocation efficiency will improve.  
As markets expand and shrink, firms do not remain static but adapt to their 
operating environment, with internal organization following distinct life cycle stages 
(Harris  &  Raviv  2002).  While  in  equilibrium  firms  are  organized  perfectly 
according to their environment, changes in this environment can alter the incentives 
within the firm for managers to behave non-cooperatively. In consequence, firms 
readjust  their  organizational  layout  in  an  effort  to  contain  inefficient  capital 
allocations. Firms will only do so once the cost of misallocation exceeds the cost of 
reorganizing. Hence, organizational adjustments will not take place immediately, 
providing  the  opportunity  to  observe  transitory  inefficiencies  that  precede 
reorganizations. 
I provide supporting evidence in this study that diversified firms are indeed 
more  likely  to  reconfigure  their  divisions  when  internal  capital  allocations  are 
relatively inefficient. I moreover find some evidence that a part of the analyzed 
firms  is  less  likely  to  rearrange  the  organizational  layout  in  reaction  to  capital 
misallocations when relatively well endowed with capital, i.e. when the cost of these 
misallocations is low. This result, however, does not continue  to  hold  under  all 
robustness tests. Lastly, I find that capital is allocated more efficiently following the 
reorganization of divisions and that shareholder wealth increases, corroborating the 
notion that firms reorganize to counter inefficient capital allocations. 
Prior  evidence  on  the  determinants  and  consequences  of  divisional 
reorganizations is scarce, which is largely due to the difficulty of identifying firms 
that carry out reorganizations of their internal structure. These events are relatively 
rare to observe and are a far less obvious artifact of organizational change than for 
instance divestments. I make use of the fact that SFAS 131 (FASB 1997) prescribes 
firms since 1998 to report their segments according to their internal organizations 
and identify listed US firms with changes in their segment reporting in the period 
from 1998 until 2007. I construct a unique dataset by subsequently verifying that 
these reporting changes are due to reorganizations by reading the respective 10-k 
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report sections rather than due to other explanations such as mergers, acquisitions, 
or divestments. 
This study contributes to the body of research on internal capital markets by 
providing evidence how firms react to inefficient allocations. While extant studies 
extensively  document  how  these  inefficiencies  can  arise  (Stein  2003),  only  few 
authors investigate if and how firms consequently react. Investigating the role of 
reorganizations  in  this  context  sheds  new  light  on  internal  capital  markets  and 
furthermore  extends  the  literature  on  organizational  design  and  delegation  in 
diversified  firms.  This  study  shows  that  resolving  inefficient  allocations  are  an 
additional driver of structuring delegation besides relative expertise in the firm and 
relative importance of the individual units (Baiman, Larcker & Rajan 1995) as well 
as the availability of appropriate performance measures (Moers 2006). Investigating 
the effects of reassigning decision rights among division managers in this study 
specifically  extends  knowledge  on  the  determinants  of  the  horizontal  scope  of 
authority,  an  area  that  has  so  far  received  only  limited  coverage  in  the  extant 
literature (Mookherjee 2006). 
The subsequent sections of this paper are structured as follows. Section 3.2 
provides  an  overview  of  related  research  papers  and  develops  the  underlying 
hypotheses of this study. Section 3.3 describes the data, its collection as well as the 
models to test the hypotheses, the results of which are presented in section 3.4. 
Section 3.5 concludes and provides an outlook on potential research avenues. 
 
 
3.2  Related research and hypotheses 
 
The complexity of managing large, diversified firms with several lines of business 
frequently  requires  corporate  management  to  structure  operations  into  distinct 
divisions and to assign immediate oversight responsibilities to division managers. A 
marked difference between these multidivisional firms and those engaged in a single 
line of business is the ability of the former to allocate capital among its individual 
divisions. These intra-company capital transfers can be used to fund operations with 
cash generated in a different division, thereby complementing or substituting capital 
raised externally on specialized financial markets. 
This  process  of  cross-subsidization,  also  referred  to  as  an  internal  capital 
market, has both advantages and drawbacks. Benefits may for instance arise if the 
allocating authority, i.e. the CEO, has inside information about the prospects of the 
firm’s divisions that enable him  to allocate capital more efficiently than outside 
investors  (Stein  1997;  Matsusaka  &  Nanda  2002).  Conversely,  drawbacks  from 
internal cross-subsidization may arise if information provision necessary for internal 
allocations  is  costlier  than  if  each  division  would  arrange  financial  contracts 
individually  with  the  external  capital  market.  Moreover,  capital  allocations  are 
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subject to the CEO’s own discretion and may therefore induce division managers to 
influence the allocation decision in their favor rather than the firm’s overall interest, 
i.e.  engage  in  lobbying  (Meyer,  Milgrom  &  Roberts  1992;  Scharfstein  &  Stein 
2000). Influence activities are harmful to firm performance not only because of the 
time that division managers spend on lobbying rather than engaging in productive 
activities  but  also  because  of  misguided  funds  that  would  yield  higher  returns 
elsewhere  inside  or  outside  the  firm.  Inefficient  allocations  can  also  stem  from 
diversity in performance profiles between divisions (Rajan et al. 2000): Profitable 
divisions may decide to engage in non-cooperative strategies to prevent having to 
share their surplus with less profitable divisions. Firm management may then decide 
to transfer funds between divisions to reduce diversity. Even though these cross-
subsidizations  may  be  inefficient  themselves,  they  prevent  further  inefficiencies 
arising at otherwise even higher levels of diversity. 
The central theories on internal capital markets explain that lobbying and non-
cooperative behavior of division managers are driven by the division’s profile as 
defined  by  its  assets,  profitability,  investment  prospects,  and  other  economic 
dimensions. For example, managers of unprofitable divisions in declining markets 
may  reap  more  benefits  from  lobbying  for  capital  than  managers  of  prospering 
divisions that have few problems in attracting capital. However, market conditions 
of  a  division’s  operation  naturally  fluctuate  over  time  and  will  in  consequence 
provoke  changes  in  lobbying  and  non-cooperative  behavior.  While  firms  are 
managed and organized optimally in equilibrium and have weighed up benefits and 
costs  of  internal  capital  markets,  division  manager  behavior  may  aggravate 
allocation efficiency due to a changing firm environment to a point that firms have 
to consider appropriate remedies. Lobbying models with an agency conflict between 
division  managers  and  CEO  vary  in  the  assumption  of  an  additional  conflict  of 
interest between CEO and owners of the firm (e.g. Rajan et al. 2000; Scharfstein & 
Stein 2000). This distinction is less important in the setting at hand and either CEO 
or  the  owners  of  the  firm  may  administer  remedies  to  align  division  manager 
incentives with the firm: Both parties benefit from a higher firm value irrespective 
of whether interests between them are entirely aligned.  
One approach to contain lobbying and resulting inefficient allocations that run 
counter to firm interests is to partly tie division manager compensation to corporate 
performance  through  the  provision  of  firm-level  equity  and  option  grants  (cf. 
chapter 2 of this dissertation). However, not all division managers may be willing to 
accept such a contract since part of their remuneration would be tied to firm-level 
factors beyond their immediate control. This type of contract may also be too costly 
for  the  firm:  remunerating  division  managers  partly  based  on  firm  performance 
essentially increases compensation risk (Prendergast 2002) and pay would have to 
be raised to compensate for this additional risk. In addition, Bernardo, Luo, and 
Wang (2006) argue that the cost of a division manager’s incentive contracts while 
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keeping the level of truthful reporting in a diversified firm depends on both level 
and variance of investment opportunities that the division manager holds. These 
contracts  can  therefore  turn  out  to  be  too  costly  in  some  settings  to  provide 
incentives to division managers.  
Alternatively, remuneration contracts of division managers could be adjusted 
to include a charge for cost of capital employed by the division. While residual 
income-based contracts can impede lobbying for money, Wallace (1997) indicates 
that  introducing  cost  of  capital  charges  in  performance  evaluation  can  cause 
underinvestment if managers turn down positive NPV-projects with deferred future 
cash  inflows  if  capital  charges  render  earlier  periods  unprofitable.  Exact 
depreciation schedules with cost of capital estimates for each division (Dutta & 
Reichelstein 2002) or multi-period evaluation schemes can prevent this problem, but 
implementing  these  mechanisms  is  bound  to  be  costly  and  difficult  due  to  the 
required  precision  and  amount  of  information  on  present  and  future  project 
performance.  The  incentive  problem  of  lobbying  is  therefore  not  necessarily 
resolved by charging the cost of capital. 
Rather than changing performance evaluation contracts to reduce the intra-firm 
incongruence of incentives, firms can deal with the root cause of diverging interests 
more directly and alter the way authority is delegated to division managers who 
cause inefficient capital allocations. Firms are bound to rearrange decision rights 
when  the  cost  of  contractually  reducing  incentive  problems  as  described  above 
exceeds the cost of changing the delegation of authority. The delegation of decision 
rights is fundamental for managing diversified operations and a core issue in the 
literature  on  organizational  design.  A  central  question  is  how  companies  decide 
between centralized and decentralized organization structures when communication 
between  multiple  agents  is  limited  and  costly  (Melumad,  Mookherjee  & 
Reichelstein 1992). Baiman et al. (1995) show that the degree of decentralization by 
allocating tasks to divisions depends on relative expertise and relative importance of 
the  firm’s  divisions,  whereas  Moers  (2006)  indicates  that  the  choice  to  delegate 
depends  on  the  availability  of  suitable  performance  measures.  Removing  the 
hierarchical layer of division managers and centralizing more would rule out this 
source of potential inefficiencies. It seems unlikely, however, that diversified firms 
will  reconsider  the  balance  between  delegation  and  centralization  when  internal 
capital allocation efficiency declines due to non-cooperative behavior: firms have 
already  chosen  to  diversify  ex  ante  into  distinct  operations  with  specialized 
information that a central authority is hardly able to process appropriately. 
Instead  of  adjusting  the  degree  of  delegation,  firms  can  rearrange  how 
delegated  decision  rights  are  bundled  within  each  division,  i.e.  reorganizing  the 
divisional layout. Research explaining this horizontal span of control of agents in 
settings  of  delegated  decision  rights  is  still  limited  (Mookherjee  2006),  and  this 
study aims to contribute specifically in this direction. A general conception is that 
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those  operations  should  be  grouped  together  in  divisions  that  require  joint 
coordination  (Milgrom  &  Roberts  1992)  and  in  such  a  way  that  operations  are 
supervised  by  the  manager  with  the  best  expertise  to  discover  and  evaluate 
interactions among these activities (Harris & Raviv 2002). One of the few cross-
sectional empirical studies on divisional reorganizations in general is Brickley and 
Van Drunen (1990). Similar to the preceding reasoning, they argue that changes in 
the  market  conditions  and  competitive  pressure  cause  firms  to  adapt  their 
organizational  structure.  The  causal  analysis  is  confined  to  mainly  descriptive 
evidence, identifying a range of different motives for reorganizations, which broadly 
imply that firms attempt to increase efficiency. The authors remain silent, however, 
on  the  exact  nature  of  these  efficiency  improvements  and  consider  company 
reorganizations in general, whereas this study specifically speaks to the effect on 
capital  allocations  among  divisions  as  a  determinant  of  how  decision  rights  are 
allocated in diversified firms. 
The central argument of this paper is that changing this bundling of decision 
rights,  i.e.  what  operations  are  grouped  together  in  divisions,  can  improve  the 
efficiency of internal capital allocation: the altered economic profile of the divisions 
provides its managers with a different set of incentives that can induce them to 
abstain from lobbying and non-cooperative behavior. Division managers distribute 
effort  over  productive  and  influence  activities  (Scharfstein  &  Stein  2000),  their 
choice depending on the relative returns of both types of activities. Non-cooperative 
behavior is furthermore increasing if divisions differ in these relative returns (Rajan 
et  al.  2000)  with  productive  divisions  unwilling  to  subsidize  weaker  ones. 
Reassigning  part  of  the  operations  from  one  division  to  another  changes  the 
aggregate set of investment opportunities under control of each division manager 
and reduces discrepancies in relative returns of influence and productive activities. 
A division manager with high incentives to lobby will be less likely to engage in 
such behavior when a different bundle of decision rights endows him with oversight 
over better investment projects that render lobbying unattractive vis-à-vis pursuing 
productive activities. Given that a division manager has the incentive to engage in 
lobbying, adjusting the composition of operations he supervises can also change the 
bargaining power of his lobbying efforts, derived from the underlying division’s size 
and other factors such as overall profitability. Assigning operations and assets to 
different divisions can redistribute bargaining power within the firm and thereby 
reduce the expected success of lobbying. Lower expected success will consequently 
reduce  the  likelihood  that  division  managers  decide  to  engage  in  such  non-
productive behavior
15. 
                                                 
15 Division managers could oppose organizational changes that would entail giving up bargaining power. 
Such resistance is less likely to hold, however, if reorganizations offer resisting managers compensating 
benefits. For instance, the division may shrink but be more profitable after reorganizing. 
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Reorganizations  can  improve  internal  capital  allocation  efficiency  for  two 
additional reasons unrelated to conflicting behavior of division managers. First, the 
process  of  allocating  internal  capital  can  be  streamlined  if  units  that  frequently 
interact through internal fund transfers are regrouped together in the same division. 
Transferring capital between units of the same division is likely easier to coordinate 
than if those units are set in separate divisions, similar to the idea that units requiring 
mutual  coordination  should  be  grouped  together  (Milgrom  &  Roberts  1992). 
Second, firms can reorganize the divisional layout so that a division’s subordinate 
unit is assigned to a different division where management has higher expertise to 
evaluate its investment proposals. Higher expertise will then feed back into more 
precise  assessments  of  actual  capital  requirements  of  the  units  and  less 
misallocations, thereby increasing allocation efficiency. 
Rearranging  decision  rights  can  entail  profound  changes  to  the  firm  that 
require considerable time and effort to implement, firms will not adjust the bundling 
of decision rights immediately to counter inefficient internal allocations. Instead, 
inefficient allocations have to be persistent and costly enough to justify a divisional 
reorganization.  This  friction  in  firm  response  is  bound  to  allow  empirical 
observation  of  transitory  inefficiencies  before  reorganizations.  The  preceding 
discussion leads to the first hypothesis. 
 
H1:   Diversified  firms  suffering  from  inefficient  internal  capital 
allocations rearrange decision rights of division managers.  
 
Since  reorganizing  the  divisional  layout  to  counter  allocation  inefficiencies 
likely is a costly procedure that ties management resources in the reorganization 
process, firms will only do so after trading off related costs and benefits. Firms may 
refrain  from  a  costly  reorganization  when  facing  low  levels  of  lobbying  with 
negligible misallocations of internal funds. Furthermore, efficient capital allocations 
will be more important for companies whose access to external capital is limited and 
costly,  an  application  of  the  trade-off  between  internal  allocation  and  external 
capital  proposed  in  Matsusaka  and  Nanda  (2002).  This  leads  to  the  second 
hypothesis. 
 
H2:  The probability of an internal rearrangement of decision rights in 
firms as a reaction to capital misallocations is higher for firms that 
face external financing constraints. 
 
Brickley and Van Drunen (1990) indicate that the effects of reorganizations 
may not materialize in the short run. They document a decline in firm performance 
immediately following divisional reorganizations but propose increases in the longer 
term. Similarly, improvements in the efficiency of internal capital allocations should 
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follow changes to the horizontal scope of decision rights of division managers if this 
is the initial motivation for the change. Enhancing the efficiency of internal capital 
allocations should also have reverberations in shareholder wealth, as owners of the 
firm ultimately profit from more efficient internal company processes. This results 
in the third and fourth hypothesis. 
 
H3:  The efficiency of internal capital allocations increases following 
the rearrangement of decision rights among divisions. 
H4:  Shareholder  wealth  increases  following  the  rearrangement  of 
decision rights among divisions. 
 
 
3.3  Data and model 
 
3.3.1  Data and sample selection 
To study the preceding hypotheses, I analyze firms that reorganize their divisional 
structure, being a clearly observable manifestation of the reallocation of decision 
rights among division managers. I start by obtaining a sample of firms, examining 
the segment filings in the COMPUSTAT database on all listed firms with more than 
one operating segment that are incorporated in the US in the period 1998-2007. 
Consistent with extant literature, I exclude firms with consolidated sales and assets 
below USD 20m as well as groups with one or more segments in the financial or 
real estate industry. Industry classifications are based on the NAICS rather than the 
preceding SIC scheme as the latter is phased out and not consistently available at the 
segment level for years from 2004 onwards. I consider the period starting 1998 to 
exploit the fact that the introduction of SFAS 131 in that year required firms to align 
segment  reporting  with  the  actual  organizational  layout  of  the  company.  This 
potentially reduces distortions that may arise if firms strategically (dis-) aggregate 
divisions to conceal the underlying organizational structure. To find reorganizing 
firms, I identify firm-years with a change in either the number of segments or in the 
sum of the individual segment identifier code compared to the preceding firm-year. 
Considering the sum of segment identifiers ensures capturing reorganizations with 
changes in the composition rather than the number of segments.  
Several reasons apart from reorganizations per se drive changes over time in 
segment  reporting.  Examples  are  transactions  such  as  acquisitions,  divestment, 
mergers, or altered segment reporting in preparation thereof; segment growth or 
decline  around  the  minimum  segment  reporting  thresholds;  or  changing  the 
reporting of non-operating segments, e.g. containing corporate unallocated assets or 
aggregating  intercompany  transfers  for  consolidated  reporting  reasons
16.  To 
                                                 
16 Non-operating  segments  were  excluded  from  the  sample.  Their  assets  were  not  allocated  to  other 
segments, since any method of allocation is bound to introduce an additional element of subjectivity. 
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distinguish  reorganizations  from  such  other  reasons  of  reporting  change,  I  read 
1,721 SEC 10-k forms for firm-years exhibiting a different segment structure than in 
the preceding year. I coded only those years as reorganizations if firms explicitly 
state to have changed their organizational structure. This rather elaborate procedure 
has the advantage of vastly reducing the amount of confounding effects that the 
statistical analysis would otherwise have to control for. For instance, it minimizes 
the risk of sampling firms that change their disclosure for strategic reasons rather 
than due to an actual change in their organizational layout: Segment reports are also 
part of the annual financial audit so that firms that intend to change their segment 
reports have to provide plausible evidence for doing so and are unlikely to inform 
about reorganizations unless actual changes take place.  
It was argued above that the choice to sample only years that are regulated 
under SFAS 131 reduces the chance that the observed reporting changes are due to 
strategic  disclosure  choices  that  management  intentionally  takes  to  change  the 
representation of segment information to the capital market. A main argument for 
these information distortions proposed in the literature is that firms may wish to hide 
proprietary information about profitable operations due to competitive pressure (e.g. 
Verrecchia 1983; Hayes & Lundholm 1996; Harris 1998). The inclusion of control 
variables  for  performance  effects  (cf.  section  “3.3.2  Model  and  variable 
construction”)  serves  to  additionally  reduce  the  impact  of  this  alternative 
explanation. Also, it is not clear that managers would unilaterally like to deceive the 
capital market: Both analytical and empirical research (e.g. Kanodia & Lee 1998; 
Berger  &  Hann  2003;  Bens  &  Monahan  2004)  shows  that  firms  benefit  from 
increasing  the  precision  of  publicly  disclosed  information  that  help  improve 
monitoring and reduce the cost of capital, i.e. contributing towards a higher firm 
value
17. The following two quotes are examples of the sampled firms that report a 
reorganization. 
 
LSI Industries, 2004: 
“Effective July 1, 2003, the Company re-aligned its business segments and 
now operates in the following two business segments: the Lighting Segment 
and  the  Graphics  Segment.  The  Company  is  organized  such  that  the  chief 
operating  decision  maker  (the  President  and  Chief  Executive  Officer)  now 
receives  financial  and  operating  information  relative  to  these  two  business 
segments, and organizationally, has a President of LSI Lighting Solutions Plus 
and a President of LSI Graphics Solutions Plus reporting directly to him.” 
                                                                                                                 
Wherever leaving out non-operating segments lead to a divergence between reported corporate financial 
figures and segment totals, the latter were used instead. 
17 Further tests in section 3.4 show that the sampled reorganizing firms suffer from relatively higher 
allocation problems and lower stock market performance prior to reorganization than control firms. It 
would therefore seem less likely that these firms only pretend to have changed their organization in order 
to deliberately distort information, which would entail a potential aggravation of their cost of capital. 
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Oglebay Norton Company, 2001: 
“Effective January 1, 2001, the Company realigned its businesses into three 
reporting segments, described above, focused on its key markets served. This 
new  segment  reporting  structure  aligns  operations  which  share  business 
strategies,  are  related  by  geography  and  product  mix,  and  reflect  the  way 
management evaluates the operating performance of its businesses. In 2001, 
the  Company  also  announced  that  it  was  implementing  a  new,  flatter 
management structure and consolidating formerly independent business units 
into an integrated industrial minerals company.” 
 
Reorganizations at times coincide with major transactions such as acquisitions 
of  another  firm  or  divestments  of  a  division.  I  exclude  those  combined 
reorganization  events  since  they  essentially  change  the  profile  of  the  company, 
making it difficult to trace effects of reorganizations alone. I also verify that the 
reorganization  is  not  the  result  of  any  transaction  in  the  preceding  year  using 
information  in  the  relevant  annual  reports  and  on  the  company  websites.  This 
selection procedure leads to the identification of 131 reorganizations among 110 
firms,  with  938  firm-years  and  3,920  segment-years.  Two  firms  change  their 
structure  three  times,  while  17  firms  reorganize  twice  in  the  sample  period. 
Wherever missing in the COMPUSTAT segment files, I manually added financial 
data if available in the respective 10-k form or annual report. Table 3.1 gives an 
overview of the occurrence of reorganizations over the sample period as well as the 
distribution of firm-year observations of reorganizing firms. The figures illustrate a 
somewhat  elevated  occurrence  of  reorganizations  in  the  years  2001-2003.  These 
reorganizations could in part be reflecting the troubles of the New Economy and the 
wider  economic  reverberations,  which  would  however  not  obstruct  these  firm 
observations to qualify for this study. 
Part of the subsequent analysis employs a control group of multi-segment firms 
that did not reorganize. The sampling procedure for this set of non-reorganizing 
firms is the same as the one described above, similarly excluding firms from the 
control group that engaged in any other major corporate transaction such as mergers, 
acquisitions or divestitures of part of their business. 
 
Table 3.1                       
Distribution of year observations of reorganizing firms and reorganizations 
                       
  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  total 
Year observations of 
reorganizing firms  86  97  97  102  105  103  98  90  85  75  938 
Reorganization incidents  0  10  16  20  26  23  7  12  12  5  131 
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3.3.2  Model and variable construction 
Hypothesis 1 posits that diversified firms change their organizational structure as a 
consequence of inefficient internal capital allocations. Since allocation inefficiencies 
are unlikely to be the sole determinant of reorganizations, I construct the following 
probit model on the reorganization likelihood. 
 
REORGANIZATIONi,t  =  f(ICM_EFFi,t-n , DIVERSIFICATIONi,t-n ,  
DIVERSITYi,t-n , DIVISONSi,t-n ,  EMPLOYEESi,t-n, 
LEVERAGEi,t-n , ROAi,t-n , BTMi,t-n),  (3.1) 
 
where REORGANIZATION is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that alter 
their divisional structure and 0 otherwise. Firms are indexed with i and the year of 
divisional reconfiguration with t, with n >= 1 so that all independent observation 
predate the event year. I use lagged values for all independent variables to model the 
managerial  decision  making  process  on  reorganizing  the  company  that  is  taking 
place throughout the year on the basis of prior year company characteristics. The 
main explanatory variable, ICM_EFF, is the Billet and Mauer (2003) measure of 
internal capital market efficiency, which has been repeatedly used in the literature to 
capture the efficiency of internal capital markets in multi-divisional firms in various 
settings (e.g. Bens & Monahan 2004; Berger & Hann 2007).
18 Broadly speaking, the 
rationale behind ICM_EFF is a comparison between capital expenditures and cash 
flows of each division. Capital expenditures exceeding the division’s cash flows are 
an indication that intra-firm fund transfers must have taken place to finance that 
excess  investment.  These  transfers  are  deemed  efficient  when  the  growth 
opportunities of the division receiving the transfer are above the average level of 
growth opportunities of all other divisions in that firm. This evaluation takes place 
for all divisions and is aggregated into a single firm-level measure. I compute this 
efficiency measure using the ratio of segment book and market values to capture the 
divisions’  individual  investment  opportunities.  Market  values  for  individual 
divisions are not readily available and therefore imputed using separate industry 
sales multiples
19 for each of the sampled years. Industries peers are defined as the 
group  of  at  least  five  stock-listed  single-segment  firms  with  the  same  six-digit 
NAICS industry code. Whenever less than five industry peers are available in the 
specific year then industries peers are defined at five, four, or on rare occasions 
three or two digit NAICS levels. Following hypothesis 1, ICM_EFF is expected to 
be negatively related to the incidence of reorganization.  
                                                 
18 To avoid restrictions on the sample size, the more data-intensive measure on internal capital allocation 
developed in chapter 2 is applied in section 3.4.3.4 as an alternative robustness test to using ICM_EFF, 
confirming the results of the main analyses.  
19 I use segment sales figures to estimate market values instead of segment assets as the latter is 
particularly sensitive to discretionary asset allocation within multi-division firms. 
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The  next  four  explanatory  variables  are  proxies  for  the  organizational 
complexity of the firm. DIVERSIFICATION is the Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith 
(1995) measure of unrelated diversification, capturing the dispersion of sales across 
industries that differ on the first three digits of their NAICS code classification, 
which is largely similar to distinguishing at the two-digit SIC level
20. DIVERSITY is 
the  Rajan  et  al.  (2000)  measure  of  dispersion  of  the  divisions’  growth 
opportunities
21.  Reorganizations  that  involve  rearranging  the  responsibilities  of 
division managers and the units that they supervise will be easier the more the firm’s 
different operations require the same management expertise. Similarly, it is likely 
more problematic to assign a unit to another division for firms with operations in 
different industries or in different stages of the business life cycle. Conversely, one 
could also argue that more complex organizations are more likely to reorganize. Due 
to  these  contrasting  arguments,  neither  DIVERSIFICATION  nor  DIVERSITY  is 
expected to exhibit a distinct unidirectional relation with the dependent variable. 
DIVISIONS is the number of operating divisions, i.e. excluding segments that are 
disclosed  for  financial  reporting  reasons  such  as  corporate  overhead  expenses. 
EMPLOYEES is the natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. The 
need to adjust the organizational structure at some point is likely higher for larger 
firms with more employees and those with more divisions. Both parameters are 
therefore predicted to be positively related to the occurrence of reorganizations. 
Besides organizational complexity, the model also adjusts for three additional 
firm characteristics. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long- and short-term debt to total 
assets. Debt is recurrently argued to reduce various agency costs related to free cash 
flow by contractual payment commitment (Jensen 1986). Given that debt reduces 
internal  agency  problems  then  LEVERAGE  will  be  inversely  related  to  the 
regressand. Furthermore, reorganizations are likely dependent on the level of firm 
performance and growth opportunities. Similarly, Berger and Ofek (1999) argue that 
these  two  factors  are  among  the  determinants  of  more  severe  changes  to  the 
organization  during  corporate  refocusing  programs,  i.e.  divestitures  of  non-core 
businesses. I capture the effect of firm performance with ROA, the earnings before 
interest and taxes divided by total assets. BTM is the book-to-market ratio of the 
firm as a conventional proxy of growth opportunities. Reorganizations are likely 
                                                 
20 The Bushman et al. (1995) measure of unrelated diversification is defined as  
                = ﾠ    ﾠ  (1   )
 
   
 
with pa being the sales share of industry a in total firm sales. 
 
21 The Rajan et al. (2000) diversity in growth opportunities measure is defined as 
          = ﾠ
     −     
  − 1
 
   
  
 
   
 
 
where wi is the assets share of division i in total firm assets and qi is the division i’s book-to-market ratio. 
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occurring  among  more  mature  companies,  whereas  younger  companies  are  less 
likely  to  change  their  organization  already  in  the  outset.  To  the  extent  that 
profitability is higher for more mature businesses with lower equity multiples then 
ROA  and  BTM  will  be  positively  related  to  the  probability  of  reorganizations. 
Including ROA and BTM also controls for the possibility that reorganizations are an 
indication of changes in the production function of the firm rather than changes in 
the assignment of decision rights. While less likely to be the case in the sample at 
hand given the upfront selection procedure (cf. section 3.3.1), the two performance 
parameters  also  control  for  potential  competitive  pressures  that  may  induce 
management  to  change  the  organizational  structure  to  intentionally  distort 
information.  The  probit  model  includes  identifier  variables  for  both  year  and 
industry as defined at the two-digit NAICS level. Standard errors are corrected for 
potential clustering at firm level in all specifications. 
Hypothesis 2 conjectures that allocation inefficiencies are less likely to initiate 
reorganizations in firms with comparatively abundant cash flows, i.e. a low cost of 
inefficient  capital  allocation.  I  investigate  this  moderation  effect  by  augmenting 
equation (3.1) with an interaction term between the allocation efficiency measure 
ICM_EFF  and  a  proxy  for  the  abundance  of  cash  flow,  CFABUNDANCE,  cf. 
equation (3.2). CFABUNDANCE is computed using an indicator variable for the 
lowest quintile across firms and years of the ratio of net cash flows from financing 
activities scaled by sales. Net financing cash flows increase in the amount of funds 
raised  through  either  debt  or  equity  and  decrease  with  debt  repayments  and 
dividends. Firms in the lowest quintile of the financing cash flow to sales ratio – as 
indicated through CFABUNDANCE – therefore have ample funds to allow for net 
outflows and require little additional outside financing, i.e. have sufficient internal 
funds. Following hypothesis 2, the interaction term should attenuate the effect of 
allocation efficiency on the likelihood of reorganizations and is therefore expected 
to have a positive coefficient. For completeness of the econometric specification I 
also  include  CFABUNDANCE  as  an  individual  regressor,  without  directional 
prediction of its coefficient. All other independent variables are the same as in the 
model for hypothesis 1. The model for hypothesis 2 similarly includes identifier 
variables for both year and industry as defined at the two-digit NAICS level. Also, 
all specifications correct for clustered standard errors at the firm level. 
 
REORGANIZATIONi,t  =  f(ICM_EFFi,t-n , ICM_EFFi,t-n*CFABUNDANCEi,t-n , 
CFABUNDANCEi,t-n , DIVERSIFICATIONi,t-n ,  
DIVERSITYi,t-n ,  DIVISONSi,t-n , EMPLOYEESi,t-n , 
LEVERAGEi,t-n , ROAi,t-n , BTMi,t-n)  (3.2) 
 
Hypothesis 3 and 4 concern the changes of capital allocation efficiency and 
shareholder  wealth  around  the  date  of  divisional  reorganizations,  respectively.  I 
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investigate hypothesis 3 with ICM_EFF as described above, and the stock returns of 
a 12-month buy-and-hold strategy to capture shareholder wealth per firm-year in 
variable RETURN for hypothesis 4. I compare the level of these variables between 
the reorganizing firms and an assigned control group that resembles the former but 
does not reorganize. A frequently used method to arrive at a refined control group is 
to select firms in the control group by means of two or three dimensions such as 
year and firm size (e.g. Berger & Ofek 1999; Wallace 1997). This method proceeds 
iteratively among the chosen dimensions, where the order in itself introduces an 
additional element of subjectivity. In an attempt to overcome the deficiencies of 
traditional methods, propensity score matching models (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983) 
have become increasingly popular in observational studies in recent years and have 
also started to enter accounting research (e.g. Hogan & Lewis 2005; Höppe 2009). 
Among  others,  they  have  the  considerable  advantage  that  treatment  and  control 
group  subjects  are  matched  on  multiple  dimensions  simultaneously  rather  than 
iteratively  and  that  treatment  effect  variances  are  typically  lower  than  in  pure 
random sample matching. 
To investigate hypotheses 3 and 4, I select the same control variables as in 
equation  (3.1),  the  binary  response  model  described  for  hypothesis  1,  as  key 
matching dimensions and proceed in the following four stages. First, I choose to 
match each reorganizing firm in the year preceding the reorganization event to one 
control  firm  that  neither  reorganizes  nor  is  involved  in  any  transaction  such  as 
acquisitions  or  divestments  throughout  the  sample  period.  Second,  I  determine 
averages of the matching variables for all years preceding the reorganization event. 
To find comparable matches to these average values among the control firms, I also 
compute the arithmetic mean among control firms. In particular, I calculate average 
values in each year over the year itself and all preceding years
22. This step is taken 
to reduce potential distortions in matching control firms that may spring from outlier 
values in the reference year used for matching. Third, I fit a probit propensity score 
model with nearest neighbor matching to identify matching control firms for all 
reorganizing firms that do not strictly increase or decrease the number of segments. 
This method results in a matched control firm for each reorganizing firm in the firm 
prior to changing the divisional structure. In a fourth step, the control firm years are 
marked  as  preceding  or  following  the  year  of  reorganization  of  the  matched 
reorganizing  firm.  I  then  use  these  years  to  identify  differences  in  allocation 
efficiency and shareholder wealth before and after reorganizing a firm’s divisions. 
                                                 
22 More  specifically,  average  values  used  in  matching  reorganizing  and  control  firms  are  defined  as 
follows. Let     ∈  indicate the value of matching variable v for company n in period t. Observations 
preceding a reorganization are indexed with   < 0 and with   > 0 or subsequent years, with min   =    
being the earliest observation in the time series of firm n. To obtain averages including the current and all 
preceding years, but no subsequent years, matrix V is transformed into  where 
    ∈  :    =
   
 
  
  + 1 −   
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3.4  Empirical findings 
 
3.4.1  Descriptives and univariate statistics 
Table 3.2 categorizes the 110 sampled reorganizing firms depending on whether the 
firms increase, decrease, or keep the same number of divisions after rearranging 
their  internal  structure.  The  majority  of  firms  increase  the  number  of  divisions, 
either by forming an entirely new segment or by splitting up existing ones. 11 firms 
change their structure several times during the sample period and do not strictly 
increase or decrease the number of divisions.  
Table 3.3 reports key descriptive statistics for the reorganizing firms in panel A 
using data from the periods both preceding and following the reorganization event 
as well as the control group of firms in panel B. The median reorganizing firm has 
USD 1.1bn in assets and a return on assets of 8.2%, with three operating segments. 
Panel B reveals that the control group is characterized by on average smaller firms, 
with  the  median  firm  holding  total  assets  of  USD  388m  and  employing  1,800 
employees. Despite the size differences, untabulated mean comparison tests show 
that both groups of firms do not differ significantly in terms of return on assets, 
book-to-market  ratio,  nor  the  measure  of  excess  value  of  diversified  firms. 
Preceding studies on internal capital allocations frequently make use of the latter 
construct to compare the sum of all individually valued divisions with that of the 
actual group equity market value (Berger & Ofek 1995; Bens & Monahan 2004). 
Despite the use of NAICS instead of SIC classifications as in previous studies, I find 
the average discount to be comparable to preceding studies at -19% for the control 
group  and  almost  similar  at  -21%  for  the  reorganizing  firms.  The  ratio  of 
restructuring costs to consolidated sales is almost identical at on average 1% for 
reorganizing firms. This supports the argument that the identified reorganizations 
address  the  organization  rather  than  the  operations  of  the  company,  i.e.  do  not 
involve above-average restructurings in the sense of plant closures or large-scale 
employee dismissals as captured in restructuring costs. 
Table 3.2 
Composition of reorganizing firms 
 
       
Number of reorganizing firms  110  100% 
  thereof:     
  increasing the number of segments  40  36% 
  decreasing the number of segments  34  31% 
  keeping the number of segments  25  23% 
  firms with multiple reorganizations  11  10% 
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Table 3.3 
Descriptive firm statistics         
         
Panel A – Reorganizing firms         
             
   Mean  Median   St. dev.  Min  Max  N 
Total assets (USD mm)  4,409  1,077  8,244  22  60,928  934 
Total sales (USD mm)  4,554  1,106  9,587  22  101,703  934 
Employees (‘000)  18.204  4.800  33.908  0.142  211.000  925 
ROA  0.082  0.082  0.074  -0.466  0.333  934 
BTM  0.603   0.511   0.457   0.000   4.104   848 
LEVERAGE  0.589  0.582  0.232  0.099  1.986  934 
DIVISIONS  3.302  3.000  1.190  2  7  934 
DIVERSIFICATION  0.443  0.453  0.391  0.000  1.740  934 
DIVERSITY  0.243  0.213  0.150  0.002  0.830  821 
ICM_EFF  0.004  0.000  0.191  -1.747  1.750  804 
EXCESSVALUE  -0.208  -0.245  0.609  -1.365  1.358  723 
Restructuring costs/total sales  0.013  0.006  0.020  -0.010  0.197  308 
             
             
Panel B – Control group of firms         
             
   Mean  Median  St. dev.  Min  Max  N 
Total assets (USD mm)  2,395  388  7,934  20  242,223  11,994 
Total sales (USD mm)  1,908  385  5,649  20  137,634  11,991 
Employees (‘000)  7.740  1.800  23.199  0.100  910.000  11,578 
ROA  0.047  0.068  0.147  -2.698  0.333  11,935 
BTM  0.714   0.533   0.675   0.001   4.104   9,877 
LEVERAGE  0.579  0.562  0.314  0.074  3.044  11,994 
DIVISIONS  2.731  2.000  0.998  2  10  11,996 
DIVERSIFICATION  0.285  0.143  0.327  -0.126  1.505  11,998 
DIVERSITY  0.336  0.300  0.201  0.001  2.129  8,937 
ICM_EFF  0.004  0.000  0.239  -1.747  1.750  4,619 
EXCESSVALUE
  -0.185  -0.207  0.613  -1.386  1.385  8,590 
Restructuring costs/total sales  0.022  0.007  0.102  -1.186  3.404  2,561 
             
             
ROA are earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets.  BTM is the book-to-market ratio of 
the firm as a conventional proxy of growth opportunities. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long- and short-
term debt to total assets. DIVISIONS is the number of operating divisions. DIVERSIFICATION is the 
Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) measure of unrelated diversification. DIVERSITY is the Rajan et 
al. (2000) measure of dispersion of the divisions’ growth opportunities. ICM_EFF is the Billet and 
Mauer (2003) measure of internal capital market efficiency, based on segment growth opportunities. 
EXCESSVALUE is the Berger and Ofek (1995) diversification discount measure, based on division sales. 
 
 
Thesis_JF Andre_v06.pdfChapter 3 
  60 
The descriptive statistics in table 3.3 contain all observations before and after 
the  reorganization.  For  a  preliminary  analysis  of  the  changes  surrounding 
reorganizations, I split the reorganizing firm year observations into those preceding 
and following the change in organization layout. Results from mean comparison t-
tests of these two sub-samples are depicted in table 3.4. The tabulations indicate an 
increase  in  the  internal  capital  market  efficiency  at  a  two-sided  significance 
threshold of 1%, pointing at post-reorganization improvements taking place within 
the organizations. The change in allocation efficiency is investigated in more detail 
in  the  analysis  on  hypothesis  3.  Return  on  assets  declined  by  1%  following  the 
reorganization event, statistically significant at 10%. The drop can be interpreted as 
the transitory decline in performance due to changing the organizational structure.  
   
Table 3.4 
Comparative firm statistics before and after reorganizing 
 
  Years < t
1    Years >= t
1   Difference  t-test 
 
Mean 
(1)  N   
Mean 
(2)  N    (1)-(2)  p-value 
                   
Total assets  
(USD mm)  3,372  388    3,805  449    -433  0.330  
Total sales  
(USD mm)  3,221  388    4,930  449    -1,710  0.009 *** 
Employees ('000)  16.514  381    16.217  447    0.297  0.897  
ROA  0.085  388    0.076  449    0.009  0.065 * 
BTM  0.633  355    0.596  396    0.037  0.285  
LEVERAGE  0.575  388    0.608  449    -0.033  0.046 ** 
DIVISIONS  3.108  388    3.334  449    -0.226  0.005 *** 
DIVERSIFICATION
  0.413  388    0.459  449    -0.046  0.080 * 
DIVERSITY  0.266  362    0.218  375    0.048  0.000 *** 
ICM_EFF  -0.015  351    0.022  372    -0.037  0.014 *** 
EXCESSVALUE  -0.184  290    -0.240  351    0.056  0.253  
Restructuring costs/total sales  0.015  74    0.012  189    0.003  0.300  
                         
1 The year of reorganization is indicated as year t. Hence, columns (1) and (2) list values for firm years 
preceding and following a reorganization, respectively. 
ROA are earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. BTM is the book-to-market ratio of 
the firm as a conventional proxy of growth opportunities. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long- and short-
term debt to total assets. DIVISIONS is the number of operating divisions. DIVERSIFICATION is the 
Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) measure of unrelated diversification. DIVERSITY is the Rajan et 
al. (2000) measure of dispersion of the divisions’ growth opportunities. ICM_EFF is the Billet and 
Mauer (2003) measure of internal capital market efficiency, based on segment growth opportunities. 
EXCESSVALUE is the Berger and Ofek (1995) diversification discount measure, based on division sales. 
***, **, and * identify significant results at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
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The table further documents a significant increase in both total firm sales as well as 
the number of operating segments, whereas the total number of employees does not 
change significantly. Taken together, this substantiates the appropriateness of the 
initial  sample  screening  procedure  to  select  firms  that  change  the  structure  of 
operations  of  its  existing  (human)  resources,  rather  than  expanding  or  reducing 
resources altogether.  
Table  3.5  depicts  Pearson  correlations  between  the  independent  variables 
 
Table 3.6                   
Probit model of incidence of reorganization on broad sample 
                   
                   
     
(1) Incidence of 
reorganization 
REORGANIZATIONt   





sign   
Marginal 
effect  Prob.      
Marginal 
effect  Prob.   
                   
ICM_EFFt-n  -    -0.068  0.003 ***    -0.052  0.016 ** 
DIVERSIFICATIONt-n  ?    0.028  0.351     0.034  0.233  
DIVERSITYt-n  ?    -0.045  0.368     -0.046  0.319  
DIVISIONSt-n  +    0.000  0.486     0.000  0.488  
EMPLOYEESt-n  +    0.023  0.001 ***    0.023  0.001 *** 
LEVERAGEt-n  -    -0.034  0.195     -0.050  0.129  
ROAt-n  +    0.107  0.149     0.151  0.105  
BTMt-n  +    -0.014  0.128     -0.015  0.126  
                   
Industry controls      No        Yes     
Year controls      No        Yes     
Intercept      Yes        Yes     
                   
Pseudo R2      0.069        0.137     
No. of observations      1,411        1,242     
                   
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at firm-level. The marginal effect is equal to the partial 
derivative δ E[y|x]/δx  =  φ(x’β)β  of  the  binary  response  model,  evaluated  at  sample  means. 
REORGANIZATION is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that alter their divisional structure and 0 
otherwise. ICM_EFF is the Billet and Mauer (2003) measure of internal capital market efficiency, based 
on segment growth opportunities. DIVERSIFICATION is the Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) 
measure of unrelated diversification. DIVERSITY is the Rajan et al. (2000) measure of dispersion of the 
divisions’ growth opportunities. DIVISIONS is the number of operating divisions. EMPLOYEES is the 
natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long- and short-
term debt to total assets. ROA are earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. BTM is the 
book-to-market ratio of the firm as a conventional proxy of growth opportunities. ***, **, and * identify 
significant results at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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employed in the probit models to document potential multicollinearity problems. 
None  of  the  correlation  factors  are  so  high  for  multicollinearity  to  be  of 
discomforting impact. In addition, the variance inflation factors of these variables do 
not  exceed  the  conventional  threshold  of  10  with  average  values  of  around  3 
(untabulated).  This  corroborates  the  impression  gained  from  inspecting  the 
correlations in table 3.5. 
 
 
3.4.2  Main analyses 
3.4.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
To investigate the determinants of divisional reorganization, I first run the main 
propensity specification on a sample comparing the control group of firms with all 
reorganizing firms, regardless of whether they increase, decrease, or keep the same 
number  of  segments  subsequent  to  the  reorganization  event.  To  investigate  the 
sensitivity of the results to including control variables, I first run specification (1) in 
table 3.6, excluding year and industry control variables. The results indicate that 
internal  capital  market  efficiency  is  negatively  related  to  the  occurrence  of 
reorganizations, significant at the 1% level. Industry and year controls are added in 
specification (2). The number of observations declines compared to specification (1) 
as  some  industry  and  year  indicator  variables  perfectly  predict  the  dichotomous 
dependent variable, i.e. exhibit no variation in the latter, so that these industries and 
years  are  excluded.  Internal  capital  market  efficiency  remains  significantly 
negatively related to the incidence of reorganization (p=1.6%) when adding industry 
and year controls. In other words, the lower the efficiency of internal allocations, the 
higher  the  probability  of  a  divisional  reorganization.  This  finding  confirms 
hypothesis 1. Of the other explanatory variables, only the number of employees 
relates significantly to changing the organizational structure. 
The  preceding  specifications  were  estimated  using  the  entire  group  of 
reorganizing firms, irrespective whether they increase, decrease or keep the number 
of  divisions  after  changing  their  structure.  Estimating  the  model  across  all 
reorganizations  irrespective  of  changes  in  the  number  of  segments  is  potentially 
imprecise  for  three  reasons.  First,  an  additional  division  might  rather  be  the 
reflection of growth in part of the firm’s operations, vice versa for combining a 
division with another one. Indeed, some companies that increased the number of 
divisions at times reported in their 10-k form that this was due to the engagement in 
a  growth  market.  Hence,  these  firms  are  potentially  changing  their  production 
function at the same time that they are changing their organization, which may make 
it difficult to infer on the effect of the latter alone. Incorporating return on assets and 
the market-to-book ratio in the preceding probit models can at least to some degree 
control  for  such  performance-  and  production-related  motives,  but  may  not 
sufficiently isolate them. Second, changing the number of divisions essentially also 
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changes the amount of disclosure communicated to the financial market. The impact 
on disclosure may lead firms to react differently to inefficient internal allocations, 
e.g. to be more likely to split a segment to reduce information asymmetries. Third, 
measuring misallocations is likely including a certain degree of measurement error 
for  each  division  contained  in  a  firm.  It  follows  that  changes  in  measured 
misallocation may result from changes in the number of underlying divisions and 
the degree of measurement precision absent any differences in actual misallocations. 
Table 3.7                   
Probit model of incidence of reorganization on focussed sample 
                   
                   
     
(1) Incidence of 
reorganization 
REORGANIZATIONt   





sign   
Marginal 
effect  Prob.      
Marginal 
effect  Prob.   
                   
ICM_EFFt-n  -    -0.030  0.000 ***    -0.046  0.000 *** 
DIVERSIFICATIONt-n  ?    -0.004  0.644     -0.013  0.317  
DIVERSITYt-n  ?    -0.023  0.113     -0.040  0.029 ** 
DIVISIONSt-n  +    0.001  0.310     0.003  0.184  
EMPLOYEESt-n  +    0.007  0.001 ***    0.012  0.000 *** 
LEVERAGEt-n  -    0.012  0.144     -0.006  0.378  
ROAt-n  +    0.078  0.020 **    0.127  0.009 *** 
BTMt-n  +    0.001  0.377     -0.002  0.328  
                   
Industry controls      No        Yes     
Year controls      No        Yes     
Intercept      Yes        Yes     
                   
Pseudo R2      0.152        0.267     
No. of observations      1,326        655     
                   
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at firm-level. The marginal effect is equal to the partial 
derivative  δE[y|x]/δx  =  φ(x’β)β  of  the  binary  response  model,  evaluated  at  sample  means. 
REORGANIZATION is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that alter their divisional structure and 0 
otherwise. ICM_EFF is the Billet and Mauer (2003) measure of internal capital market efficiency, based 
on segment growth opportunities. DIVERSIFICATION is the Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) 
measure of unrelated diversification. DIVERSITY is the Rajan et al. (2000) measure of dispersion of the 
divisions’ growth opportunities. DIVISIONS is the number of operating divisions. EMPLOYEES is the 
natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long- and short-
term debt to total assets. ROA are earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. BTM is the 
book-to-market ratio of the firm as a conventional proxy of growth opportunities. ***, **, and * identify 
significant results at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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In consideration of these concerns, I restrict the sample of reorganizing firms to 
those  that  keep  the  number  of  divisions  after  reorganization  or  that  reorganize 
several times with no strict increase or decrease in the number of divisions. This 
subsample  contains  firms  that  mostly  reassign  part  of  a  full  division  under  the 
auspices  of  another  one  and  is  likely  to  be  a  stronger  setting  to  analyze  the 
reassignment  of  decision  rights  among  division  managers  compared  to  studying 
reorganizations  in  general  that  may  dilute  the  analysis  with  the  confounding 
phenomena described above.  
Table  3.7  provides  the  results  from  analyzing  the  refined  sample  of 
reorganizing firms. Similar to the entire sample of reorganizations, I start with a 
reduced  model  excluding  industry  and  year  controls  in  specification  (1), 
documenting a negative association of allocation efficiency and the incidence of 
reorganizations  and  a  strong  statistical  significance  below  1%.  Augmenting  the 
model  with  indicator  variables  for  industry  and  year  in  specification  (2)  further 
reinforces  this  relation.  Compared  to  including  all  types  of  reorganizations,  the 
association of allocation with reorganizations in the full model in specification (2) is 
much  stronger  (t-value  -6.33,  p<1%).  As  in  the  full  sample  specifications,  the 
number  of  employees  is  strongly  related  to  the  regressand.  According  to 
expectations,  reorganizations  occur  more  often  for  firms  with  higher  return  on 
assets,  proxying  for  more  mature  companies.  Lastly,  the  Pseudo  R
2  for  the  two 
specifications  is  persistently  higher  than  in  the  full  sample.  The  higher  joint 
explanatory power of the independent variables indicates that the antecedents, which 
the model controls for, have a higher statistical significance in the focused sample. 
 
3.4.2.2 Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 posits that firms are less likely to react to inefficient allocations by 
changing  their  organizational  design  in  case  of  abundant  funds  at  disposal.  I 
augment the specifications shown in table 3.7 with an interaction term between cash 
flow abundance and the efficiency of internal capital allocations as well as a main 
effect of cash flow abundance. The results are reported in table 3.8. In specification 
(2),  the  main  effect  of  internal  capital  allocation  efficiency  is  negative  and 
significant at the 1% level, similar to the original model in table 3.7. The interaction 
term is positive at a statistical significance of 1% (t-value 2.97, p=0.2%), showing 
that cash flow abundance acts as a moderator on the inverse relationship between 
allocation efficiency and the occurrence of reorganizations. Firms with a relative 
abundance of cash, i.e. facing few financial constraints, are therefore less likely to 
react to inefficiencies in the fund allocation process by reorganizing. This makes 
intuitive sense as an abundance of capital diminishes the marginal cost of capital 
and thus the marginal cost of capital misallocation, making it more attractive for 
firms to keep the organizational status quo. The remaining coefficients resemble 
direction and significance of the original specification in table 3.7, indicating high 
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orthogonality of the two cash flow abundance terms. Ai and Norton (2003) argue 
that interaction terms in probit models require transformation before inferences on 
the significance are possible. In an untabulated test, I apply their method and find 
that the interaction term remains negative, but insignificant for the majority of the 
firms with an average z-statistic of 0.76. However, the standard deviation of this z-
statistic at 0.46 and a maximum value at 6.05 indicate that the z-statistic for the 
interaction  term  surpasses  the  critical  value  of  1.96  in  some  cases.  Therefore, 
Table 3.8                   
Probit interaction lag model of incidence of reorganization 
                   
                   
     
(1) Incidence of 
reorganization 
REORGANIZATIONt   





sign   
Marginal 
effect  Prob.      
Marginal 
effect  Prob.   
                   
ICM_EFFt-n  -    -0.030  0.000 ***    -0.048  0.000 *** 
ICM_EFFt-n 
*CFABUNDANCEt-n  +    0.022  0.157     0.055  0.002 *** 
CFABUNDANCEt-n  ?    0.002  0.693     0.009  0.204  
DIVERSIFICATIONt-n  ?    -0.004  0.648     -0.013  0.333  
DIVERSITYt-n  ?    -0.023  0.110     -0.042  0.028 ** 
DIVISIONSt-n  +    0.001  0.322     0.003  0.206  
EMPLOYEESt-n  +    0.007  0.001 ***    0.012  0.000 *** 
LEVERAGEt-n  -    0.012  0.139     -0.007  0.354  
ROAt-n  +    0.078  0.025 **    0.125  0.012 *** 
BTMt-n  +    0.001  0.370     -0.002  0.331  
                   
Industry controls      No        Yes     
Year controls      No        Yes     
Intercept      Yes        Yes     
                   
Pseudo R2      0.152        0.271     
No. of observations      1,326        655     
                   
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at firm-level. The marginal effect is equal to the partial 
derivative δ E[y|x]/δx  =  φ(x’β)β  of  the  binary  response  model,  evaluated  at  sample  means. 
REORGANIZATION is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that alter their divisional structure and 0 
otherwise. ICM_EFF is the Billet and Mauer (2003) measure of internal capital market efficiency, based 
on segment growth opportunities. CFABUNDANCE is computed using an indicator variable for the 
lowest quintile across firms and years of the ratio of net cash flows from financing activities scaled by 
sales. It indicates the abundance of cash flows in the firm, i.e. the inverse degree of cash constraints. 
DIVERSIFICATION is the Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) measure of unrelated diversification. 
DIVERSITY is the Rajan et al. (2000) measure of dispersion of the divisions’ growth opportunities. 
DIVISIONS is the number of operating divisions. EMPLOYEES is the natural logarithm of the number of 
employees in the firm. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long- and short-term debt to total assets. ROA are 
earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. BTM is the book-to-market ratio of the firm as 
a conventional proxy of growth opportunities. ***, **, and * identify significant results at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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hypothesis 2 holds at least for some of the sampled firms but the strength of this 
evidence is obviously limited.	 ﾠ 
 
3.4.2.3 Hypothesis 3  
Table  3.4  already  indicated  significant  improvements  in  internal  allocation 
efficiency when comparing the years prior to and after reorganizing in a two-sample 
t-test. This result, however, considers all types of division reorganizations instead of 
focusing on those reorganizations where the number of divisions does not change. 
Table 3.9                   
Comparative firm statistics before and after reorganizing         
                   
Panel A – Internal capital market efficiency of reorganizing vs. propensity matched control 
firms 
             
  Reorganizing firms
    Control firms
    Difference  t-test 
Time period  Mean (1)  N    Mean (2)  N    (1)-(2)  p-value 
                   
(a) before reorganizing                   
ICM_EFF  -0.051  88    0.040  92    -0.091  0.010 *** 
                   
(b) after reorganzing                   
ICM_EFF  -0.004  81    0.012  20    -0.016  0.545  
                  
                   
 
Panel B – Stock returns of reorganizing vs. propensity matched control firms 
                   
  Reorganizing firms 
  Control firms    Difference  t-test 
Time period  Mean (1)  N    Mean (2)  N    (1)-(2)  p-value 
                   
(a) before reorganizing                   
RETURN    -0.084  81    0.061  96    -0.145  0.010 *** 
                   
(b) after reorganzing                   
RETURN    0.134  92    0.153  50    -0.019  0.854  
                   
ICM_EFF  is  the  Billet  and  Mauer  (2003)  measure  of  internal  capital  market  efficiency,  based  on 
segment growth opportunities. RETURN is the stock return of a 12-month buy-and-hold strategy to 
capture shareholder wealth per firm-year. ***, **, and * identify significant results at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels (two-tailed). 
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This is likely to be the stronger setting due to fewer potentially confounding events, 
as argued above. Also, this inter-temporal comparison does not control for other 
changes in the economic environment that may affect allocation efficiency of all 
firms. To address both issues, I compare allocation efficiency values of reorganizing 
firms that keep the number of divisions to the group of control firms determined 
through propensity matching as described in section 3.3.2. Results are depicted in 
table  3.9,  panel  A.  The  significant  difference  in  allocation  efficiencies  before 
reorganization turns insignificant after changing the allocation of decision rights. 
This is in line with the argument that observed inefficiencies in capital allocation are 
transitory  and  that  firm  reactions  reduce  inefficiencies.  The  result  confirms 
hypothesis  3.  Additionally,  I  check  for  the  nonparametric  equality  of  medians 
between the groups and also run Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. The untabulated results 
from  both  alternatives  confirm  the  findings  from  the  two-sample  t-tests.  Capital 
allocation efficiencies are significantly lower compared to the control group before 
reorganizing  and  this  difference  vanishes  after  the  change  of  the  organizational 
layout.  
Direct estimations on the dimensions of this improvement are difficult since 
the  underlying  measure  developed  by  Billet  and  Mauer  (2003)  is  an  aggregated 
variable  without  immediate  interpretation.  However,  the  change  in  the  measure 
before and after reorganization of 0.047 (-0.004 – [-0.051]) constitutes 16.5% of the 
measure’s standard deviation before reorganizing, providing some indication of the 
benefits of firms reassigning decision rights among division managers.  
 
3.4.2.4 Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 posits that shareholders should ultimately gain from improving the 
efficiency  of  the  internal  allocation  process.  The  analysis  for  this  hypothesis 
resembles  the  test  of  hypothesis  3,  substituting  the  measure  of  internal  capital 
market efficiency with the 12-month buy-and-hold stock returns as depicted in panel 
B of table 3.9. The tests indicate that returns are significantly lower for reorganizing 
firms compared to their control group for the years preceding the reassignment of 
decision rights, whereas differences become insignificant in the subsequent years. 
This  confirms  hypothesis  4  and  corroborates  the  impression  gained  when 
considering  capital  allocation  efficiency  in  hypothesis  3  that  reorganizations 
reestablish parity with control firms. The same inference is also drawn from the 
untabulated tests of the nonparametric equality of medians and Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests. The diminishing differential between the reorganizing firms and the group of 
control  firms  from  initially  0.145  (0.061  –  [-0.084])  to  0.019  (0.153  –  0.134) 
illustrates the considerable effect on shareholder wealth. 
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3.4.3  Additional analyses and robustness tests 
3.4.3.1 Year-to-year changes 
The  binary  response  model  to  investigate  the  effect  of  internal  capital  market 
efficiency on the propensity to reorganize is specified in levels, i.e. inferences are 
drawn  from  absolute  differences  between  the  reorganizing  and  control  group  of 
Table 3.10                   
Probit interaction lag model of incidence of reorganization, specification in changes 
                   
                   
      (1) Focussed sample    (2) Broad sample 
     
Incidence of 
reorganization 






sign   
Marginal 
effect  Prob.      
Marginal 
effect  Prob.   
                   
ICM_EFFt-n  -    0.000  0.000 ***    -0.001  0.041 ** 
DIVERSIFICATIONt-n  ?    -0.006  0.760     0.000  0.000 *** 
DIVERSITYt-n  ?    0.015  0.282     0.066  0.025 ** 
DIVISIONSt-n  +    -0.038  0.173     0.164  0.008 *** 
EMPLOYEESt-n  +    0.018  0.239     0.019  0.062 * 
LEVERAGEt-n  -    -0.097  0.001 ***    -0.144  0.015 ** 
ROAt-n  +    0.014  0.049 **    0.001  0.384  
BTMt-n  +    -0.028  0.061 *    -0.003  0.405  
                   
Industry controls      Yes        Yes     
Year controls      Yes        Yes     
Intercept      Yes        Yes     
                   
Pseudo R2      0.470        0.193     
No. of observations      70        253 
 
   
                   
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at firm-level. The marginal effect is equal to the partial 
derivative δ E[y|x]/δx  = φ (x’β)β  of  the  binary  response  model,  evaluated  at  sample  means.  All 
explanatory  variables  are  expressed  in  percentage  changes  with  respect  to  the  preceding  period. 
REORGANIZATION is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that alter their divisional structure and 0 
otherwise. ICM_EFF is the Billet and Mauer (2003) measure of internal capital market efficiency, based 
on segment growth opportunities. DIVERSIFICATION is the Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) 
measure of unrelated diversification. DIVERSITY is the Rajan et al. (2000) measure of dispersion of the 
divisions’ growth opportunities. DIVISIONS is the number of operating divisions. EMPLOYEES is the 
natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long- and short-
term debt to total assets. ROA are earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. BTM is the 
book-to-market ratio of the firm as a conventional proxy of growth opportunities. ***, **, and * identify 
significant results at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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firms. Alternatively, it is conceivable that variations in changes over time rather than 
variations in absolute levels of capital allocation efficiency initiate reorganizations. 
For instance, reorganizing firms may exhibit stronger declines in capital allocation 
efficiency than control firms. I analyze this alternative by calculating year-to-year 
percentage changes in the variables and rerun the main probit model from equation 
(3.1). The disadvantage of this approach is that two consecutive years have to be 
available to obtain percentage changes. This considerably restricts the number of 
observations that can enter the analysis. Results are provided in table 3.10. I run the 
specification using the sample of reorganizing firms that do not change the number 
of divisions, which was argued to be the stronger setting, in column (1), as well as 
on the full sample of all reorganizing firms in column (2) to overcome possible 
disadvantages resulting from the limited number of observations. For both samples, 
results indicate that firms are more likely to change their divisional organization the 
stronger  internal  capital  market  efficiency  declines  from  year  to  year.  This 
strengthens the evidence found in the original probit model to support hypothesis 1.  
 
3.4.3.2 Probit regression using propensity score matching 
The main probit models used to investigate hypothesis 1 consider all multi-segment 
firms in the sample period for comparison with the reorganizing firms to minimize 
the  amount  of  subjectivity  that  is  inevitably  being  introduced  when  selecting  a 
commensurate control group. However, there are various discrepancies in the range 
of  firm  characteristics  between  the  sampled  reorganizing  firms  and  their  control 
group, as noted before. To ensure that these differences do not introduce systematic 
bias  into  the  analysis,  I  run  alternative  tests  using  propensity  score  matching 
following  the  same  procedure  as  in  the  analysis  for  hypothesis  3  and  4.  After 
obtaining the propensity matched control group of firms, I run a probit model on the 
reorganizing  and  matched  control  firms  to  trace  the  impact  of  allocation 
inefficiencies  on  the  probability  to  reorganize.  While  obtaining  matches  for  all 
reorganizing firms, a number of control firms have missing values for the measure 
of allocation efficiency. This reduces the sample size to n=102.  
Results are presented in table 3.11. Regressing the measure for internal capital 
market efficiency on the incidence of reorganization alone in specification (2) does 
not  yield  a  significant  relation  at  conventional  levels.  Excluding  the  variables 
originally used for propensity matching is suitable in case of close matches so that 
matching variables should not be significantly related to the regressand. However, 
differences  in  the  matching  dimensions  may  persist  after  matching  so  that  it  is 
sensible  to  include  the  matching  variables  as  regressors,  results  of  which  are 
presented in specification (1). Indeed, the logarithm of the number of employees is 
significantly  related  to  the  regressand  and  reveals  that  even  after  matching 
differences between the group of reorganizing and control firms persist. Including 
the  matching  variables,  the  measure  for  internal  capital  market  efficiency  is 
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significantly  related  to  the  reorganization  of  decision  rights  among  division 
managers at p=6.0%.  
 
3.4.3.3 Geographic segments 
A potential concern of correlated omitted variables in this study stems from other 
factors that may lead firm management to change their organizational structure and 
that influence the efficiency of capital allocations at the same time. For instance, a 
decline  in  general  product  market  conditions  could  be  the  root  cause  for 
Table 3.11                   
Probit matched sample model of incidence of reorganization 
                   
                   
     
(1) Incidence of 
reorganization 
REORGANIZATION   





sign   
Marginal 
effect  Prob.      
Marginal 
effect  Prob.    
                   
ICM_EFF  -    -0.457  0.060 *    -0.236  0.143   
DIVERSIFICATION  ?    -0.042  0.905          
DIVERSITY  ?    0.014  0.902          
DIVISIONS  +    0.059  0.285          
EMPLOYEES  +    0.039  0.029 **         
LEVERAGE  -    -0.014  0.477          
ROA  +    0.522  0.294          
BTM  +    0.093  0.196          
                   
Intercept      Yes        Yes     
                   
Pseudo R2      0.053        0.008     
No. of observations      102        102     
                   
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at firm-level. The marginal effect is equal to the partial 
derivative δ E[y|x]/δx  =  φ(x’β)β  of  the  binary  response  model,  evaluated  at  sample  means. 
REORGANIZATION is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that alter their divisional structure and 0 
otherwise. ICM_EFF is the Billet and Mauer (2003) measure of internal capital market efficiency, based 
on segment growth opportunities. DIVERSIFICATION is the Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) 
measure of unrelated diversification. DIVERSITY is the Rajan et al. (2000) measure of dispersion of the 
divisions’ growth opportunities. DIVISIONS is the number of operating divisions. EMPLOYEES is the 
natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long- and short-
term debt to total assets. ROA are earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. BTM is the 
book-to-market ratio of the firm as a conventional proxy of growth opportunities. ***, **, and * identify 
significant results at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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reorganizing the firm and for inefficient allocations. Also, the firm may reorganize 
due to the entering or exiting a product market. I address this issue as much as 
possible already through control variables as well as through the initial identification 
of reorganizing firms by excluding various firms where 10-k disclosure hints at 
external  rather  than  internal  reasons  for  the  change  in  company  structure,  as 
described in the sample selection procedure. However, it might still be the case that 
firms  either  do  not  explicitly  state  that  market  conditions  changed  or  that  the 
selected control variables do not appropriately filter these effects. For that reason I 
study  geographic  segment  disclosures  to  verify  that  external  market  conditions 
remain stable for the selected reorganizing firms. 
FASB segment reporting regulation requires firms to disclose revenues and 
assets by geographic area (SFAS 131, para. 104-107), in addition to disclosure about 
operating  segments.  Even  though  the  two  forms  of  segment  disclosure  may 
coincide, the latter informs about the actual divisional structure, whereas geographic 
segment  reporting  is  rather  meant  to  facilitate  the  assessment  of  the  firm’s  risk 
concentration by geographic area
23. Purely organizational changes to the divisional 
structure  that  are  the  focus  of  this  study  should  result  in  a  change  in  business 
segment reporting alone, whereas geographic segments should remain unaffected 
                                                 
23 An inspection of the dataset yields that geographic and business segment reporting do not coincide for 
the vast majority of sampled firms, based on a comparison of segment names and alternatively segment 
sales between the two types of reports. 
Table 3.12           
Geographic segment statistics before and after reorganizing       
           
  Mean  Difference  t-test 
Type of reorganizing firm 
prior 
(1)  (2)  (1)-(2)  p-value 
           
(a) Increasing the number of business segments           
Number of geographic segments  2.622  3.698  -1.076  0.000 *** 
Diversification
1  0.538  0.677  -0.139  0.010 *** 
           
(b) Decreasing the number of business segments           
Number of geographic segments  3.400  2.788  0.612  0.050 ** 
Diversification
1  0.529  0.421  0.108  0.079 * 
           
(c) Keeping the number of business segments           
Number of geographic segments  3.418  3.692  -0.274  0.404  
Diversification
1  0.671  0.735  -0.064  0.449  
                 
Columns (1) and (2) list values for firm years preceding and following a reorganization, respectively. 
1 Diversification is the Bushman et al. (1995) measure of diversification, in this case based on total sales 
of geographic segments 
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around the time of reorganization since the company should continue to serve the 
same markets irrespective of its internal organization. To test the validity of this 
presumption, I analyze the 110 reorganizing firms with respect to the number of 
geographic  segments  reported  as  well  as  considering  an  aggregate  corporate 
measure  of  the  firm’s  geographic  segment  sales,  the  measure  of  overall 
diversification  as  in  Bushman  et  al.  (1995)
24.  Table  3.12  reports  a  significant 
increase  (decrease)  in  the  number  of  geographic  segments  and  in  geographic 
diversification  for  firms  that  increase  (decrease)  the  number  of  segments  after 
reorganizing.  This  suggests  that  not  only  organizational  structure  but  also 
underlying operations changed for these types of reorganizations. However, neither 
number  of  geographic  segments  nor  geographic  diversification  changed  for  the 
subsample of reorganizing firms that did not alter the number of segments. This 
supports the choice to focus mainly on these firms in the earlier analyses rather than 
on the entire sample of reorganizing firms, where changes to operations apart from 
only reorganizations potentially lower the precision of the analyses. 
 
3.4.3.4 Additional model variations 
The previously described binary response models all use probit specifications based 
on the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The findings are robust to 
the  alternative  use  of  standard  normal  logistic  distribution  functions  with  logit 
models. The findings are also robust for taking present rather than lagged values for 
the  independent variables in all regression models. Since reorganizations can be 
lengthy procedures that at times have durations of more than one year, I also vary 
the  event  year:  Instead  of  using  all  firm  years  up  to  the  point  when  the 
reorganization  was  reported,  I  omit  year  t-1  up  until  year  t-3  in  separate 
specifications. The results remain comparable. 
As indicated in the analysis on hypothesis 1, firms may also reorganize for 
reasons unrelated to allocation inefficiencies, for instance due to growth of one of 
their operations that require separate management supervision. To control for this 
alternative, I rerun the model based on equation (3.1) in untabulated tests excluding 
those firms where the 10-k report suggests that the reorganization may be partly 
linked to expanding the firm’s business. I additionally exclude reorganizations that 
appear to be linked to an earlier financial distress situation, which is the case for 3 of 
the  110  reorganizing  firms.  The  results  using  this  altered  sample  remain  highly 
comparable and almost unchanged.  
I also vary the test on hypothesis 1 by applying an alternative measure of the 
quality of internal allocations developed in chapter 2 of this dissertation. The results 
are depicted in specification (1) of table 3.13. Even though the more extensive data 
requirements  of  this  alternative  proxy  considerably  restrict  the  sample  size  and 
                                                 
24 Since most firms have several industries per geographic segments, measuring unrelated diversification 
based on geographic segments is not feasible. 
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require  using  the  broad  sample  of  reorganizing  firms,  the  findings  remain  very 
similar to those based on the measure from Billet and Mauer (2003).  
To further investigate if firms are more likely to reorganize at low, rather than 
high levels of allocation efficiency, I recode the main explanatory variable using 
two indicator variables for observations where efficiency takes on positive values 
Table 3.13                   
Probit interaction lag model of incidence of reorganization 
                   
                   
     
(1) Incidence of 
reorganization 
REORGANIZATIONt   





sign   
Marginal 
effect  Prob.      
Marginal 
effect  Prob.   
                   
Allocation qualityt-n  -    -0.510  0.019 **        
Medium ICM efficiencyt-n  -           0.011  0.158  
High ICM efficiencyt-n  -           -0.012  0.041 ** 
                 
DIVERSIFICATIONt-n  ?    0.055  0.112     -0.010  0.521  
DIVERSITYt-n  ?    0.056  0.316     -0.044  0.034 ** 
DIVISIONSt-n  +    -0.004  0.383     0.004  0.174  
EMPLOYEESt-n  +    0.022  0.003 ***    0.012  0.001 *** 
LEVERAGEt-n  -    -0.059  0.154     -0.023  0.214  
ROAt-n  +    0.122  0.254     0.087  0.109  
BTMt-n  +    -0.036  0.032 **    -0.006  0.200  
                   
Industry controls      Yes        Yes     
Year controls      Yes        Yes     
Intercept      Yes        Yes     
                   
Pseudo R2      0.214        0.250     
No. of observations      384        655     
                   
Standard errors are corrected for clustering at firm-level. The marginal effect is equal to the partial 
derivative δ E[y|x]/δx  =  φ(x’β)β  of  the  binary  response  model,  evaluated  at  sample  means. 
REORGANIZATION is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms that alter their divisional structure and 0 
otherwise. Allocation quality is the measure of internal capital allocation quality measure developed in 
chapter 2 of this dissertation. Medium (high) ICM efficiency are indicator variables based on the Billet 
and Mauer (2003) measure of internal capital market efficiency, ICM_EFF, equal to 1 if ICM_EFF=0 
(ICM_EFF>0). DIVERSIFICATION is the Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1995) measure of unrelated 
diversification. DIVERSITY is the Rajan et al. (2000) measure of dispersion of the divisions’ growth 
opportunities. DIVISIONS is the number of operating divisions. EMPLOYEES is the natural logarithm of 
the number of employees in the firm. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long- and short-term debt to total assets. 
ROA are earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. BTM is the book-to-market ratio of 
the firm as a conventional proxy of growth opportunities. ***, **, and * identify significant results at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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and  where  the  Billet  and  Mauer  algorithm  sets  allocation  efficiency  between 
positive and negative values at zero. I expect that firms with positive values for 
allocation  efficiency  are  less  likely  to  reorganize  than  firms  with  inefficient 
allocations. Results in column (2) in table 3.13 confirm these expectations. 
In the analysis on hypothesis 2, I construct a new proxy for the level cash 
constraints  within  a  firm,  CFABUNDANCE.  To  verify  my  findings,  I  rerun  the 
analyses in table 3.7 in untabulated tests using a comparable measure as in Core and 
Guay (2001), which is based on the three year average of common and preferred 
dividends plus cash flow from investments less cash flow from operations, scaled by 
total  assets.  I  further  indicate  high  and  low  values  in  the  resulting  variable  by 
applying a median split. Coefficients and levels of significance closely resemble the 
results in table 3.7. 
I  vary  the  analysis  on  the  inter-temporal  effects  in  hypothesis  3  and  4  by 
extending the underlying sample from firms that reorganize and keep the number of 
divisions to all types of reorganizations, i.e. where also the number of divisions 
changes. The results are comparable to the ones depicted in table 3.9. Stock returns 
as well as capital allocation efficiency improve at significant levels vis-à-vis the 
control group of firms.  
 
 
3.5  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I examine whether diversified firms reassign decision rights among 
division  managers  through  divisional  reorganizations  in  response  to  inefficient 
allocations of internal capital between divisions and find supporting evidence. The 
effect is persistent across various specifications and robustness checks. A significant 
increase in the allocation efficiency following the reorganization event additionally 
documents  that  reorganizing  the  divisional  structure  is  effective  in  containing 
inefficient internal capital transactions. Moreover, I investigate if firms subject their 
decision to change the assignment of decision rights to a trade-off between costs and 
benefits. I specifically analyze whether firms are less likely to reorganize subsequent 
to inefficient capital allocations when relatively well endowed with cash, i.e. when 
the cost of misallocations is relatively low. I document some confirming evidence, 
but this result does not hold under all robustness tests. Lastly, results indicate that 
stock returns increase following the redistribution of decision rights, illustrating that 
shareholders benefit from these organizational changes. 
This  study  inevitably  faces  a  number  of  limitations.  Firstly,  company 
reorganizations  can  be  complex  processes  with  numerous  antecedents,  at  times 
taking place over several years. It is therefore difficult to pin down an exact event 
date  when  the  reorganization  took  place  since  actual  implementation  may  have 
taken several months or years. This makes it inherently difficult to select the precise 
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period  during  which  the  reorganization  was  triggered.  Secondly,  purely  internal 
reorganizations absent any acquisitions or divestments of part of the firm are very 
rare  events,  imposing  constraints  on  the  sample  size  as  well  as  the  resulting 
statistical  power.  Thirdly,  despite  their  frequent  application  in  various  studies, 
measures of internal capital allocation efficiency remain approximations that have to 
rely on assumption when and where capital should have been allocated. Imprecision 
in capturing actual internal transfers is therefore inevitable. Lastly, disclosure about 
reorganizations in 10-k reports is frequently kept brief with respect to the specific 
nature of the changes, giving rise to potential coding errors during the manual data 
gathering process. 
Regardless of its limitations, this study contributes to the extant literature in 
multiple ways. It adds to the growing literature on internal capital markets (cf. Stein 
2003) by showing how firms react to inefficient allocations. Moreover, I extend the 
literature  on  organizational  design  offering  insights  into  the  determinants  of 
divisionalized firm structures. Baiman et al. (1995) investigate the role of relative 
expertise within the firm and the relative importance of the business unit, whereas 
Moers  (2006)  examines  how  the  firm’s  choice  to  delegate  depends  on  the 
availability  of  appropriate  performance  measures.  This  study  adds  that  internal 
capital allocations are an additional driver of intra-firm delegation and the allocation 
of decision rights between division managers. This is of particular interest as only 
very few prior studies speak to the determinants of the horizontal scope of authority 
(Mookherjee 2006). 
In  the  light  of  the  scarcity  of  studies  on  divisional  reorganizations,  future 
research may investigate numerous aspects that were not or only briefly touched 
upon in this study. One possibility is to focus on the financial market effects of the 
change in segment reporting that necessarily follow from reconfigurations of the 
divisional  layout  due  to  financial  reporting  regulation.  Future  research  may 
additionally use a broader sample over longer time periods to reinforce the evidence 
provided in this study. 
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Variable name  Description 
BTM  BTM is the book-to-market ratio of the firm as a 
conventional proxy of growth opportunities. 
CFABUNDANCE  CFABUNDANCE is computed using an indicator 
variable for the lowest quintile across firms and years 
of the ratio of net cash flows from financing activities 
scaled by sales. It indicates the abundance of cash 
flows in the firm, i.e. the inverse degree of cash 
constraints. 
DIVERSIFICATION  DIVERSIFICATION is the Bushman, Indjejikian, and 
Smith (1995) measure of unrelated diversification. 
DIVERSITY  DIVERSITY is the Rajan et al. (2000) measure of 
dispersion of the divisions’ growth opportunities. 
DIVISIONS  DIVISIONS is the number of operating divisions. 
EMPLOYEES  EMPLOYEES is the natural logarithm of the number 
of employees in the firm. 
EXCESSVALUE  EXCESSVALUE is the Berger and Ofek (1995) 
diversification discount measure, based on division 
sales. 
ICM_EFF  ICM_EFF is the Billet and Mauer (2003) measure of 
internal capital market efficiency, based on segment 
growth opportunities. 
LEVERAGE  LEVERAGE is the ratio of long- and short-term debt 
to total assets. 
REORGANIZATION  REORGANIZATION is an indicator variable equal to 
1 for firms that alter their divisional structure and 0 
otherwise. 
RETURN  RETURN are stock returns of a 12-month buy-and-
hold strategy to capture shareholder wealth per firm-
year. 
ROA  ROA are earnings before interest and taxes divided by 
total assets. 
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Capital budget renegotiations and the adverse 







Abstract: A large part of the literature on investment decisions taken within multi-
divisional firms focuses on investment outcomes whereas relatively little is known 
about  the  underlying  capital  budget  process.  We  analyze  these  processes,  more 
specifically  the  effect  of  information  and  agency  problems  on  the  allocation  of 
capital to individual investment projects with multiple stages, which allow an agent 
to renegotiate project budgets with the principal. Despite the prevalence of multi-
stage  budget  processes  in  practice,  prior  studies  mostly  assume  only  a  single 
negotiation  period  and  provide  no  clear  indication  how  agents  behave  in  multi-
period settings. Based on capital budget data from a large, multi-divisional firm, we 
find that agents incorporate more slack into budgets during renegotiations the more 
the principal delegates investment decision rights to the agent and to a higher extent 
at the outset of an investment when the principal has less information about the true 
nature of the investment. We further find that the agent takes advantage of multi-
period budget processes to shift budgetary slack between investment stages of a 
project, an effect that has not been considered in prior studies. The agent does so to 
a higher extent the more decision rights are delegated and the less uncertainty the 
agent faces about his consumption preferences of slack. 
 
 
                                                 
25 This chapter is based on a working paper co-authored with Frank Moers and Alexander Brüggen. 
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4.1  Introduction 
 
In this paper, we empirically examine the capital budgeting process of a large multi-
divisional  firm  and  the  implications  of  the  dynamics  that  underlie  this  process. 
Although investment decisions are one of the most important decisions made by 
firms  (e.g.,  Harris  &  Raviv  1996),  relatively  little  is  known  about  the  capital 
allocation  process  that  triggers  these  investment  decisions.  We  examine  how 
information  and  agency  problems  affect  the  allocation  of  capital  to  individual 
investment projects over time, starting from the initial investment proposal moving 
to subsequent renegotiations. 
Most of the literature on within-firm  investment  decisions  is  related  to  the 
literature  on  internal  capital  markets.  This  literature  stresses  the  agency  conflict 
between division managers and the CEO and how the agent’s rent-seeking behavior 
affects internal capital allocation (e.g., Rajan et al. 2000; Scharfstein & Stein 2000). 
One of the main insights from this literature is that rent-seeking results in weaker 
divisions  being  cross-subsidized  by  stronger  divisions,  which  is  inefficient 
(compared to a first-best setting). The studies in this area all focus on investment 
outcomes rather than the underlying capital budgeting process. Understanding the 
underlying process, however, allows for more insights into investment outcomes 
because the characteristics of this process do not only vary between firms but more 
importantly also between individual investment projects of a single division. 
 The  literature  on  budgeting  in  general  and  capital  budgeting  in  particular 
offers a more detailed look at how capital budgets can be distorted. Typically in a 
budgeting  context  the  agent  moves  first  to  provide  the  principal  with  a  limited 
number  of  choices  (e.g.,  Bower  1970;  Marino  &  Matsusaka  2005).  Given  the 
existence of information asymmetry between the principal and agent on the exact 
nature of the investment project, the agent will try to incorporate slack into the 
budget for private consumption purposes (e.g., Antle & Eppen 1985).
26 Even though 
the principal is aware of the agent’s incentive, he is unable to verify with certainty 
the amount of slack in the budget, resulting in situations of overinvestment. 
This is, however, only part of the story. Actual capital budgeting processes 
have  two  important  features  that  are  underexplored  in  the  (empirical)  literature. 
First, in larger firms, decision rights to allocate capital to investment projects are 
rarely held by a single principal and some decision rights have to be decentralized. 
As a result, there are “high delegation” investment projects with little involvement 
and control by the principal and “low delegation” investment projects with high 
involvement and control by the principal. Marino and Matsusaka (2005) analytically 
show that delegation is optimal when agents who have investment projects that the 
principal would not prefer can pool with agents who have projects that the principal 
                                                 
26 Private consumption should be interpreted broadly here in the sense that it does not only relate to perks 
or investments in pet projects, but also to not having to put in high effort to efficiently manage costs. 
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would  prefer.  The  intuition  is  that,  if  the  principal  would  require  an  approval 
process, i.e., “low delegation”, then the former group of agents would strategically 
“over-propose” so as to mislead the principal, obviously making things even worse 
for the principal. This implies that (1) slack is more likely to be part of the budget 
when delegation is high and (2) that this is an equilibrium outcome. 
A  second  important  feature  is  that  capital  budgeting  is  a  dynamic  process. 
Actual  investment  processes  offer  the  agent  the  possibility  to  renegotiate  the 
allocated budget, as most capital investment projects bear considerable uncertainty 
concerning the exact costs. This renegotiation is analyzed specifically in this paper. 
In renegotiating the allocated budget, two types of changes can occur: (1) changes to 
the total budget of the investment project and (2) changes to the timing of costs 
within the already allocated budget. We refer to these behaviors as cost escalation 
and  cost  shifting,  respectively.  In  addition  to  occurring  for  purely  operational 
reasons, we argue that these behaviors are systematically related to delegation and 
as such (also) occur for opportunistic reasons. In particular, we argue that delegation 
allows  the  agent  to  exploit  his  information  asymmetry  and  add  slack  during 
renegotiations, resulting in cost escalation. Assuming that information asymmetry 
gradually declines over the course of the investment, we predict that cost escalation 
is  predominately  related  to  delegation  during  the  early  stages  of  the  investment 
process.  In  contrast,  we  predict  that  cost  shifting  is  predominately  related  to 
delegation  during  the  more  mature  stages  of  the  investment  process  for  the 
following reasons. When an agent with investment decision rights builds slack into 
the  budget,  he  is  uncertain  about  his  consumption  preferences  during  the  later 
periods of the investment project and therefore spreads slack over these periods in 
an arbitrary fashion (e.g., equal split). Over time, i.e., during the more mature stages 
of the investment, this uncertainty is resolved and the agent will reallocate his build-
in slack according to his revealed consumption preferences, resulting in cost shifting 
between periods. 
In  sum,  we  predict  that  delegation  is  systematically  related  to  both  cost 
escalation and cost shifting for reasons of information asymmetry and uncertainty 
about  consumption  preferences,  respectively.  Given  that  both  information 
asymmetry  and  uncertainty  decrease  over  the  course  of  the  investment,  we 
specifically predict that, for an agent with investment decision rights, cost escalation 
is  the  dominant  behavior  during  the  early  stages  of  the  investment,  while  cost 
shifting is the dominant behavior during the more mature stages. 
We test our predictions using a unique sample of capital budgeting data of a 
globally operating, multidivisional firm that is listed in one of the major European 
market indices. Based on an analysis of data for individual investment projects, we 
find  that  requested  increases  in  a  project’s  total  investment  sum  are  positively 
associated with the project’s investment decision rights allocated to the agent. We 
further find that this relationship is predominately present during the early stages of 
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the investment, confirming our expectation that information asymmetry is exploited 
most when it is the highest. Regarding cost shifting, we find that the amount of costs 
requested  to  postpone  to  later  periods  and/or  advance  to  the  current  period  is 
positively associated with investment decision rights associated with the project. 
Consistent  with  our  expectation  that  uncertainty  about  consumption  preferences 
resolves over time, we find that the relationship between cost shifting and delegation 
is especially present during the more mature stages of the investment. Additional 
analyses and robustness checks all confirm our main results, and overall our results 
are consistent with expectations. 
We contribute to the literature in several related ways.  In  contrast  to  most 
studies  in  this  area,  we  examine  the  dynamics  of  the  capital  budgeting  process 
instead of the static investment outcomes that result from this process. Examining 
the dynamics is important because investment projects are typically multi-period in 
nature and allow the agent to renegotiate during the course of the investment. We 
first of all show that this renegotiation is nontrivial, as it results in an increase in a 
project’s  total  investment  sum  of  more  than  nine  percent  on  average  per 
renegotiation (i.e., per budget round). Understanding this renegotiating process is 
therefore important because it provides insights into why investment costs escalate. 
We show that investment costs predominately escalate when the agent can exploit 
his information asymmetry, i.e., when he has significant investment decision rights. 
The total investment sum of high delegation investment projects increases by more 
than 15 percent on average per renegotiation, while that of low delegation projects 
remains  on  average  the  same.  We  furthermore  contribute  to  the  literature  by 
showing that the agent’s behavior is itself dynamic in the sense that it changes over 
the course of the investment project. An agent with investment decision rights will 
build in slack during the early stages of the investment and as such cost escalation 
occurs during this period. In later periods, the agent engages in cost shifting so as to 
reallocate  the  build-in  slack  to  match  his  consumption  preferences.  Finally,  we 
contribute to the literature by examining capital budgeting and capital investments at 
a greater level of detail than done to date. As a result, our study provides significant 
insights into the interplay of capital budgeting processes, delegation, and investment 
outcomes. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 4.2, we discuss 
related  research  and  in  section  4.3  we  subsequently  develop  our  hypotheses.  In 
section 4.4 and 4.5, we describe our research site and data, respectively. We present 
our main results, additional analyses, and robustness checks in section 4.6 and we 
conclude in section 4.7. 
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4.2  Related research 
 
4.2.1  Internal capital markets 
Capital investment decisions are among the central elements of managing firms and 
have  a  critical  influence  on  the  future  development  of  the  investing  entity. 
Maintaining  control  over  the  investment  process  is  therefore  vital  but  becomes 
increasingly challenging as firms expand in size and investment volume, requiring a 
rising  number  of  investment  decisions  to  be  decentralized  across  the  firm’s 
hierarchy. This delegation has the benefit of allowing the delegating agent to hold a 
wider  portfolio  of  operations  given  benefits  to  scope  and  scale.  Delegation  also 
allows agents within the firm to specialize on their assigned task. Contrasting these 
benefits, a continuing stream of research documents the prevalence of the costs of 
delegation with earlier accounts in Williamson (1967) on the exacerbating loss of 
control between hierarchies in expanding firms. A related, more recent stream of 
literature on internal capital markets investigates the loss of control in diversified 
firms  when  subordinate  holders  of  investment  decision  rights  use  private 
information to lobby for excess funds during the capital allocation process, typically 
between division and the firm’s headquarters (Rajan et al. 2000; Scharfstein & Stein 
2000).  With  the  exception  of  Villalonga  (2004),  empirical  studies  in  this  field 
generally resort to segment reporting to infer on conflicts about capital allocation 
efficiencies. The choice for studying the conflict at this aggregated level is in part 
driven by the challenge for any external researchers to obtain sufficiently detailed 
data below division level that firms typically hold back due to their sensitive nature. 
Due  to  this  lack  of  detail,  however,  the  exact  process  how  agents  specifically 
attempt  to  obtain  excess  funds  during  the  allocation  process  remains  largely 
unaddressed.  
 
4.2.2  Budgetary slack 
Similar to the studies on internal capital market, a main building block in the slack 
literature is that an agent exploits private information to obtain more resources for 
perquisite  spending  (Antle  &  Eppen  1985),  i.e.  attempts  to  increase  slack  in 
investment proposals. The extant literature in this field is predominantly defined by 
experiments and analytic evidence, typically employing a synthesized two-player 
setting with superior and subordinate bargaining about the budget with single-period 
negotiations  and  investments  (e.g.  Chow  et  al.  1988;  Arya  et  al.  2000).  Actual 
investment projects, however, frequently last longer than only one budget period 
and budget processes typically enable the subordinate to revise budgets even after 
the start of the investment project. This aspect has received only very little attention 
in the literature. Even in the few studies that implement multiple budget periods 
(Antle & Fellingham 1990) or multiple rounds of renegotiation (Fisher et al. 2002) 
slack  is  always  introduced  prior  to  the  investment  period,  i.e.  neglecting 
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renegotiations. Harris & Raviv (1996) analytically investigate a setting where an 
agent may request additional funds after being granted a certain spending limit in 
order to obtain more funds for a project. More recently, Marino & Matsusaka (2005) 
analytically  show  how  delegation  of  investment  decision  rights  affects  agents’ 
behavior in terms of budget proposals to the principal. However, no prior study has 
yet produced detailed empirical evidence how delegation affects adjustments of the 




4.3  Development of hypotheses 
 
In order to clarify how slack arises throughout the course of an investment project it 
is instructive to first consider the characteristics of a generic multi-period capital 
budget  process  in  decentralized  firms.  This  process  in  which  central  firm 
management (the principal) decides how capital is allocated among the investments 
projects  proposed  by  each  of  the  firm’s  business  units  (the  agents)  can  be 
characterized in five different stages, as illustrated in figure 4.1. The budget request 
round  begins  with  the  agent  submitting  a  project  (stage  1)  to  the  principal, 
specifying its expected duration as well as required funds for each future budget 
period.  In  stage  2,  the  principal  then  decides  how  closely  the  project  should  be 
reviewed by delegating decision rights over the projects among different levels of 
management (cf. Marino & Matsusaka 2005): more important investments are likely 
reviewed with more scrutiny at higher management levels. Vice versa, less critical 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Stylized budget process. Area A signifies the actual investment 
cost of a project per budget period, area B is the incorporated budgetary slack. 







I  II  III  … 
1 – submission of investment project  4 – main investment phase & renegotiation 
2 – review period  5 – end of investment project 
3 – approval of project   
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projects  involve  fewer  top-level  managers.  Once  reviewed,  the  principal  may 
request  changes  or  turn  the  submitted  project  down.  In  case  of  acceptance,  the 
principal transfers the requested capital and notifies the agent (stage 3) to commence 
the  main  investment.  The  main  investment  stage  can  span  up  to  N  separate 
investment periods (stage 4), before the project is finished in stage 5. 
At the end of each individual investment period in stage 4, the principal offers 
the  agent  the  possibility  to  renegotiate  the  project’s  cost  specifications  of  the 
following  periods.  This  possibility  is  offered  because  the  agent  is  subject  to 
uncertainty  at  the  outset  of  the  project  about  how  the  investment  will  exactly 
develop. The initial cost planning is therefore only an estimate that may have to be 
adapted to factors that lie outside the control of the agent. For instance, increasing 
competition  may  necessitate  building  a  factory  faster  than  initially  planned. 
Alternatively,  raw  material  price  changes  may  alter  construction  costs.  During 
budget renegotiations, an agent can therefore request to (1) change the total costs 
initially granted and/or (2) shift costs between periods, postponing present costs to 
the future or conversely accelerating future costs to the current period. 
These renegotiations can occur for purely operational reasons. However, the 
agent may also take advantage of this opportunity to modify the budget in a way that 
serves his own rather than the firm’s best interest. Since the agent’s interests are not 
entirely in line with those of the principal, he will prefer a higher capital budget 
even if this is detrimental to the firm, a view which is consistent with the literature 
on internal capital markets and budgetary slack. To obtain excess funds for private 
consumption  (Antle  &  Eppen  1985),  the  agent  can  incorporate  slack  for  each 
investment period in stage 4 (partition B, figure 4.1) beyond the actual cost of the 
project  per  period  (partition  A,  figure  4.1).  Two  issues  are  important  here:  (1) 
information asymmetry between the principal and agent and (2) agent’s uncertainty 
about his consumption preferences. In the remainder of this section, we will argue 
that  information  asymmetry  affects  the  level  of  slack  built  in,  resulting  in  cost 
escalation,  while  uncertainty  about  preferences  affects  the  timing  of  slack 
consumption, resulting in cost shifting. 
For  capital  budgeting  to  be  a  non-trivial  problem,  information  and  agency 
problems need to exist (e.g., Harris & Raviv 1996, 1998). In general, the agent is 
assumed  to  be  self-interested  and  to  prefer  more  capital  over  less  for  private 
consumption purposes. As a result, the agent will try to incorporate slack into the 
budget. Typically, the principal cannot detect slack and prevent it from occurring 
since he cannot verify with certainty the difference between the actual and proposed 
investment  cost.  This  is  due  to  an  inherent  information  asymmetry  between  the 
proposing agent and the reviewing principal about the real cost of the project, which 
only the agent can directly observe. The extent to which the agent can effectively 
exploit  his  information  asymmetry  depends  on  the  extent  to  which  investment 
decision rights have been allocated to him. If the agent has significant investment 
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decision rights, he can use this freedom and request a capital budget that fits his 
preferences. The question then is why the principal would delegate at all. Marino 
and Matsusaka (2005) show, in a capital budgeting context, that retaining the right 
to intervene as a principal can be more costly than delegating investment decision 
rights. The intuition is that, if the agent has to go through an approval process, then 
he  might  distort  the  information  transmitted  to  the  principal  even  more  to  gain 
approval  from  the  principal.  When  the  principal  is  unable  to  separate  these 
“distorted”  projects  from  “non-distorted”  projects,  he  is  better  off  delegating 
investment  decision  rights  to  the  agent.  Following  the  intuition  of  Marino  and 
Matsusaka (2005), we assume that the principal delegates optimally and therefore 
that  delegation  is  high  when  an  approval  process  would  lead  to  even  greater 
distortions, while delegation is low when distortions are unlikely to occur when the 
principal can intervene. 
Facing the previously outlined budget process, the agent unlikely incorporates 
all slack already when first submitting the investment for two reasons. Firstly, the 
agent likely tries to state costs as low as possible upfront to render the project more 
attractive and increase the chances of acceptance by the principal. Secondly, the 
agent does not know yet how the principal delegates decision rights on the project 
during the review phase and thus how closely the project will be reviewed. The 
difficulty to predict how the principal will delegate is in part due to the delegation 
decision being a function of the projects that all other agents within the firm submit 
in the same round, a piece of information that the agent cannot have at the point of 
submitting. In consequence, the agent rather incorporates slack in the subsequent 
renegotiation periods once the investment has been approved and the delegation 
level at which the project is monitored is known. This discussion leads to the first 
hypothesis. 
 
H1:   Budgeted costs escalate in the delegation of investment decision 
rights. 
 
As  argued  above,  the  ability  to  incorporate  slack  into  the  capital  budget 
requires the existence of information asymmetry between principal and agent. As 
multi-period projects proceed from one investment period to the next, the principal 
learns  more  about  the  actual  state  of  the  project.  The  information  asymmetry 
between agent and principal on the state of the investment project consequently 
decreases over time, as depicted in figure 4.2. Over the course of the investment 
phase, it therefore becomes increasingly difficult to incorporate more slack during 
the renegotiation for the capital budget since the principal is increasingly able to 
distinguish between budget requests due to changes in actual costs (partition A) or 
due to slack building (partition B). Hence, when agents are able to exploit their 
information  asymmetry  due  to  high  delegation,  they  will  request  higher  budget 
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increases in earlier renegotiation periods of a project to take advantage of the higher 
information asymmetries during these periods. This leads to the second hypothesis.  
 
H2:  Budgeted costs escalate in the delegation of investment decision 
rights to a higher extent in the earlier stages of a project. 
 
As  indicated  above,  budget  renegotiations  may  not  only  involve  total  cost 
changes but also cost shifting between periods. Besides operational reasons such as 
the  need  to  accelerate  a  project,  an  agent  may  also  use  a  cost  shift  request  to 
redistribute  budget  slack  that  has  already  been  incorporated  in  the  budget 
previously. In terms of figure 4.1, the agent shifts partition B between the investing 
periods. Antle and Fellingham (1990) more generally allude to the possibility that 
agents may choose to shift slack between periods, but the details of this aspect have 
been  mostly  left  unconsidered  in  the  literature  thus  far.  The  agent  may  wish  to 
reallocate slack because he does not know with certainty how much slack he will 
desire to consume in subsequent periods when slack is incorporated for the first 
time. Since multi-period projects can turn out differently than initially expected, the 
agent may in fact prefer a different level of consumption than the one initially set 
per period. 
The ability to shift slack allows the agent to reduce these differences without 
having to request adjustments to the overall investment volume of the project. The 
latter  is  arguably  more  difficult  to  renegotiate  with  the  principal  than  an  inter-
periodic  reallocation  of  an  already  granted  sum.  While  shifting  costs  does  not 
change the overall project budget, it is nevertheless costly to the firm: shifting costs 
Figure 4.2 Schematic development of agent uncertainty about 
future consumption and development of information asymmetry 
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reduces the predictability of cash flows required for investments so that the firm has 
to hold more funds for unforeseen changes in the investment budget. 
The extent to which this cost-shifting behavior is observed depends on the 
agent’s ability to incorporate slack in the first place. As a result, similar to requests 
to change the investment volume of a project, these cost shifts are more pronounced 
the  more  the  decision  rights  to  supervise  a  project  are  delegated  to  lower 
management levels, i.e. the less a principal is immediately involved in the review of 
a project. The third hypothesis follows from this discussion. 
 
H3:  The  inter-periodic  shifting  of  budgeted  costs  increases  in  the 
delegation of investment decision rights. 
 
Hypothesis 3 argues that agents can resort to cost shifting requests to shift 
budget between periods to realign differences between actual and desired level of 
slack. These differences arise because of the inherent uncertainty about consumption 
preferences.  This  uncertainty  is  higher  the  longer  the  time  between  setting  and 
consuming slack, since foreseeing the desired level of slack when first incorporating 
slack is more difficult for later than for earlier investment periods. 
The  agent’s  uncertainty,  however,  is  decreasing  as  the  project  evolves, 
depicted graphically in figure 4.2. With declining uncertainty about consumption 
preferences, the agent is better able to forecast not only the development of the 
project but also the according level of slack that he desires himself. Cost shifting 
requests  to  realign  desired  and  actual  levels  of  slack  will  therefore  be  more 
pronounced in more mature periods when the agent is better able to align slack with 
his consumption preferences
27. This discussion leads to the fourth hypothesis. 
 
H4:  The  inter-periodic  shifting  of  budgeted  costs  increases  in  the 
delegation of investment decision rights to a higher extent in the 
later stages of a project. 
 
 
4.4  The research site 
 
The data to investigate the hypotheses put forth in this study were gathered at a large 
multinational corporation headquartered in Europe. The company is stock-listed and 
included in one of the main European stock market indices. The unique access to 
this organization allows for a much more detailed analysis than previous, related 
studies.  The  company’s  internal  organization,  reporting  and  control  structures 
                                                 
27 An argument could be proposed that with less uncertainty the agent may also align desired and actual 
level of consumption by requesting a change to the entire project cost, as discussed in hypothesis 1 and 2. 
However, decreasing information asymmetry would make it more likely that the principal detects slack. 
The agent therefore prefers cost shifting, which is arguably a more covert way to manage slack.  
Thesis_JF Andre_v06.pdfCapital budget renegotiations and the adverse consequences of delegation 
  89 
closely resemble those used in comparable firms of this size, so that observed effects 
are unlikely arising from any exceptional characteristics of this research site. The 
company  is  diversified  into  various  industrial  activities,  producing  intermediate 
goods primarily sold to other manufacturers. The various operations are organized in 
an array of business units, each headed by a business unit director. 
The business unit directors are compensated based on similar contracts. The 
units generally produce for outside customers, with very few internal transfers of 
products, so that each operates with a certain degree of independence of the firm’s 
other operations. Business units that are more related to each other are grouped 
together in clusters, which also form the basis for financial segment reporting. Each 
cluster is assigned a board member with specific responsibility for their operations. 
The different board members hold closely comparable compensation contracts. 
The  company  operates  a  sophisticated  control  system  for  managing  the 
investment  process  of  its  diversified  units.  The  treasury  function  is  entirely 
centralized  and  business  units  cannot  contract  individually  with  the  external 
financial market for funding. The budgeting process resembles the one illustrated in 
figure 1. New capital investment projects are initiated in the business units: they are 
first screened by the unit director, before submitting the project to the corporate 
accounting department by means of a standardized form used for requesting capital 
expenditures. This corresponds to stage (1) in figure 4.1. The projects pertain in 
almost all cases to only a single unit; joint projects between business units are very 
rare. Requests for capital expenditures are arranged in two main rounds per year, 
with proposed investments usually scheduled to begin in the subsequent half-year. 
Risks of each project are evaluated subjectively and while the internal hurdle rate 
can change from year to year depending on the general economic situation, it is not 
risk-adjusted for individual business units or projects. 
The corporate accounting department delegates decision rights to approve and 
follow investment projects to three different levels of authority within the firm’s 
hierarchy,  initiating  the  review  stage  (2)  as  in  figure  4.1.  In  the  case  of  high 
delegation, projects are assigned to the business unit director and a single board 
member who is appointed to supervise that unit. Under medium delegation, projects 
require approval by the entire management board in addition to the unit director and 
the  assigned  board  member.  At  the  lowest  level  of  delegation,  i.e.  highest 
centralization,  also  the  supervisory  board  is  involved  in  inspecting  projects  in 
addition  to  all  previously  mentioned  management  ranks.  These  three  delegation 
levels are set by the head of corporate accounting after all units have submitted their 
proposals for a budget round. The assignment of these levels is determined by the 
size of the project as well as subjective factors such as its perceived importance, and 
the  assignment  applies  during  the  whole  investment  project.  In  addition,  the 
supervisory board can modify projects to be evaluated at their level of authority, i.e. 
the setting with the lowest delegation. Although business unit managers can expect 
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very important projects to be assigned to a higher management level, they cannot 
foresee the assigned level with certainty prior to the announcement in stage (3) in 
figure  4.1.  This  is  an  important  aspect,  making  it  less  likely  that  business  units 
incorporate more slack already in their initial project submission for projects that 
will be assigned a higher degree of delegation. Instead, they will rather do so after 
the  supervision  level  has  been  assigned,  introducing  more  slack  for  projects  the 
more a project is delegated, i.e. the less it is centrally controlled. 
Once decision rights are allocated, the different management levels examine 
their  assigned  investment  projects.  The  projects  are  grouped  in  three  categories 
according  to  their  progress  stage.  The  first  category  concerns  new  investments 
proposed for approval. The second category contains projects at an intermediary 
approval stage where the main investments (stage 4, figure 4.1) have not yet started. 
They are either resubmitted after having been turned down in a preceding budget 
round, or they have been exceptionally submitted in between budget rounds. In the 
latter case upfront investments may have already taken place but approval is still 
needed  in  the  following  ordinary  budget  request  period.  Projects  in  the  third 
category have been approved already and are in the main investment phase (stage 4, 
figure 4.1). Besides deciding on the approval of projects, the budget process is used 
to  examine  business  unit  requests  to  change  the  cost  structure  of  all  but  newly 
submitted projects. The cost structure is modified when business units seek to obtain 
additional funds for a project. Smaller cost changes do not need to be explicitly 
reported  but  business  units  need  to  obtain  authorization  from  their  assigned 
management level for deviations exceeding either ten percent of the project’s total 
investment  sum  or  a  predefined  threshold  amount.  The  latter  criterion  is  set  to 
prevent excessive cost escalations with larger projects. The cost structure can also 
change  when  business  units  request  to  alter  the  initially  proposed  timing  of  a 
project’s investment costs. Units can either ask to advance costs that were planned 
to occur at a later stage to the current budget period, or conversely to postpone costs 
from the current to subsequent periods. After all decisions on project approvals and 
cost structure changes are taken, corporate accounting informs all business units 
about the final outcome. This closes the budget request round. 
 
 
4.5  Nature of the data and descriptive statistics 
 
The analyses of this study are based on data emanating from the budget process 
described  above.  More  specifically,  we  obtained  budget  requests  on  capital 
investment projects from business units throughout a period of seven consecutive 
budgeting  rounds,  i.e.  four  calendar  years.  This  time  span  was  selected  due  its 
consistency  of  internal  reporting  requirements.  For  all  projects  business  units 
individually report budgeted investment costs for the current period as well as total 
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costs across past and future periods. If the unit seeks to increase the total budgeted 
investment amount, the project report also states the new amount requested.  
Similarly, the report indicates if and what amount the business unit requests to 
either advance investments costs budgeted for later stages towards the current period 
–  or conversely postpone current investment costs to the future. Each project is 
reported  as  either  new,  early  stage  or  ongoing,  i.e.  in  one  of  the  three 
aforementioned progress stages. Reports on early stage and ongoing projects also 
indicate to what hierarchical management level these projects have been assigned. A 
total of 3,149 reports were retrieved from the company’s budget reporting system, 
Table 4.1             
Descriptive business unit-level statistics         
             
             
Panel A - Annually reported data         
             
   Mean  Median  St. dev.  Min  Max  N 
SALES  563  409  564  18  2,401  63 
CAPITAL  354  258  424  2  1,829  62 
EMPLOYEES  1,292  686  1,506  5  6,384  63 
CAPEX  31.975  19.400  31.611  0.100  130.700  63 
ROI  0.275  0.153  1.893  -8.320  11.663  63 
SALESGROWTH  0.168  0.055  0.496  -0.233  3.167  63 
             
             
Panel B - Bi-annually reported data         
             
Number of:   Mean  Median  St. dev.  Min  Max  N 
All investment projects  15.215  9  16.885  0  73  163 
New projects  3.509  1  5.267  0  34  163 
Early stage projects  2.865  1  4.269  0  22  163 
Mature stage projects  6.871  4  7.610  0  34  163 
High delegation projects  8.896  4  12.537  0  56  163 
Medium delegation projects  1.227  0  2.170  0  11  163 
Low delegation projects  0.313  0  0.899  0  5  163 
             
Variables in panel A are all per business unit and calendar year and defined as follows. SALES is sales 
revenues in million EUR. CAPITAL is the total capital held in million EUR. EMPLOYEES is the number 
of employees. CAPEX is capital expenditures for investments in million EUR. ROI is the return on 
investment. SALESGROWTH is the percentage growth in sales revenue. All variables in panel B are 
based on reported numbers of projects per business unit and per budget submission round. 
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which  were  subsequently  matched  with  internal  financial  statement  data  of  the 
requesting business units. Projects were assigned a unique identifier to be able to 
track them over the sample period. We exclude incomplete and inconsistent entries 
as  well  as  intangible  investment  projects.  The  latter  follow  a  different  reporting 
format and are not comparable as such to tangible investments. This procedure leads 
to a sample of 2,480 project-round observations based on 805 unique investment 
projects. 
On average 23 different business units report each budget period. Although the 
company largely kept its internal organizational structure, some adjustments took 
place, e.g. merging and splitting some of the business units. The number of units per 
budget round ranges between 21 and 26, with a total of 33 distinct business units 
over the sample period. Information about these units is provided in table 4.1. Panel 
A presents descriptive statistics on the requesting business units, which is based on 
annually reported data. The average business unit has sales of EUR 563m and a 
workforce of 1,292 employees. Average annual capital expenditures of EUR 32m 
constitute  around  9%  of  mean  capital  held,  which  is  conventional  for  industrial 
firms that rely on capital investments as an important source of value generation. 
Panel B informs about the portfolio of investment projects that each business unit 
reports. These statistics stem from data that is available bi-annually, i.e. for every 
budget round request. PROJECTS is the number of investment projects reported per 
business unit in a given budget round. The average business unit report states a 
portfolio of 15.2 projects. The largest share of 6.9 projects concerns mature-stage 
investments.  Reports  on  early-stage  and  new  projects  account  for  2.9  and  3.5 
projects on average, respectively. The remainder of the projects not falling in these 
categories concerns finished or cancelled investments. 
An alternative classification is to group projects according to the attributed 
delegation  level  (high,  medium,  or  low).  Generally,  the  number  of  projects  per 
business  units  increases  in  the  delegation  level:  On  average,  8.9  projects  are 
assigned to the highest level of delegation compared to only 0.3 projects at lowest 
delegation  category.  Project  observations  that  do  not  fall  in  one  of  the  three 
delegation categories are new projects that have not been assigned such a level yet. 
Descriptive project-level statistics across all business units are given in table 
4.2. PROJECTCOUNT indicates how many times a project appears in the budget 
report of a business unit during the sample period. Including the current budgeting 
round, the average project is being reported for 2.6 times, with a maximum of 7 
rounds, i.e. spanning all budgeting rounds of the sampled years. The average project 
has  a  total  investment  sum,  INVTOTAL,  of  EUR  5.7m,  with  investments  in  the 
current  period,  INVCURRENT,  of  EUR  1.9m  on  average.  CHGCOST  is  the 
percentage change of a project’s total investment amount requested by a business 
unit. Overall, 27% of the project reports state a request to change the project’s total 
investment  sum,  requesting  an  average  increase  of  9.3%  compared  to  the  last 
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period’s  total  investment.  CHGCOSTXP  is  the  actual,  i.e.  ex  post,  percentage 
change of a project’s total investment from one budget period to the next after a 
request for a change in the project’s investment has been filed. The average actual 
cost change of 9.2% is very close to the original request, indicating that change 
requests on average materialize as asked for. COSTSHIFT is the absolute percentage 
change of the investment in the current budget period due to requests to shift costs. 
Cost  shifts  are  either  due  to  postponing  costs  initially  budgeted  for  the  current 
towards future project periods or vice versa due to advancing costs budgeted for 
later project stages to the current period. While cost shifts affect the investment in 
the current period, INVCURRENT, they leave the total investment sum, INVTOTAL, 
unchanged. These cost shifts result on average in an absolute change of 71.6% in the 
investment volume of a project’s imminent budget period. Affecting 18% of the 
sampled  project  observations,  requests  to  shift  costs  occur  less  frequently  than 
requests to change the entire investment sum of a project.  
The sample of project reports was first split in two, according to whether the 
information asymmetry between principal and agent about these projects is high or 
low.  Low  information  asymmetry  projects  are  smaller,  more  standardized 
investments  in  for  example  environmental  safety,  workplace  security,  or 
maintenance of buildings. Information asymmetry is low for these projects because 
the principal can easily verify the scope and requirements of these investments when 
submitted by the agent. Incorporating slack in these projects is therefore difficult for 
Table 4.2               
Descriptive project-level statistics         
               
   Mean  Median  St. dev.  Min  Max  N  % 
PROJECTCOUNT  2.608  2.000  1.613  1  7  2,480  100 
INVTOTAL  5.671  2.112  12.238  0  220.000  2,160  87 
INVCURRENT  1.904  0.800  3.766  0  45.631  1,731  70 
CHGCOST  0.093  0.015  0.504  -0.909  2.900  673  27 
CHGCOSTXP  0.092  0.003  0.530  -0.949  3.000  494  20 
COSTSHIFT  0.716  0.500  1.033  0.000  8.500  455  18 
               
PROJECTCOUNT is a count variable set to 1 for the first report of a project in the sample period and 
incrementing with 1 for every additional report on that project. INVTOTAL is the total project investment 
across all budget periods in million EUR. INVCURRENT is the project investment scheduled to take 
place in the current budget period in million EUR. CHGCOST is the requested percentage change in a 
project’s total investment including the current as well as future budget periods. CHGCOSTXP is the 
actual, ex-post percentage change in a project’s total investment across all budget periods from one 
budget  period  to  the  next,  after  a  request  to  change  costs  has  been  submitted.  COSTSHIFT  is  the 
requested absolute percentage change in a project’s current budget period investment by fully or partly 
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the  agent.  Low  information  asymmetry  investments  are  marked  with  the 
dichotomous  variable  LOWIA.  High  information  asymmetry  projects  are  more 
difficult to assess so that the degree of delegation is important when determining 
how  much  control  the  principal  exercises  over  a  project.  As  mentioned  in  the 
description of the research site, the level of delegation is set by the principal to be 
low, medium or high. Accordingly, the dichotomous variables DLOW, DMEDIUM 
and DHIGH identify projects in each of these three delegation levels.  
The project-level variables described in table 4.2 are further analyzed at these 
distinct delegation levels in table 4.3. Comparing averages between the different 
levels  in  panel  A  reveals  that  the  project  investment  cost  (INVTOTAL, 
INVCURRENT) as well as the number of times a project is occurring in the sampled 
period (PROJECTCOUNT) strictly decreases in the level of delegation. Panel B 
indicates that almost all of these differences are statistically significant. Conversely, 
results for business unit requests to change the total investment amount per project 
(CHGCOST)  or  to  shift  costs  (COSTSHIFT)  between  periods  all  increase  in  the 
extent of delegation. Actual, ex-post total investment cost changes (CHGCOSTXP) 
follow the same pattern. Most of these differences are significant at the 10% level. 
This offers an interim corroboration of hypotheses H1 and H3 that cost change and 
inter-periodic  cost  shift  requests  increase  in  delegation.  Taken  together  with  the 
findings on project size and length, this table illustrates that smaller and potentially 
less  important  projects  are  delegated,  at  the  cost  of  project  cost  increases  and 
deviations from the initial timing of outlays. In addition to the delegation levels, 
panel  A  lists  investment  characteristics  for  low  information  asymmetry  projects 
(LOWIA). These are on average smaller and of shorter duration than high delegation 
projects. Untabulated tests confirm these differences to be significant. Additionally, 
cost  shift  requests  are  insignificantly  different  from  high  delegation  projects, 
whereas cost change requests are significantly lower. 
Pearson correlation statistics for all variables used as explanatory or control 
variables in the multivariate analysis are given in table 4.4. While most correlations 
are significant at conventional levels, they remain mostly at relatively small values. 
Moreover, untabulated tests indicate that variance inflation factors remain always 
below 2. Taken together, these results imply that multicollinearity is not of concern 
for the multivariate models employed in this dataset. 
For an indication of the economic impact of the cost change and cost shift 
requests during the budget process, we sum up the Euro amount for cost change and 
cost shift requests individually per sampled budget round and scale by the sum of all 
capital investments in that period. Results are given in table 4.5. Apart from a slight 
increase of cost change requests, there appears to be no major time trend in request 
behavior over the sample period. On average, business units request to change 5.4 
percent of the investment sum per sampled budget period whereas cost shift requests 
amount to 9.9 percent. These figures illustrate that cost change as well as cost shift 
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requests affect a considerable share of investments and stress the impact of a control 
problem in the budget process. 
 
 
4.6  Results 
 
4.6.1  Main analyses 
4.6.1.1 Hypothesis 1 
To  investigate  hypothesis  1,  we  construct  a  multiple  regression  model  with  the 
percentage change of the total project cost, CHGCOST, as dependent variable. The 
main explanatory variables are DMEDIUM and DLOW that indicate projects with 
medium and low delegation, using DHIGH as the base level. Both variables are 
expected to indicate significantly lower levels of cost changes at their respective 
level of delegation. We include LOWIA to compare high delegation projects with 
low information asymmetry investments that leave the agent with little leeway to 
incorporate slack. We expect cost changes to be lower for the latter. The model can 
be stated as follows. 
 
CHGCOSTp,t   =  f(DMEDIUMp , DLOWpt , LOWIAp , CONTROLSp,t)  (4.1) 
 
The indices p and t identify the project and the budget round, respectively. 
CONTROLS is a vector of several control variables. Two of them are at project-
level.  First,  the  number  of  times  a  project  is  reported  in  the  sample, 
PROJECTCOUNT, proxies for the length of a project. Project cost changes arising 
from  uncertainty  are  likely  decreasing  the  more  the  project  advances, 
PROJECTCOUNT is therefore expected to be negatively related to the dependent 
variable.  Second,  LNINVTOTAL  is  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  project’s  total 
investment. Since larger and thus more complex projects are more likely subject to 
unforeseen cost developments, we expect LNINVTOTAL to be positively related to 
CHGCOST.  Three  control  variables  adjust  for  specificities  of  the  business  unit 
submitting the project: return on investment, ROI, year-to-year sales growth of the 
unit,  SALESGROWTH,  and  size  of  the  unit  as  the  natural  logarithm  of  sales, 
LNSALES.  There  are  no  unidirectional  predictions  for  these  variables.  Standard 
errors are corrected for potential clustering at project-level.  
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Results for hypothesis 1 are presented in table 4.6, first running the model 
without control variables in specification (1). The coefficients for DMEDIUM and 
DLOW are significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. On average, cost change 
requests at medium delegation level are 9 percentage points lower than at high level. 
The  average  level  of  cost  change  requests  further  decreases  at  low  delegation, 
around 15 percentage points lower than at high level. This evidence documents a 
continuous decline in cost changes the less investment decision rights are delegated, 
supporting  hypothesis  1.  Cost  change  requests  for  low  information  asymmetry 
projects are also significantly lower than at high delegation, as predicted. This can 
be explained by the more standardized nature of these projects that allow for few 
discretionary changes. Adding control variables in specification (2) reinforces the 
evidence  of  the  first  model.  The  coefficient  of  DMEDIUM  further  increases  in 
significance. Furthermore, the differences in cost change requests for the different 
delegation  levels  increase  to  15  and  36  percentage  points  for  DMEDIUM  and 
DLOW,  respectively.  This  underlines  the  impact  that  the  delegation  of  decision 
rights on investments has on the cost request behavior of the firm’s business units. 
Of the control variables,  PROJECTCOUNT  is  significantly  negatively  related  to 
requested cost changes (p<1%), documenting that cost change requests are declining 
in the length of a project. The significant and positive coefficient of LNINVTOTAL 
Table 4.5               
Investments, cost change and cost shift requests for each sample period 
               
               
  Period    Cost change requests    Cost shift requests 
Sample  investment           
period  (1) Total     (2) Total  (2)/(1)    (3) Total  (3)/(1) 
               
P1  399.0    13.0  0.032    37.8  0.095 
P2  490.8    5.4  0.011    38.8  0.079 
P3  384.7    13.2  0.034    41.0  0.107 
P4  537.0    16.4  0.031    28.2  0.053 
P5  453.3    53.1  0.117    52.4  0.115 
P6  552.3    42.4  0.077    68.7  0.124 
P7  524.1    39.0  0.074    62.9  0.120 
               
Mean P1-7  477.3    26.1  0.054    47.1  0.099 
                 
All amounts in columns 1, 2 and 3 are in million EUR.  
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(p<1%)  speaks  for  higher  cost  change  requests  of  larger,  i.e.  more  complex, 
projects.  
 
4.6.1.2 Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 states that requests to change the total scope of an investment project 
are more pronounced in the early stages of a multi-period investment project. To 
investigate this issue, we split observations in two groups according to whether they 
pertain  to  projects  in  early  or  more  advanced  stages.  The  company’s  reporting 
indicates the project stage, more specifically whether a project is new, has been 
submitted and some upfront investments have taken place, or whether it is in its 
main investment phase. For the latter two stages, business units can submit requests 
to change the total investment sum or to shift costs between periods. We set the 
dichotomous variable EARLY to identify observations on projects that are submitted 
but where the main investment stage has not started yet. We then add EARLY to the 
model used for hypothesis 1 and interact this variable with the identifier variables 
for medium and high delegation levels as well as for low information asymmetry 
 
Table 4.6                   
Regression model of cost change requests and levels of delegation 
                   
                   
  Predicted   
(1) Cost change 
requests 
CHGCOST    
(2) Cost change 
requests 
CHGCOST  
Independent variables  sign    Coeff.  Prob.      Coeff.  Prob.   
                   
DMEDIUMp  -    -0.089  0.054 **    -0.152  0.003 *** 
DLOWp  -    -0.153  0.000 ***    -0.364  0.000 *** 
LOWIAp  -    -0.128  0.001 ***    -0.147  0.001 *** 
                   
PROJECTCOUNTpt  -            -0.044  0.000 *** 
LNINVTOTALpt  +            0.083  0.000 *** 
ROIpt  ?            -0.082  0.162  
SALESGROWTHpt  ?            0.178  0.146  
LNSALESpt  ?            0.005  0.834  
                   
Intercept      Yes        Yes     
R-Square      0.014        0.078     
N      673        616     
                   
Table 4.6 continued next page                 
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projects. As in the models employed earlier on, standard errors are corrected for 
clustering at project level.  
 
CHGCOSTp,t   =   f(DMEDIUMp , DLOWp , LOWIAp , EARLYp,t ,   (4.2) 
DMEDIUM*EARLYp,t , DLOW*EARLYp,t ,  
LOWIA*EARLYp,t , CONTROLSp,t) 
 
Table 4.6 continued                            
                   
  Predicted   
(3) Cost change requests 
CHGCOST    
(4) Cost change requests 
CHGCOST  
Independent variables  sign    Coeff.  Prob.      Coeff.  Prob.   
                   
DMEDIUMp  -    -0.022  0.281     -0.079  0.030 *** 
DLOWp  -    -0.074  0.003 **    -0.330  0.000 *** 
LOWIAp  -    -0.043  0.128     -0.056  0.097 * 
                   
EARLYpt  +    0.326  0.000 ***    0.273  0.000 *** 
DMEDIUM*EARLYpt  -    -0.266  0.015 **    -0.279  0.006 *** 
DLOW*EARLYpt  -    -0.224  0.003 ***    -0.147  0.081 * 
LOWIA*EARLYpt  -    -0.281  0.006 ***    -0.274  0.008 *** 
                   
PROJECTCOUNTpt  -            -0.032  0.004 *** 
LNINVTOTALpt  +            0.094  0.000 *** 
ROIpt  ?            -0.056  0.304  
SALESGROWTHpt  ?            0.151  0.194  
LNSALESpt  ?            0.008  0.719  
                   
Intercept      Yes       Yes     
R-Square      0.069       0.118    
N      673       616    
                             
All standard error are corrected for potential clustering at project level. CHGCOST is the requested 
percentage change in a project’s total investment including the current as well as future budget periods. 
EARLY is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for budget reports on early stage projects with several 
upfront investments having taken place but prior to the main investment stage, 0 otherwise. DMEDIUM 
and DLOW are dichotomous variables equal to 1 for medium and low delegation projects, respectively, 
and 0 otherwise. LOWIA is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for low information asymmetry projects 
that are more standardized and allow for only little discretion in project expenses, such as investments in 
workers’ security, buildings and automation, i.e. are unlikely to be used to incorporate budgetary slack, 0 
otherwise. PROJECTCOUNT is a count variable set to 1 for the first report of a project in the sample 
period and incrementing with 1 for every additional report on that project. LNINVTOTAL is the natural 
logarithm of the total project investment across all budget periods in million EUR. ROI is the return of 
investment  per  business  unit  and  calendar  year. SALESGROWTH  is  the  percentage  growth  in  sales 
revenue per business unit and calendar year. LNSALES is the natural logarithm of the sales revenues per 
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We expect the main coefficient of EARLY, identifying early-stage observations 
for high delegation projects, to be significantly positive, indicating that cost change 
requests are larger in early investment stages. Furthermore, the interaction terms on 
medium  and  low  delegation  as  well  as  low  information  asymmetry  projects  are 
expected to be significantly negative, i.e. significantly lower than high delegation 
requests in early project stages.  
Specification  (3)  of  table  4.6,  excluding  control  variables,  confirms  these 
expectations.  Cost  change  requests  of  high  delegation  projects  (EARLY)  are 
significantly  higher  (p<1%)  in  earlier  project  stages  by  33  percentage  points. 
Requests for medium and low delegation projects are significantly lower than high 
delegation projects by 27 (p<5%) and 22 (p<1%) percentage points in the early 
stage as compared to the mature stage. The coefficients on the main effect of EARLY 
as well as all interaction effects remain significant, corroborating the evidence from 




Table 4.7                   
Regression model of cost shifting requests and levels of delegation 
                   
                   
  Predicted   
(1) Cost shifting requests 
COSTSHIFT    
(2) Cost shifting requests 
COSTSHIFT  
Independent variables  sign    Coeff.  Prob.      Coeff.  Prob.   
                   
DMEDIUMp  -    -0.212  0.003 ***    -0.260  0.009 *** 
DLOWp  -    -0.384  0.001 ***    -0.381  0.029 ** 
LOWIAp  -    0.092  0.301     0.188  0.170  
                   
PROJECTCOUNTpt  -            -0.003  0.471  
LNINVTOTALpt  +            0.026  0.340  
ROIpt  ?            0.094  0.039 ** 
SALESGROWTHpt  ?            -0.364  0.093 * 
LNSALESpt  ?            0.182  0.013 *** 
                   
Intercept      Yes       Yes     
R-Square      0.009       0.027    
N      455       419    
                 
Table 4.7 continued next page               
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4.6.1.3 Hypothesis 3 
To  analyze  hypothesis  3  on  cost  shifting  behavior,  we  employ  the  multiple 
regression  model  used  to  investigate  hypothesis  1  and  replace  the  dependent 
variable with COSTSHIFT, the requested absolute percentage change in the current 
investment  period  caused  by  either  postponing  part  of  the  current  period’s 
investment or by advancing costs initially budgeted for later project periods.  
Table 4.7 continued                   
                   
  Predicted   
(3) Cost shifting requests 
COSTSHIFT    
(4) Cost shifting requests 
COSTSHIFT  
Independent variables  sign    Coeff.  Prob.      Coeff.  Prob.   
                   
DMEDIUMp  -    -0.156  0.048 **    -0.252  0.030 ** 
DLOWp  -    0.090  0.156     -0.041  0.420  
LOWIAp  -    -0.072  0.216     -0.019  0.436  
                   
MATUREpt  ?    0.018  0.434     0.000  0.500  
DMEDIUM*MATUREpt  -    -0.109  0.223     -0.003  0.493  
DLOW*MATUREpt  -    -0.680  0.000 ***    -0.475  0.001 *** 
LOWIA*MATUREpt  -    0.233  0.193     0.292  0.189  
                   
PROJECTCOUNTpt  -            -0.001  0.487  
LNINVTOTALpt  +            0.022  0.367  
ROIpt  ?            0.090  0.050 ** 
SALESGROWTHpt  ?            -0.364  0.113  
LNSALESpt  ?            0.169  0.028 ** 
                   
Intercept      Yes       Yes    
R-Square      0.014       0.031    
N      455       419    
                 
All standard error are corrected for potential clustering at project level. COSTSHIFT is the requested 
absolute percentage change in a project’s current budget period investment by fully or partly postponing 
originally scheduled costs to a later period or vice versa advancing future costs to the current period. 
MATURE is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for budget reports on projects in their main investment 
phase, 0 otherwise. DMEDIUM and DLOW are dichotomous variables equal to 1 for medium and low 
delegation projects, respectively, and 0 otherwise. LOWIA is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for low 
information asymmetry projects that are more standardized and allow for only little discretion in project 
expenses, such as investments in workers’ security, buildings and automation, i.e. are unlikely to be used 
to incorporate budgetary slack, 0 otherwise. PROJECTCOUNT is a count variable set to 1 for the first 
report of a project in the sample period and incrementing with 1 for every additional report on that 
project. LNINVTOTAL is the natural logarithm of the total project investment across all budget periods 
in million EUR. ROI is the return of investment per business unit and calendar year. SALESGROWTH is 
the percentage growth in sales revenue per business unit and calendar year. LNSALES is the natural 
logarithm of the sales revenues per business unit and calendar year in million EUR. ***, **, and * 
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COSTSHIFTp,t   =   f(DMEDIUMp , DLOWp , LOWIAp , CONTROLSp,t)  (4.3) 
 
The  results  are  given  in  table  4.7,  specification  (1).  Both  DMEDIUM  and 
DLOW  are  significantly  negatively  related  to  the  dependent  variable  at  a 
significance level of 1%, as predicted. The coefficients suggest that cost shifting 
requests are gradually decreasing the less decision rights are delegated and the more 
the  principal  retains  control.  More  specifically,  cost  shifts  for  medium  and  low 
delegation are on average 21 and 38 percentage points lower than at high delegation. 
This evidence is not altered when adding control variables in specification (2) with 
coefficients  of  DMEDIUM  and  DLOW  remaining  significant  at  1%  and  5%, 
respectively.  The  findings  from  both  specifications  confirm  hypothesis  3.  The 
results for the control variables in specification (2) furthermore reveal that larger 
and more profitable units file significantly higher cost shift requests, whereas neither 
project size nor duration has a substantial impact. 
 
4.6.1.4 Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 states that the increase of cost shifting requests for more delegated 
projects should be more prominent in later, more advanced stages of an investment 
project.  A  similar  interaction  model  as  for  hypothesis  2  is  used  to  analyze  this 
conjecture, replacing CHGCOST with COSTSHIFT. Since the focus of hypothesis 4 
is on the effects in the later project phase, we replace EARLY with the inversely 
coded, dichotomous variable MATURE that identifies observations on projects in 
their main investment stage. We also interact the latter with DMEDIUM, DLOW and 
LOWIA to trace the individual mature-stage behavior of these project types.  
 
COSTSHIFTp,t   =   f(DMEDIUMp , DLOWp , LOWIAp , MATUREp,t , 
DMEDIUM*MATUREp,t , DLOW*MATUREp,t ,  
LOWIA*MATUREp,t , CONTROLSp,t)  (4.4) 
 
Following  hypothesis  4,  the  coefficient  of  MATURE  should  indicate  a 
significantly higher average level of cost shift requests of high-delegation projects 
towards later project stages. Ever fewer costs are however available to be shifted 
between periods as a project progresses. For instance, in the terminal investment 
period no costs remain that may be accelerated to this period. The extent of cost 
shift requests is therefore bound to mechanically decline towards the end of projects. 
This counterbalances the effect of higher costs shifts in mature stages as agents 
attempt  to  reallocate  slack  as  a  consequence  of  developments  that  could  not  be 
foreseen at the outset of the project, as posited in hypothesis 4. The net effect of 
MATURE is thus uncertain and we therefore have no specific sign prediction for this 
variable. In contrast, the average level of cost shifts for medium- and low-delegation 
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projects should be lower than for high-delegation projects in the mature stage. The 
signs  of  both  interaction  coefficients  should  thus  be  significantly  negative  for 
hypothesis 4 to hold.  
Results are provided in specifications (3) and (4) of table 4.7 without and with 
additional  control  variables.  The  average  level  of  cost  shift  requests  is 
insignificantly  different  between  early  and  mature  stages  for  high-delegation 
projects (MATURE). The average medium- and low-delegation cost shift requests 
both decline compared to high-delegation costs shifts when reaching later project 
 
Table 4.8                   
Logistic regression model on the incidence of cost change and shift requests at early 
and mature project stages 
                   
                   
Independent  Predicted   
(1) Incidence of cost 
shift request 
COSTSHIFT_EVENT    
(2) Incidence of cost 
change request 
CHGCOST_EVENT  
variables  sign    Coeff.  Prob.      Coeff.  Prob.   
                   
EARLY   ?            0.055  0.697  
MATURE   -    -0.626  0.000 ***         
                   
DMEDIUM   ?    0.352  0.159     0.049  0.417  
DLOW   ?    -0.736  0.092 *    0.204  0.286  
LOWIA   ?    -0.583  0.001 ***    0.002  0.496  
                   
PROJECTCOUNT   -    -0.248  0.000 ***    0.017  0.367  
LNINVTOTAL   +    0.257  0.000 ***    0.323  0.000 *** 
ROI   ?    0.027  0.836     -0.057  0.463  
SALESGROWTH   ?    -0.359  0.155     0.029  0.893  
LNSALES   ?    -0.049  0.483     -0.088  0.179  
                   
Intercept      Yes       Yes    
R-Square      0.069       0.035    
N      1,424       1,424    
                 
All  standard  error  are  corrected  for  potential  clustering  at  project  level.  COSTSHIFT_EVENT  is  a 
dichotomous variable equal to 1 when the project observation indicates a cost shift request, 0 otherwise. 
EARLY is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for budget reports on early stage projects with several 
upfront investments having taken place but prior to the main investment stage, 0 otherwise. MATURE is 
a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for budget reports on projects in their main investment phase, 0 
otherwise. DMEDIUM and DLOW are dichotomous variables equal to 1 for medium and low delegation 
projects, respectively, and 0 otherwise. LOWIA is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 for low information 
asymmetry projects that are more standardized and allow for only little discretion in project expenses, 
such  as  investments  in  workers’  security,  buildings  and  automation,  i.e.  are  unlikely  to  be  used  to 
incorporate budgetary slack, 0 otherwise. PROJECTCOUNT is a count variable set to 1 for the first 
report of a project in the sample period and incrementing with 1 for every additional report on that 
project. LNINVTOTAL is the natural logarithm of the total project investment across all budget periods 
in million EUR. ROI is the return of investment per business unit and calendar year. SALESGROWTH is 
the percentage growth in sales revenue per business unit and calendar year. LNSALES is the natural 
logarithm of the sales revenues per business unit and calendar year in million EUR. ***, **, and * 
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stages, the decline in the latter case (DLOW*MATURE) is significant at the 1% level 
in both specifications (3) and (4). This confirms hypothesis 4. 
 
4.6.2  Supplementary analyses 
4.6.2.1 Probability of change requests 
The hypotheses of this study specifically concentrate on the extent of project change 
requests once they have been submitted in relation to varying degrees of delegation. 
In a supplementary analysis we also investigate the probability that these change 
requests occur. We argued in the analysis of cost shift requests that they are likely 
less pronounced towards the end of a project, i.e. in mature project stages, as the 
amount of remaining project costs evidently declines and thus also the part that can 
potentially be shifted between periods. Similarly, we expect that the probability of a 
cost shift requests mechanistically is lower in mature compared to earlier project 
stages. In contrast, the remaining part of a project should not mechanically affect the 
probability of requests to change the total costs of an investment. The latter should 
therefore occur with equal probability between early and mature stages.  
We analyze both conjectures with a binary probit model on the incidence of 
cost change and cost shift requests. CHGCOST_EVENT is a binary variable equal to 
1 whenever a project observation reports the filing of a cost change request and is 
equal  to  0  for  all  other  observations.  Similarly,  COSTSHIFT_EVENT  identifies 
project observations with requests to shift costs. This coding procedure extends the 
analysis to 1,424 observations, excluding newly submitted investments for which no 
change requests can be filed. The results of the probit model on the probability of 
cost shifts and cost changes are provided in specification (1) and (2) of table 4.8, 
respectively. Standard errors are corrected for potential clustering at the investment 
project level. The results indicate that the probability of a cost shift request is indeed 
lower as a project enters later, more mature project stages, whereas cost change 
requests are equally likely to occur over the course of an investment. We further 
investigate whether the probability of cost shift and change requests differs between 
delegation levels. An agent unlikely submits cost shift or change requests solely for 
the purpose of augmenting or rearranging slack in an investment. It is more likely 
that the agent takes the opportunity of an operational reason to also manage slack. 
We therefore spell no specific expectation how the incidence of a cost change or 
cost  shift  request  is  related  to  the  level  of  delegation.  Results  show  that  the 
incidence of a cost shift request is less likely for low delegation and low information 
asymmetry projects compared to high delegation projects, at a significance level of 
10%  and  1%,  respectively.  We  find  no  significant  differences  for  cost  change 
requests. The results on early and mature stage probabilities are robust to excluding 
the  indicator  variables  for  the  different  delegation  levels  and  vice  versa.  The 
findings  are  furthermore  unchanged  when  including  indicator  variables  for 
individual project rounds of the sample period. 
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Table 4.9                   
Regression model of ex post cost changes and levels of delegation 
                   
                   
  Predicted  
(1) Actual cost change per 
project, CHGCOSTXP ,t+1    
(2) Actual cost change per 
project, CHGCOSTXP  
Independent variables  sign    Coeff.  Prob.      Coeff.  Prob.   
                   
DMEDIUMp  -    -0.112  0.047 **    -0.005  0.460  
DLOWp  -    -0.296  0.000 ***    -0.240  0.001 *** 
LOWIAp  -    -0.196  0.000 ***    -0.070  0.077 * 
                   
EARLYpt  +            0.364  0.000 *** 
DMEDIUM*EARLYpt  -            -0.386  0.003 *** 
DLOW*EARLYpt  -            -0.293  0.006 *** 
LOWIA*EARLYpt  -            -0.370  0.004 *** 
                   
PROJECTCOUNTpt  -    -0.037  0.013 ***    -0.023  0.071 * 
LNINVTOTALpt  +    0.054  0.014 ***    0.071  0.004 *** 
ROIpt  ?    -0.151  0.055 *    -0.126  0.067 * 
SALESGROWTHpt  ?    0.225  0.095 *    0.166  0.186  
LNSALESpt  ?    -0.006  0.827     -0.003  0.905  
                   
Intercept      Yes       Yes    
R-Square      0.059       0.127    
N      473       473    
                   
All standard error are corrected for potential clustering at project level. CHGCOSTXP is the actual, ex-
post percentage change in a project’s total investment across all budget periods from one budget period 
to the next, after a request to change costs has been submitted. EARLY is a dichotomous variable equal to 
1 for budget reports on early stage projects with several upfront investments having taken place but prior 
to the main investment stage, 0 otherwise. DMEDIUM and DLOW are dichotomous variables equal to 1 
for  medium  and  low  delegation  projects,  respectively,  and  0  otherwise.  LOWIA  is  a  dichotomous 
variable equal to 1 for low information asymmetry projects that are more standardized and allow for 
only  little  discretion  in  project  expenses,  such  as  investments  in  workers’  security,  buildings  and 
automation, i.e. are unlikely to be used to incorporate budgetary slack, 0 otherwise. PROJECTCOUNT is 
a count variable set to 1 for the first report of a project in the sample period and incrementing with 1 for 
every  additional  report  on  that  project.  LNINVTOTAL  is  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  total  project 
investment across all budget periods in million EUR. ROI is the return of investment per business unit 
and calendar year. SALESGROWTH is the percentage growth in sales revenue per business unit and 
calendar year. LNSALES is the natural logarithm of the sales revenues per business unit and calendar 
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4.6.2.2 Ex post cost change model 
The focus of this study is on requests to change investment projects. However, the 
principal  may  still  decide  to  turn  down  or  reduce  an  agent’s  initial  proposal.  A 
rational agent is unlikely to continue asking the principal to change an investment 
unless there is a chance that this request will be honored. We nevertheless also 
analyze  how  project  costs  actually  develop  following  a  request  to  change  an 
investment  to  indicate  whether  the  requested  amounts  materialize.  We  rerun  the 
analyses on cost change requests using the ex post change of the total investment 
sum from the budget period when a cost change request is filed to the subsequent 
period, CHGCOST_XP. As described before, the descriptive statistics of requested 
and actual cost changes closely resemble each other. This pattern continues to hold 
in  the  multivariate  analyses  for  hypotheses  1  and  2,  rerunning  the  models 
documented  in  table  4.6  and  replacing  CHGCOST  with  CHGCOST_XP
28.  The 
results are reported in table 4.9: actual cost changes are more pronounced the more a 
project is delegated, reconfirming hypotheses 1. Furthermore, EARLY as well as the 
interaction terms in specification 2 have the same sign and similar significance as 
the original model reported in table 6. This reconfirms hypothesis 2. These results 




4.6.2.3 Further robustness tests 
We apply further untabulated modifications to our analyses to test the robustness of 
our results. First, we alter the way standard errors of our multivariate regression 
models are corrected, changing from potential clustering at project level to potential 
clustering  at  business  unit  level.  Results  remain  unaffected.  Second,  the  firm’s 
reporting system has a pre-defined indication whether a project is in an early or 
mature  stage,  feeding  into  the  analysis  of  hypotheses  2  and  4.  We  modify  the 
distinction between early and mature by reclassifying up to a third of a project’s 
available mature observations as pertaining to the early stages. Hypotheses 2 and 4 
continue to hold under this modification. Third, we rerun all multivariate models 
including indicator variables for the seven budget periods that were sampled. The 
signs and significances of all main explanatory variables remain unaffected. Fourth, 
above conclusions on cost change requests in hypotheses 1 and 2 are drawn from 
inspecting change requests that affect all remaining periods of a project. One could 
argue that a principal is able to detect attempts to incorporate slack in the current 
period more easily than in more distant periods if more time is spent to monitor 
immediate changes. The agent would consequently refrain from incorporating slack 
                                                 
28 The ex post analysis covers less observations than the original model in table 4.6 as some observations 
subsequent to a request lie outside the sample period. 
29 A comparable ex post analysis is not feasible for cost shift changes, given that total actual cost changes 
over the entire investment as in CHGCOST_XP are unaffected by additional cost shift requests between 
periods. 
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and cost change requests should not escalate in delegation for changes affecting the 
current period. We test this conjecture by replacing total project cost changes with 
cost change requests for the current period and find the similar results. The agent is 
thus equally able to incorporate slack in current as in more distant project periods 
and the principal’s monitoring is not lower in the latter case. Fifth, the variable 
PROJECTCOUNT  increases  over  a  project’s  lifecycle  and  is  therefore  closely 
related to the project stage identifiers EARLY and MATURE. This may introduce a 
multicollinearity problem in the analyses for hypotheses 2 and 4. We therefore rerun 
the  potentially  affected  specifications  leaving  out  PROJECTCOUNT  and  obtain 
closely comparable estimates that confirm both hypotheses. Sixth, we exclude low 
information asymmetry projects from all main multivariate models and find similar 
results supporting all four hypotheses. Overall, none of the modifications we applied 
changed the evidence that the main analyses of this study delivered. 
 
 
4.7  Discussion 
 
The  results  of  this  study  highlight  several  adverse  consequences  of  delegating 
decision rights of multi-period investment projects. First, our findings indicate that 
additional requests to change the total investment sum of projects are significantly 
higher the more authority over a project is delegated. We argue that these escalating 
requests indicate that business units seek to extend budgetary slack by exploiting 
lower  corporate  control  among  projects  with  higher  delegation  of  investment 
decision rights. Second, we argue that the information asymmetry between principal 
and agent on the actual nature of a project is particularly high at the start of an 
investment. Slack-seeking agents are therefore likely to incorporate more slack in 
earlier project stages. In support of this argument, our results show that requests to 
change the total scope of an investment are indeed particularly high at the outset of a 
project. Third, we propose that business units not only implement more slack but 
also reallocate this slack to a higher extent between investment periods the more a 
project is delegated. Business units benefit from reallocating slack between periods 
as consumption preferences of slack can change over the course of the investment, 
deviating  from  the  slack  incorporated  per  period  when  first  submitting  a  multi-
period investment. We find corroborating evidence for this argument as cost shifts 
increase in the level of delegation. Fourth, we argue that the difference between 
actually desired slack and initially allocated slack is higher the longer the time span 
between first incorporating and consuming slack. More mature periods therefore 
hold a higher difference in actual and desired slack. This induces the agent to resort 
to  higher  cost  shifting  to  reduce  this  difference,  which  our  evidence  supports. 
Several robustness tests reinforce the evidence found for all four hypotheses. 
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One  of  the  implications  of  this  study  is  that  the  organizational  design  of 
decision rights matters in budgeting processes. Companies that intend to delegate 
decision  rights  need  to  be  aware  of  the  possible  adverse  consequences  that  our 
results highlight. Although delegation can be an optimal response to avoid possible 
further  distortions  (Marino  &  Matsusaka  2005),  these  potential  benefits  of 
delegation should be traded off against the deteriorating precision of the investment 
budget when granting more decision rights to lower hierarchical levels. Another 
implication concerns the post-auditing of capital budgets to monitor the performance 
of  investment  decisions.
30 Various  authors  note  that  only  few  firms  employ 
sophisticated  post-audits  (Smith  1993;  Pierce  &  Tsay  1992;  Haka  2007).  Firms 
could,  however,  considerably  improve  their  budgeting  process  when  using  post-
audits, as the potential value of post-audits has been repeatedly illustrated in the 
literature (e.g. Myers et al. 1991; Gordon & Smith 1992). This study reinforces the 
evidence on potential gains of post-audits as budget renegotiations that lead to slack 
escalations can be detected and contained when employing appropriate post-audit 
procedures. 
Our results are subject to several limitations. First, the findings might not be 
directly  representative  of  other  firms  since  our  data  emanates  from  one  specific 
corporate group. However, this concern is alleviated by the fact that the budgeting 
process  implemented  in  this  company  is  very  typical  for  comparable  industrial 
firms.  Second,  for  some  analyses  only  a  limited  number  of  observations  are 
available, especially on the differences of cost shifting requests at early and mature 
stages. This constrains the array of empirical methods that can be applied to the data 
and limits the strength of some of our findings. Lastly, operational reasons unrelated 
to  purposeful  implementation  and  reallocation  could  at  least  partly  drive  the 
business units’ requests for cost changes and cost shifts. While it is difficult to see 
why these reasons would systematically vary with the level of delegation, it may be 
that  the  cost  request  data  used  in  this  study  only  roughly  approximates  slack, 
reducing the precision of our results. 
In spite of these limitations, we are convinced that our study contributes to the 
extant  literature  on  capital  budgeting,  budgetary  slack,  and  the  delegation  of 
authority. While prior papers predominantly consider budget processes with slack 
being incorporated before the actual investment occurs, we analyze a setting where 
projects  span  across  several  budget  periods.  This  setting  is  of  particular  interest 
because multi-period investments offer agents the possibility to renegotiate budgets. 
In consequence, agents can adjust the amount of slack per period, which previous 
studies assume to be locked in at the outset of projects. As projects develop over 
time, agents are bound to update their beliefs of the project and adapt budgetary 
                                                 
30 Note that post-auditing refers to auditing the actual performance of the investment projects after the 
fact. It does not refer to costly auditing of information transmitted during the capital budgeting process, 
as for example assumed in the models of Harris and Raviv (1996, 1998). 
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slack accordingly. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to offer empirical 
evidence on the consequences of delegating authority in these settings and at this 
level of detail. A potential avenue for future research is to further investigate the 
interplay between cost shift and cost change requests at different life-cycle stages of 
investment  projects.  Furthermore,  it  would  be  interesting  to  extend  the  analysis 
towards the exact trade-off decisions when investment decision rights are delegated, 
for instance when varying the compensation contracts of the agents involved. 
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Variable name  Description 
CAPEX  Capital expenditures for investments per business unit and 
calendar year in million EUR. 
CAPITAL  Total capital held per business unit and calendar year in million 
EUR. 
CHGCOST  Requested percentage change in a project’s total investment 
including the current as well as future budget periods. 
CHGCOST_EVENT  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 when the project observation 
indicates a cost change request, 0 otherwise. 
CHGCOSTXP  Actual, ex-post percentage change in a project’s total investment 
across all budget periods from one budget period to the next, 
after a request to change costs has been submitted. 
COSTSHIFT  Requested absolute percentage change in a project’s current 
budget period investment by fully or partly postponing originally 
scheduled costs to a later period or vice versa advancing future 
costs to the current period. 
COSTSHIFT_EVENT  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 when the project observation 
indicates a cost shift request, 0 otherwise. 
DHIGH  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 for high delegation level 
projects (low central supervision), 0 otherwise. 
DLOW  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 for low delegation level projects 
(high central supervision), 0 otherwise. 
DMEDIUM  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 for medium delegation level 
projects (medium central supervision), 0 otherwise. 
EARLY  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 for budget reports on early 
stage projects with several upfront investments having taken 
place but prior to the main investment stage, 0 otherwise. 
EMPLOYEES  Number of employees per business unit and calendar year. 
INVCURRENT  Project investment scheduled to take place in the current budget 
period in million EUR. 
INVTOTAL  Total project investment across all budget periods in million 
EUR. 
LNINVTOTAL  Natural logarithm of INVTOTAL. 
LNSALES  Natural logarithm of SALES. 
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LOWIA  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 for low information asymmetry 
projects that are more standardized and allow for only little 
discretion in project expenses, such as investments in workers’ 
security, buildings and automation, i.e. are unlikely to be used to 
incorporate budgetary slack, 0 otherwise. 
MATURE  Dichotomous variable equal to 1 for budget reports on projects in 
their main investment phase, 0 otherwise. 
PROJECTCOUNT  Count variable set to 1 for the first report of a project in the 
sample period and incrementing with 1 for every additional 
report on that project. 
ROI  Return on investment per business unit and calendar year. 
SALES  Sales revenues per business unit and calendar year in million 
EUR. 
SALESGROWTH  Percentage growth in sales revenue per business unit and 
calendar year. 














Diversified  firms  can  create  considerable  value  by  efficiently  allocating  capital 
between business units to internally finance capital investments. Companies that 
resort to internal capital avoid the regulatory rigidities of external debt and equity 
markets  as  well  as  the  inherently  higher  information  asymmetries  between  the 
company and its potential investors. In the light of firms increasing in size and 
complexity over the last decades, the question how to allocate capital efficiently has 
become both more prominent as well as more difficult to answer. A major factor 
inhibiting efficient allocations is non-cooperative behavior within the firm, when 
managers of business units are interested in their own unit’s rather than the firm’s 
best  interest.  Due  to  this  conflict  of  interests,  managers  try  to  obtain  additional 
capital for their own unit even if these funds would have yielded a higher return 
elsewhere in the firm. Capital allocation efficiency and ultimately firm value suffer 
from this behavior. 
The three studies in this dissertation contribute towards a better understanding 
of  the  conditions  that  induce  non-cooperative  behavior  during  capital  allocation 
processes.  Furthermore,  the  results  indicate  countermeasures  that  firms  can 
implement to improve allocation efficiency. This chapter provides a summary of the 
findings of each study, their limitations as well as their implications for diversified 
firms. An outlook on potential future research in the area concludes this dissertation. 
 
 
5.1  Summary of results 
 
The  first  study,  presented  in  chapter  2,  empirically  investigates  the  impact  of 
compensation on the capital allocation efficiency within multi-divisional firms. The 
CEO cannot verify exactly the investment opportunities in each division and needs 
to hire division managers. Furthermore, interests of division managers and CEO are 
not entirely aligned, because division manager incentives are primarily tied to the 
own  division  rather  than  the  firm.  In  this  setting,  division  managers  can  try  to 
maximize the capital allocation to their division and lobby the CEO for a higher 
share of the capital budget. Given that the CEO has an interest to maintain the 
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composition  of  divisions  within  the  firm,  he  cannot  simply  dismiss  lobbying 
division managers but instead needs to pay quasi-rents to prevent them from leaving 
the firm. The CEO faces two alternatives how to pay these quasi-rents. He can either 
raise the share of capital being allocated to that division or more directly increase 
the  division  manager’s  individual  remuneration  to  stop  him  from  lobbying. 
Scharfstein and  Stein (2000) show that the division manager’s utility from both 
options is the same, but that the latter option is less costly for the firm since it does 
not additionally distort the capital budget. 
It would thus be in the best interest of the firm to pay the division manager 
directly. This payment however reduces corporate funds under control of the CEO, 
which would not be affected when reallocating the capital budget among divisions 
instead.  Since  the  CEO  reaps  personal  benefits  from  larger  corporate  funds  and 
since also his interests are not necessarily in line with those of the owners of the 
firm, the CEO will prefer to allocate division managers a larger share rather than 
paying them directly. The findings in the first study indicate that this is indeed the 
case: the higher the excess allocation to a division beyond the economically justified 
level,  the  lower  the  division  manager’s  total  remuneration.  Conversely, 
underallocations are not associated with remuneration. This stresses that the CEO is 
able  to  deprive  some  divisions  of  part  of  the  capital  budget  without  having  to 
compensate the division manager for this loss, i.e. that substituting allocations for 
remunerations  between  divisions  is  not  a  zero-sum  game.  Diverging  interests 
between division manager and CEO as well as CEO and owners of the firm are 
underlying the misallocation problem. A potential solution is therefore to tie the 
personal wealth of managers more closely to that of the firm by issuing firm-wide 
equity  incentives.  In  support  of  this  argument,  allocation  quality  is  shown  to 
increase in the amount of issued equity incentives. 
The study presented in chapter 3 of this dissertation analyzes how firms can 
react to contain inefficient allocations caused by self-interested division managers 
by  reconfiguring  the  organizational  layout  of  their  divisions.  The  common 
denominator in the theories on internal allocation efficiency is that non-cooperative 
division manager behavior is caused by the economic profile of the division, as 
defined through parameters such as profitability and investment opportunities. For 
instance,  lobbying  rather  than  working  on  the  assigned  tasks  is  particularly 
profitable  for  a  manager  of  a  division  with  low  investment  opportunities.  Non-
cooperative behavior is also more likely among companies with strong differences 
in  investment  opportunities  between  their  divisions.  Rather  than  addressing  this 
incentive problem by issuing equity incentives as investigated in chapter 2, firms 
can  also  more  directly  approach  this  problem  at  the  root  cause,  changing  the 
economic profile itself. A division with low investment opportunities and thus high 
incentives  to  lobby  can  for  instance  be  merged  with  another,  high  investment 
opportunity division in a way that the joint investment outlook is sufficiently high 
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that lobbying is not attractive enough for the division manager. Also, changes to the 
organizational  layout  can  be  used  to  smooth  economic  discrepancies  between 
divisions  to  reduce  the  motivation  for  harmful,  non-cooperative  behavior.  The 
results show that firms are indeed more likely to reconfigure their organization when 
prior capital allocation efficiencies are lower than in comparable firms. Measures of 
capital allocation efficiency as well as shareholder wealth increase subsequent to 
these reconfigurations, reinforcing the argument that firms reconfigure to improve 
allocation efficiency. Furthermore, the sample lends some support to the expectation 
that such reconfigurations are less likely to occur when the cost of misallocating 
funds internally is relatively low. 
Whereas chapter 2 and 3 study the broad effects of capital allocations, chapter 
4 considers the budget process underlying capital allocations in more detail. More 
specifically, the third study investigates the consequences of decentralizing decision 
rights on the extent of budgetary slack, i.e. excess allocations, in a budgetary setting 
that allows capital-seeking business unit managers (the agents) to adjust their budget 
proposal once a multi-period investment is underway. Similar to the two studies in 
chapter 2 and 3, the CEO, i.e. the principal, cannot observe the actual state of an 
investment  that  an  agent  proposes  and  therefore  cannot  disentangle  slack  from 
actual project costs. The agent can exploit these conditions and incorporate slack 
into  his  proposal  during  renegotiations  to  obtain  more  funds  for  perquisite 
consumption. Furthermore, since processing capacity is limited, the CEO cannot 
decide  on  all  investment  projects  alone  but  needs  to  delegate  some  of  these 
investment  decision  rights  to  lower  hierarchical  levels,  at  the  expense  of  losing 
immediate  control  over  all  investment  projects.  In  consequence,  one  of  the 
predictions  is that agents incorporate more slack during renegotiations when the 
principal  delegates  more  and  retains  less  control  over  the  project.  Information 
asymmetries between principal and agent on the state of the project are particularly 
high at the outset of projects but decline as the investment proceeds and as actual 
costs become easier to detect for the principal. The second prediction is therefore 
that the agent is more likely to incorporate slack into the budget in earlier rather than 
later  project  stages  to  take  advantage  of  higher  information  asymmetries.  The 
findings strongly support both expectations. The third prediction states that agents 
not  only  exploit  lower  control  in  order  to  escalate  slack  but  also  to  shift  slack 
between periods. The agent may desire to shift slack since the agent cannot perfectly 
foresee  how  multi-period  projects  will  exactly  develop  so  that  the  agent’s 
consumption preference when to consume slack can change during a multi-period 
investment and deviate from the initial slack allocation. Shifting slack allows the 
agent to realign actual and desired slack level. In line with the initial prediction, 
results indicate that slack shifting occurs to a stronger extent for more delegated 
projects  under  less  control  of  the  principal.  Additionally,  slack  shifting  is  more 
pronounced when an agent is more certain about the development of the investment, 
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i.e. in later project stages, whereas agents shift less under higher uncertainty during 
earlier project stages.  
 
 
5.2  Limitations 
 
Considerable attention has been devoted to the empirical research design in order to 
maximize  the  validity  of  the  results  of  all  studies  presented  in  this  dissertation. 
Nevertheless, several limitations are in order. In chapter 2, the benchmark model 
may not capture all factors that play a role during the capital allocation decision 
despite its high explanatory power. Elaborate validation and testing of the results 
associated with this model however alleviate this concern. 
The studies presented in chapter 2 and 3 share two limitations. First, the two 
analyses impute growth opportunities of non-listed segments on the basis of listed 
single-segment firms in the same industry. This can only serve as an approximation 
of  actual,  but  unobservable  growth  opportunities.  Second,  both  studies  rely  on 
publicly available financial segment data to infer on allocations within the firm, 
since allocations between divisions are not directly disclosed. Due to the widespread 
use of these estimation techniques, the two limitations pertain to most studies in the 
literature  on  internal  capital  markets.  In  order  to  improve  the  quality  of  these 
estimations, both studies use segment data reported under SFAS 131: this standard 
requires firms to report more closely according to their actual organizational design 
and reduces some of the discretion that firms enjoyed under the preceding standard 
SFAS 14. 
Investigating  changes  to  the  divisional  layout  of  firms  in  chapter  3  is 
complicated  by  the  fact  that  these  reconfigurations  may  span  a  time  period  of 
several  months.  This  makes  it  difficult  to  determine  an  exact  event  date. 
Additionally, disclosure on these reconfigurations is very limited so that they can at 
times only be identified when comparing detailed changes between two consecutive 
segment reports. In addition, the lack of disclosure makes it difficult to discriminate 
organizational  changes  to  a  finer  extent  than  presented  in  this  dissertation. 
Divisional reorganizations in absence of other potentially diluting event that change 
the organization such as acquisitions or divestments are also relatively rare and not 
straightforward to detect. This limits the sample size and thus also the range of 
applicable statistical analyses. 
The more detailed internal data in chapter 4 allows circumventing some of the 
imputation  problems  inherent  in  the  other  two  cross-sectional  studies.  The 
advantage of more detailed data comes at the possible costs that the findings may 
not be immediately generalizable. This concern can largely be dispelled by the fact 
that  the  budgeting  system  and  also  the  other  organizational  arrangements  in  the 
analyzed  industrial  group  are  very  similar  to  those  found  in  comparable  firms. 
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Another potential limitation is that operational reasons unrelated to budgetary slack 
may  drive  requests  to  renegotiate  budgets,  so  that  using  cost  request  data  only 
roughly  approximates  slack.  While  unobservable  operational  reasons  can 
undoubtedly affect requests to change project budgets, it is difficult to see how these 
would be systematically linked to the level of delegation. Analyzing differences of 
cost  requests  between  delegation  levels  therefore  largely  filters  out  confounding 
effects of unobservable factors. A final limitation stems from the available sample 
size. The analyzed industrial group did not always adhere to the same format of their 
budgeting reports, so that only those budget period reports could enter the analysis 
that followed a comparable format. This puts an inevitable limit to the sample size 
and also the range of suitable statistical tests. 
 
 
5.3  Implications and recommendations for future research 
 
Various implications follow from the results of this dissertation. Parties that can 
profit from these insights include not only academic scholars but also management 
and  shareholders  of  multi-divisional  firms,  as  well  as  financial  market 
intermediaries. 
The study on internal allocation quality and compensation in chapter 2 stresses 
that  the  internal  investment  efficiency  in  multi-divisional  firms  can  suffer  from 
multiple  agency  problems  between  shareholders  and  top  management,  but  also 
between different layers of management. The study shows that shareholders and 
management can resort to firm-wide equity incentives to at least partly resolve these 
agency problems and improve the allocation efficiency as managers refrain from 
influence activities when the resulting costs are affecting their personal wealth. This 
indicates  that  compensating  employees  below  top  management  level  with  stock 
options  not  only  increases  retention  but  also  has  immediate  incentive  effects, 
inducing employees to act more in the interest of the firm. This result also shows 
that  compensation  contracts  of  division  managers  should  not  only  be  based  on 
considerations  of  operational  interdependence  between  divisions.  This  more 
conventional controllability argument states that division managers should only be 
compensated on the performance of the entire firm if inter-divisional dependencies 
allow  a  division  manager  to  affect  the  performance  of  other  units.  Firm-based 
remuneration  is  otherwise  argued  to  only  increase  noise,  exposing  division 
managers  to  unnecessary  compensation  risk.  The  study  shows,  however,  that 
division managers may also engage in influence activities when there are few or no 
operational  links  between  the  units  of  a  firm.  To  prevent  this  behavior  and  to 
improve  internal  investment  efficiency,  firms  should  therefore  consider 
compensating  division  managers  on  firm  performance  even  in  the  absence  of 
interdependencies  between  divisions.  Furthermore,  the  presence  of  incentive 
Thesis_JF Andre_v06.pdfChapter 5 
  118 
packages can also serve as a signal to analysts in the external financial market to 
better estimate the extent of allocation problems within the firm. This is of particular 
interest because the relatively opaque nature of information about the constituents of 
multi-divisional firms frequently leads external analysts to value these companies at 
a discount. 
This  dissertation  indicates  that  firms  can  –  apart  from  adjusting  the 
compensation structure – also change the organizational layout of the firm to reduce 
influence activities of division managers surrounding the capital allocation process. 
The study presented in chapter 3 shows that firms can reduce the incentives of a 
division manager to engage in non-cooperative behavior by adjusting the economic 
profile of their divisions. To do so, firms do not necessarily have to engage in large-
scale, costly reorganizations. Instead, changes to the economic profile of a division 
can  also  be  achieved  by  adjusting  the  composition  of  operations  that  a  division 
manager supervises, which entails a change in reporting and the way decision rights 
are partitioned rather than a physical change in the actual operations. The results of 
this study stress that firms should not only devise their internal organization in the 
light of operational practicalities but also with respect to potential non-cooperative 
behavior that the internal structure may provoke. The results also show that external 
analysts  and  other  intermediaries  in  the  financial  market  can  use  disclosures 
surrounding divisional reorganizations to infer on the efficiency of internal capital 
allocations  and  in  how  far  companies  attempt  to  improve  the  latter.  The  data 
gathering process for this study however demonstrated that these disclosures are still 
relatively limited so that firms that wish to unmistakably signal the benefits of their 
organizational  changes  could  potentially  profit  from  extending  the  information 
disclosed to the financial market. 
In chapter 4, this dissertation documents the costly consequences of delegating 
authority over investment project decisions in capital budgeting processes. More 
specifically,  budgets  are  shown  to  be  less  precise  as  self-interested  managers 
incorporate more slack and reallocate more excess funds between periods the higher 
the level of delegation of an investment project. These findings underline that firms 
that have to deal with a multitude of investment proposals from their business units 
should  consider  two  aspects.  First,  delegating  investment  decisions  has certainly 
several benefits, for instance freeing up management resources of the delegating 
party to be used elsewhere in the firm. However, the results in this dissertation 
indicate that costs can escalate with non-trivial amounts the more budget authority is 
delegated.  Firms  should  therefore  not  delegate  investment  decisions  without 
thoroughly trading off the benefits of delegation with the costly loss of control in the 
guise  of  budgetary  slack.  Second,  firms  that  are  already  delegating  investment 
decision rights or those that plan to do so should be aware of the importance of 
appropriate internal reporting systems. These systems can help reducing information 
asymmetries between the budget-requesting and budget-granting party, thereby ex 
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ante lowering the potential implementation of slack. These systems also facilitate 
the  post-auditing  of  budgets.  While  elaborate  post-audits  are  still  rarely  used  in 
practice, this dissertation indicates that they can be of considerable value to track 
and prevent the escalation and inter-periodic reallocation of slack over the course of 
multi-period investment projects. 
A multitude of research possibilities exist to extent this dissertation and other 
studies  in  the  field  of  internal  capital  allocation.  Kuppuswamy  and  Villalonga 
(2010)  remark  that  only  very  few  studies  have  attempted  to  explain  causal 
relationships in internal capital markets. Aiming in this direction, chapters 2 and 3 
contribute  to  the  literature  by  analyzing  the  role  of  compensation  contracts  and 
organizational design to contain non-cooperative behavior in allocation processes. 
However, future research could address potential additional approaches that firms 
take to counter inefficient allocations. For instance, it is not yet profoundly studied 
if rotating management reduces non-cooperative behavior of division managers, as 
indicated in Stein (2003), and how these schemes specifically work. Concerning 
chapter 3, the annual reporting cycle for segment reports as well as the extreme 
scarcity of related, supplemental information in other publications and news sources 
led to a time window of one year within which the event took place. Future research 
could try to narrow this time span to more precisely measure allocation efficiencies 
that surround divisional reconfigurations. Chapter 3 investigates the possibility that 
firms  are  less  likely  to  change  their  divisional  structure  to  counter  inefficient 
allocations when misallocations are less costly. Firms certainly also take additional 
trade-off  decisions  before  deciding  to  reorganize  divisions  and  more  research  is 
needed to clarify this decision making process.  
The  extant  literature  on  capital  allocation  problems  is  largely  resorting  to 
segment disclosures in annual reports. In the light of the inevitable limitations of 
segment data, further insights are more likely to spring from the use of internal 
allocation  data.  The  limited  prior  research  on  budget  renegotiations  studied  in 
chapter 4 illustrates that internal data, while harder to obtain, can allow for a host of 
new analyses that could help to better understand capital allocation processes. This 
dissertation  intends  to  extend  knowledge  in  academia  and  practice  on  internal 
capital allocation processes, which are at the heart of managing multi-divisional 
firms. Many of the mechanisms in this area however still remain unknown. Internal 
capital allocation research therefore continues to be a challenging field of study that 
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De wereldwijde economische activiteit en interactie is de afgelopen decennia sterk 
toegenomen. Een gevolg van deze economische groei is niet alleen een toename in 
het aantal, maar ook in de omvang van bedrijven.  Naarmate  een  bedrijft  groeit, 
worden  degelijke  management  structuren,  die  de  steeds  complexere  organisatie 
kunnen steunen, belangrijker. In productiebedrijven zijn daarbij vooral procedures 
voor de efficiënte interne allocatie van kapitaal voor investeringen in vaste activa 
cruciaal. Immers, deze vaste activa bepalen de toekomstige productie en productivi-
teit  van  het  bedrijf.  Dit  proefschrift  bestudeert  deze  allocatiemechanismen,  de 
inefficiënties die hierbij kunnen optreden en de stappen die bedrijven kunnen nemen 
om deze inefficiënties te beperken of op te lossen.  
Het  eerste  hoofdstuk  geeft  een  inleiding  in  het  onderzoeksgebied  en  een 
overzicht  van  de  hoofdaspecten  van  interne  kapitaalallocatie.  Vooral  binnen 
gediversifieerde ondernemingen met meerdere divisies of business units zijn deze 
allocaties van belang. Bij deze concerns vormt het hoofdkantoor de enige link naar 
de  externe  kapitaalmarkt.  Verder  bundelt  het  hoofdkantoor  het  kapitaal  dat  de 
divisies genereren. Op basis van investeringsaanvragen door de divisies beslist dan 
het hoofdkantoor hoe het extern en intern kapitaal binnen het bedrijf verdeeld wordt. 
Voorstanders van kapitaalallocatie binnen gediversifieerde bedrijven tonen aan dat 
de  interne  allocatie  efficiënter  is  dan  een  directe  financiering  van  een 
investeringsproject door de externe kapitaalmarkt. De reden hiervoor is vooral dat 
het hoofdkantoor een beter inzicht heeft in hoe rendabel de investeringen zijn dan 
kapitaalverstrekkers  in  de  externe  markt,  dat  wil  zeggen  dat  beslissingen  onder 
minder informatie asymmetrie genomen worden. Verder is interne financiering van 
voordeel om minder afhankelijk van de externe kapitaalmarkt te kunnen opereren, in 
het  bijzonder  bij  structurele  marktproblemen  zoals  in  opkomende  markten  of  in 
meer  ontwikkelde  economieën  tijdens  de  recente  kredietcrisis.  Tegenstanders 
argumenteren dat interne kapitaalallocaties vaak een subjectieve beslissing van het 
hoofdkantoor zijn. Dit geeft managers, die investeringen aanvragen, de mogelijkheid 
om  de  besluitvorming  in  hun  eigen  voordeel  te  beïnvloeden  om  zodoende  meer 
kapitaal dan het economisch optimum te ontvangen. Dit non-coöperatieve gedrag 
van managers resulteert in inefficiënties omdat het kapitaal niet meer altijd het beste 
investeringsproject bereikt. 
Gezien de potentiële inefficiënties van interne allocaties, is het opmerkelijk dat 
de bestaande literatuur weinig aandacht besteedt aan de manieren waarop bedrijven 
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inefficiënties kunnen voorkomen of tenminste beperken. Dit is het startpunt van het 
onderzoek in hoofdstuk 2. Het uitgangspunt voor deze studie is dat divisie managers 
voorrang geven aan de doelen van hun eigen divisie in plaats van die van de gehele 
onderneming;  anders  gezegd,  dat  er  een  conflict  in  incentives  bestaat.  Daardoor 
proberen  deze  managers  tijdens  de  kapitaalallocatie  meer  middelen  te  krijgen, 
ongeacht het betere potentieel van projecten in andere divisies. Dit is ten eerste 
mogelijk  omdat  het  hoofdkantoor,  vertegenwoordigd  door  de  CEO, 
beïnvloedingsactiviteiten  niet  helemaal  kan  onderscheiden  van  rechtvaardige 
investeringsaanvragen door informatie asymmetrie tussen divisie en hoofdkantoor. 
Ten tweede is het door deze informatie asymmetrie en de specificiteit van taken 
noodzakelijk  te  delegeren.  Door  deze  afhankelijkheid  kan  de  CEO  de 
beïnvloedingactiviteiten  niet  negeren,  omdat  de  divisie  managers  anders  kunnen 
dreigen het bedrijf te verlaten. 
De CEO heeft twee keuzes om hierop te reageren. Aan de ene kant kan hij 
direct  meer  aan  de  beïnvloedende  manager  uitbetalen  en  zijn  salaris  verhogen. 
Alternatief kan de CEO ook beslissen om de divisie manager meer kapitaal voor 
investeringen toe te wijzen, op kosten van een verlaging van het budget van alle 
andere divisies. De divisie manager beschouwt zowel directe uitbetaling als ook 
(over-) allocatie als substituten. De directe uitbetaling levert minder kosten voor de 
onderneming op dan de reallocatie van kapitaal, die de investeringsefficiëntie van 
het  hele  bedrijf  verlaagt.  Echter  het  direct  verhogen  van  het  salaris  verlaagt  het 
hoeveelheid  kapitaal  onder  de  controle  van  de  CEO,  hetgeen  indruist  tegen  zijn 
streven om zo veel mogelijk kapitaal te controleren. In zoverre de incentives van de 
CEO niet helemaal parallel lopen met de doelen van de onderneming, zal de CEO de 
reallocatie van het budget prefereren boven directe uitbetaling. De verwachting is 
dus  dat  kapitaalallocatie  naar  een  divisie  en  salaris  van  de  divisie  manager  als 
substituut negatief gerelateerd zijn en dat excessieve allocaties de efficiëntie van 
interne investeringen verlagen. Een oplossing voor dit probleem, dat gedreven wordt 
door afwijkende prikkels tussen divisie manager, CEO en eigenaar van het bedrijf, is 
het  belonen  middels  aandeel-gebaseerde  beloningscontracten  aan  alle  betrokken 
partijen, oftewel “firm-wide equity incentives”. Hierdoor merkt een manager, die 
beslissingen neemt die de efficiëntie van kapitaalallocatie verlagen, dit direct in zijn 
beloning.  De  verwachting  is  dus  dat  de  kwaliteit  van  interne  kapitaalallocaties 
positief gerelateerd is aan de uitgave van equity incentives. 
Deze verwachtingen worden getest op basis van de segmentrapportage van een 
streekproef van beursgenoteerde bedrijven in de VS in de jaren 1998 tot 2004, in 
combinatie  met  handmatig  verzamelde  data  over  bezoldigingsstructuren.  De 
resultaten bevestigen de verwachting dat inefficiënte, excessieve kapitaalallocaties 
negatief gerelateerd zijn aan het salaris van de directe divisie manager. Allocatie en 
directe  compensatie  zijn  dus  substituten.  Verder  tonen  de  resultaten  aan,  dat  de 
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kwaliteit  van  kapitaalallocatie  stijgt,  als  er  meer  equity  incentives  uitgegeven 
worden. 
Terwijl hoofdstuk 2 het effect van beloningscontracten op de efficiëntie van 
kapitaalallocaties  bestudeert,  richt  hoofdstuk  3  zich  op  veranderingen  in  de 
organisatiestructuur als alternatief om de efficiëntie van deze allocaties te verhogen. 
Meerdere  theoretische  studies  argumenteren  dat  het  economisch  profiel  van  een 
divisie de hoofdreden voor non-coöperatief gedrag van divisie managers is, wat als 
gevolg  inefficiënte  interne  kapitaalallocatie  heeft.  Een  manager  besteedt 
bijvoorbeeld meer tijd aan lobbyen als de verwachte rendementen van productieve 
activiteiten  lager  zijn  dan  van  lobbyen.  Verder  kunnen  sterke  verschillen  in 
investeringsmogelijkheden tussen divisies ertoe leiden dat beter presterende divisies 
suboptimaal investeren omdat zij niet bereid zijn om zwakkere divisies door het 
kapitaal van de optimale investering mede te financieren. Reallocaties van kapitaal 
door een interventie van de CEO kunnen de investeringsefficiëntie verbeteren maar 
zijn meer een teken dan een oplossing van niet-coöperatief gedrag. 
In het equilibrium kiezen bedrijven voor de optimale organisatiestructuur die, 
gegeven alle andere markt factoren, de kosten van niet-coöperatief gedrag omtrent 
de  kapitaalallocatie  zo  laag  mogelijk  houdt.  Omdat  markten  zich  verschillend 
kunnen  ontwikkelen,  veranderen  de  economische  profielen  van  de  individuele 
divisies en daarmee ook de prikkels voor inefficiënt gedrag en lobbyen naar meer 
kapitaal door de divisie manager. Om deze inefficiënties tenminste voor een deel te 
voorkomen, is een mogelijke oplossing het veranderen van het economisch profiel 
van  de  divisie,  aangezien  dit  de  oorspronkelijke  reden  van  inefficiënte 
kapitaalallocaties is. Het profiel van een divisie kan veranderd worden door een 
nieuwe samenstelling van de activiteiten die in iedere divisie gebundeld zijn. In 
plaats van alleen sterk presterende activiteiten in een divisie en zwakkere in een 
andere kunnen bijvoorbeeld sterke en zwakke activiteiten in een divisie onder het 
toezicht  van  een,  in  plaats  van  twee  divisie  managers  gebundeld  worden.  Dit 
verlaagt de diversiteit van divisieprestaties en daarmee het niet-coöperatief gedrag 
bij de kapitaalallocatie. Hieruit resulteert de hypothese dat bedrijven met minder 
efficiënte  kapitaalallocaties  meer  geneigd  zijn  om  hun  divisies  opnieuw  te 
structureren. Verder wordt verwacht dat de efficiëntie van kapitaalallocaties na een 
herstructurering van divisies stijgt. 
De hypotheses van de tweede studie worden onderzocht met behulp van een 
streekproef  van  gediversifieerde  bedrijven  uit  de  VS  in  de  jaren  1998  tot  2007. 
Segmentrapportage in deze periode valt, zoals in de eerste studie van dit proef-
schrift,  onder  het  reglement  van  SFAS  131.  Veranderingen  in  de 
organisatiestructuur leiden daarom ook tot een verandering in de segmentrapportage. 
Dit maakt het mogelijk om veranderingen in de organisatiestructuur op te sporen. 
Om  andere  redenen  voor  een  verandering  in  de  segmentverslaggeving,  zoals 
acquisities  of  deelverkoop  van  de  onderneming,  uit  te  sluiten,  werden  10-k 
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rapportages van de SEC gelezen. Bedrijven geven in deze rapportages de reden voor 
veranderingen  in  de  verslaggeving  aan.  Op  die  manier  kunnen  daadwerkelijke 
reorganisaties geverifieerd en andere evenementen uitgefilterd worden. Deze groep 
van  reorganiserende  bedrijven  wordt  in  de  analyse  vergleken  met  soortgelijke 
bedrijven die niet van organisatiestructuur veranderen. De resultaten tonen aan dat 
bedrijven met minder efficiënte kapitaalallocaties een grotere kans hebben om hun 
organisatiestructuur  te  veranderen.  Verder  stijgen  de  efficiëntie  van  kapitaal-
allocaties en de ondernemingswaarde voor aandeelhouders als gevolg van deze her-
structureringen. 
De twee studies in hoofdstuk 2 en 3 gebruiken extern gerapporteerde data om 
de  efficiëntie  van  interne  kapitaalallocaties  te  meten,  zoals  de  meerderheid  van 
gerelateerde studies in dit onderzoeksgebied. Een reden hiervoor is dat bedrijven 
meestal terughoudend zijn met het beschikbaar stellen van interne data. Echter, het 
gebruik  van  externe  data  limiteert  de  precisie  en  de  omvang  van  de  mogelijke 
analyses.  Ten  gevolge  van  deze  beperkingen  blijven  veel  vragen  over  het 
allocatieproces op basis van publiek beschikbare data onbeantwoord.  
De derde studie van dit proefschrift gaat op deze beperkingen in en bestudeert 
kapitaalallocaties  direct  met  behulp  van  een  interne  dataset  over  het 
investeringsproces van een gediversifieerd concern. De focus van de analyse ligt op 
“budgetary slack”, dat wil zeggen: het gedeelte van een kapitaalallocatie dat een 
aanvragend agent (de divisie manager) boven de daadwerkelijk benodigde som van 
de principaal (de CEO) ontvangt. Het aanvragen van een bovenmatige allocatie is 
voordelig voor de agent omdat hij hiervan een persoonlijk voordeel in vorm van 
hogere eigen consumptie, oftewel “perquisites”, haalt. Slack verlaagt de efficiëntie 
van kapitaalallocaties en wordt bevorderd door een informatie asymmetrie tussen 
aanvragend agent en kapitaal gevend principaal, die het de principaal onmogelijk 
maakt om daadwerkelijke kosten van slack te onderscheiden. De meeste studies 
onderzoeken budget slack in een een-periode model terwijl investeringsprojecten 
vaak meerdere periodes beslaan en de agent de kans geven om in de loop van het 
project  de  aangevraagde  kosten  opnieuw  te  onderhandelen.  De  derde  studie 
analyseert of deze heronderhandelingen door de agent voor het verkrijgen van meer 
slack meer gebruikt worden als een principaal projecten meer delegeert en minder, 
als de principaal meer controle over het project uitoefent. Verder wordt onderzocht 
of agenten minder controle door de principaal ook gebruiken om slack voor hun 
eigen voordeel binnen de looptijd van een project voor consumptie op een eerder of 
later  tijdstip  dan  oorspronkelijk  gepland  te  verschuiven.  Verschuivingen  kunnen 
optreden  omdat  ook  de  agent  door  onverwachte  ontwikkelingen  bij  langdurende 
investeringen  niet  precies  kan  voorspellen  wanneer  hij  slack  wil  consumeren. 
Terwijl deze verschuivingen niet het budget verhogen, veroorzaken ze wel kosten 
omdat  zij  de  zekerheid  voor  de  principaal  verminderen  wanneer  hij  financiële 
middelen nodig heeft om alle projecten te kunnen financieren. 
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De budget data voor deze analyse hebben betrekking op de investeringsaan-
vragen en -beslissingen van een wereldwijd opererend concern. Het budgetterings-
proces is vergelijkbaar met soortgelijke processen in bedrijven van vergelijkbare 
omvang.  De  resultaten  bevestigen  dat  agenten  meer  slack  in  de  loop  van 
investeringsprojecten  toevoegen  als  de  principaal  meer  delegeert  en  daardoor 
minder directe controle uitoefent. Dit effect is bijzonder sterk bij meer informatie 
asymmetrie tussen principaal en agent, hetgeen het ontdekken van slack lastiger 
maakt.  Verder  geven  de  resultaten  aan  dat  agenten  meer  slack  tussentijds 
verschuiven als de principaal meer delegeert. Agenten verschuiven meer slack zodra 
zij beter kunnen plannen wanneer zij slack willen gebruiken. 
De drie studies in dit proefschrift geven veelvoudige inzichten in de werking 
van kapitaalallocaties in diversifieerde bedrijven. De eerste studie in hoofdstuk 2 
toont aan dat beloning op basis van aandelen in het geval van divisie managers kan 
bijdragen aan een verbetering in de efficiëntie van kapitaalallocaties. Vaak worden 
dergelijk beloningen alleen gebruikt om samenwerking te bevorderen tussen divisies 
in markten die onderling afhankelijk zijn. Deze studie laat zien dat deze contracten 
ook van waarde zijn als divisies minder operationeel afhankelijk van elkaar zijn om 
samenwerking bij de kapitaalallocatie te bevorderen. De eerste studie introduceert 
verder een nieuwe methode voor het meten van de kwaliteit van interne allocaties. 
Anders dan de meeste bestaande maatstaven is deze methode gebaseerd op meerdere 
meetfactoren  en  daardoor  minder  afhankelijk  van  de  sensitiviteit  en 
veronderstellingen van een meetfactor. De tweede studie in hoofdstuk 3 laat zien dat 
niet alleen veranderingen in de beloning- maar ook in de organisatiestructuur tot een 
verbetering  van  kapitaalallocaties  kunnen  leiden.  Dit  aspect  is  tot  op  heden  niet 
gedocumenteerd.  De  derde  studie  in  hoofdstuk  4  laat  de  gevolgen  zien  als  een 
bedrijf  door  delegatie  van  investeringsprojecten  minder  controle  over  de  kosten 
uitoefent. De analyse maakt duidelijk dat door het opnieuw aanvragen van kosten 
gedurende een project de kosten meer stijgen als het hoofdkantoor meer delegeert en 
dus  minder  controle  uitoefent.  De  rol  van  nieuwe  onderhandelingen  in  budget 
processen is tot nu nog niet gedocumenteerd en maakt duidelijk dat de post-audit 
van budgets, hoewel weinig gebruikt in de praktijk, een belangrijke rol kan spelen 
om  budgetcontrole  te  behouden.  Deze  en  verdere  conclusies  en  aanbevelingen 
worden in hoofdstuk 5 weergegeven. Ten slotte gaat dit proefschrift in op de vraag 














Weltweit haben über die letzten Jahrzehnte Wirtschaft und Handel bislang uner-
kannte  Ausmaße  erreicht.  Infolgedessen  haben  nicht  nur  die  Anzahl  der  hieran 
beteiligten Unternehmen sondern auch deren durchschnittliche Größe zugenommen. 
So hat seit Mitte der Neunziger Jahre die an Umsatz und Bilanzsumme gemessene 
Größe  der  US-basierten  Firmen  außerhalb  des  Finanzsektors,  die  in  der 
COMPUSTAT-Datenbank geführt werden, bis zum Jahr 2009 im Durchschnitt um 
136% bzw. 110% zugenommen. Trotz zunehmender Automatisierung ist im glei-
chen Zeitraum auch die durchschnittliche Mitarbeiterzahl um 67% gestiegen. Ein 
Ende dieses Aufwärtstrends ist vorerst nicht absehbar. 
Eine  wichtige  Voraussetzung  für  dieses  Wachstum  sind  leistungsfähige 
Managementstrukturen zur Unterstützung der internen Organisation des Unterneh-
mens.  Dabei  nehmen  insbesondere  Steuerungsprozesse  für  Kapitalanlageent-
scheidungen, z.B. für den Neubau einer Fabrik, eine besondere Rolle ein: Corbett 
und Jenkinson (1997) zeigen, dass von 1970 bis 1994 zwischen 70% und 96% aller 
Neuinvestitionen  im  Vereinigten  Königreich,  Japan,  Deutschland  und  den  USA 
durch interne Mittel finanziert wurden. Darüber hinaus verdeutlicht die noch auslau-
fende  Kreditkrise,  welche  zu  einer  bedeutenden  Verknappung  externer  Finanzie-
rungsmöglichkeiten geführt hat, die Bedeutung effizienter Innenfinanzierung. Das 
zentrale Thema dieser Dissertation sind diese internen Kapitalallokationsmechanis-
men,  welche  Faktoren  zu  Ineffizienzen  dieser  Prozesse  führen  und  wie  diesen 
Ineffizienzen entgegengewirkt werden kann. 
Das  erste  Kapitel  dieser  Dissertation  gibt  eine  kurze  Einleitung  in  das 
Forschungsgebiet  der  internen  Kapitalallokationen.  Vor  allem  in  diversifizierten 
Unternehmen mit organisatorisch von einander getrennten Geschäftsbereichen sind 
diese  Allokationen  von  Bedeutung,  da  kapitalgenerierende  Bereiche  durch 
Querfinanzierungen  kapitalschwächere  Bereiche  unterstützen  können.  Diese 
Querfinanzierungen werden zumeist durch die Konzernzentrale gesteuert, die zudem 
auch  zusätzliche  Mittel  am  externen  Kapitalmarkt,  z.B.  durch  Banken  oder  die 
Wertpapierbörse, aufnehmen und in den internen Allokationsprozess einfließen las-
sen kann. Ein Vorteil dieser internen Allokation in diversifizierten Unternehmen ist, 
dass die Konzernzentrale sehr viel geringerer Informationsasymmetrie ausgesetzt ist 
als  ein  externer  Investor,  der  beabsichtigt  direkt  in  einen  Unternehmensteil  zu 
investieren. Zudem unterliegt ein Unternehmen durch Innenfinanzierungsmechanis-
men weniger den Umständen und Anforderungen des externen Kapitalmarktes. Dies 
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ist zum einen von offensichtlichem Vorteil in Ländern mit schwach entwickelten 
Kapitalmarktstrukturen, zum anderen aber auch in Wirtschaftszonen mit ausgebilde-
ten Finanzmärkten, wenn etwa wie in der jüngsten Kreditkrise systematische Risi-
ken die Fremdmittelaufnahme erschweren. Demgegenüber darf jedoch nicht außer 
Acht gelassen werden, dass die Konzernzentrale einen subjektiven Ermessensspiel-
raum  bei  der  internen  Kapitalallokation  besitzt.  Dadurch  haben  Geschäfts-
bereichsleiter, die für Investitionen in ihrem Bereich Kapital anfragen, den Anreiz, 
die Verteilungsentscheidung zu ihren Gunsten zu beeinflussen um über das öko-
nomische  Optimum  hinaus  mehr  Kapital  zu  erhalten.  Dieses  unkooperative 
Verhalten  verringert  die  Allokationseffizienz,  da  das  Kapital  innerhalb  des 
Unternehmens nicht mehr unbedingt der besten Investitionsmöglichkeit zufließt. 
Ein Großteil der bestehenden Studien zu diesem Fragenkomplex analysiert, ob 
interne  Kapitalallokationen  durchschnittlich  ineffizient  oder  effizient  arbeiten. 
Hingegen ist die Frage, wie Unternehmen auf Ineffizienzen reagieren um diese zu 
begrenzen bisher nur in Ansätzen untersucht worden. Dies ist Gegenstand der ersten 
Studie dieser Dissertation in Kapitel 2. Im Zentrum steht dabei der Anreizkonflikt 
zwischen  Geschäftsbereichsleitern  und  Gesamtkonzern,  welcher  daraus  resultiert, 
dass sich die Bereichsleiter zuerst dem Wohlergehen ihres Firmenzweiges und erst 
nachrangig  dem  des  Gesamtunternehmens  verpflichtet  fühlen.  Durch  diesen 
Interessenkonflikt versucht der Bereichsleiter mitunter Kapital zu erhalten, welches 
innerhalb  des  Konzerns  an  anderer  Stelle  besser  investiert  wäre,  indem  er  die 
Konzernleitung in seiner Entscheidungsfindung zu seinen Gunsten zu beeinflussen 
versucht. Die Konzernleitung steht dabei vor dem Problem, dass sie aufgrund von 
Informationsasymmetrien  die  von  den  Geschäftsbereichen  vorgestellten  In-
vestitionsprojekte nicht vollständig auf deren tatsächliche Parameter hin überprüfen 
kann. Beeinflussungsaktivitäten können daher nicht grundsätzlich durchschaut und 
verhindert werden. Darüberhinaus kann die Konzernleitung selbst bei Erkennen von 
Beeinflussungsaktivitäten  die  Anfragen  der  Geschäftsbereichsleiter  nicht  einfach 
ignorieren, da letztere sonst drohen, die Firma zu verlassen. 
Da der Konzern aber auf den Erhalt der Unternehmensstruktur bedacht ist, bie-
ten sich zwei Möglichkeiten, auf Beeinflussungsaktivitäten zu reagieren. Zum einen 
kann  der  Konzern  dem  Geschäftsbereich  mehr  Investitionskapital  zuweisen, 
wodurch die Budgets anderer Bereiche, denen Mittel entzogen werden, verzerrt wer-
den. Zum anderen kann die Konzernleitung dem Geschäftsbereichsleiter direkt mehr 
Gehalt auszahlen, womit keine Budgetverzerrungen auftreten. Insgesamt verursacht 
die direkte Auszahlung weniger Kosten für das Unternehmen und ist daher im Sinne 
der Anteilseigner. Allerdings werden durch letztere Variante die der Konzernleitung 
selber zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel vermindert, welche der Konzernleitung von 
direktem, persönlichen Nutzen sind, etwa durch „perquisite spendings“. Wenn die 
Konzernleitung nicht vollständig im Interesse der Anteilseigner sondern auch zum 
eigenen  Vorteil  handelt,  wird  sie  sich  eher  für  eine  Umverteilung  des 
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Investitionsbudgets entscheiden, anstatt die eigenen Mittel zu kürzen. Durch diese 
Abwägungsentscheidung zwischen Erhöhung des Gehalts des Bereichsleiters oder 
alternativ einer übermäßigen Investition in dessen Bereich folgt die Hypothese, dass 
Gehalt und Allokation Substitute und somit negativ korreliert sind. Ferner ist zu 
erwarten,  dass  die  Entscheidung,  in  den  Kapitalallokationsprozess  einzugreifen, 
dessen  Effizienz  vermindert.  Das  Grundproblem  dieser  Fehlallokationen  liegt  in 
dem zweifachen Anreizkonflikt zwischen Bereichsleiter und Konzernleitung sowie 
der  Konzernleitung  und  den  Anteilseignern.  Eine  Möglichkeit  diesem  Problem 
entgegenzuwirken  ist  die  Ausgabe  von  auf  dem  Firmenwert  beruhenden 
Leistungsgehältern,  z.B.  in  Form  von  Aktien  oder  darauf  beruhenden  Derivaten. 
Hieraus  resultiert  die  Hypothese,  dass  die  interne  Allokationseffizienz  mit  dem 
Ausmaß derartiger Leistungsgehälter steigt. 
Die Hypothesen dieser Studie werden auf Basis der Segmentberichterstattung 
im Jahresabschlussbericht von börsennotierten, diversifizierten Unternehmen in den 
USA im Zeitraum von 1998 bis 2004 untersucht. Diese Daten wurden erweitert 
durch  einen  eigens  aufgebauten  Datensatz  über  Entlohnungsstrukturen  auf  der 
Grundlage  von  10-k  Formularen  der  amerikanischen  Börsenaufsicht  SEC.  Die 
Auswertung dieser Daten bestätigt die Erwartung, dass Kapitalallokation und Gehalt 
der Bereichsleiter als Substitut fungieren und übermäßiger Gebrauch von Allokatio-
nen zu einer Verminderung der Gesamtallokationseffizienz des Unternehmens führt. 
Weiterhin zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass die Allokationsineffizienzen zurückgehen, je 
stärker die Bereichsleiter und die Konzernleitung unternehmenswert-basierte Gehäl-
ter beziehen. 
Im  Gegensatz  zu  den  in  Kapitel  2  behandelten  Effizienzsteigerungen  durch 
Anpassungen der Gehaltsverträge liegt der Fokus der zweiten Studie dieser Disserta-
tion in Kapital 3 auf Modifizierungen der Organisationstruktur als alternativem Mit-
tel zur Verminderung von Allokationsineffizienzen. Mehrere theoretische Arbeiten 
verweisen darauf, dass nicht-kooperatives Verhalten von Bereichsleitern in diver-
sifizierten Unternehmen auf das durch ökonomische Kennzahlen ergebende Profil 
wie etwa der Wirtschaftlichkeit des ihnen unterstehenden Bereiches im Verhältnis 
zu den anderen Unternehmensbereichen zurückzuführen ist. So wird unter anderem 
angeführt, dass ein Bereichsleiter zwischen produktivem und beeinflussendem Ver-
halten aufgrund des relativen Ertrags beider Tätigkeiten wählt. Ein relativ leistungs-
schwächerer Unternehmensbereich wird daher eher zu nicht-kooperativem Verhal-
ten führen.  
Kapitel  3  erläutert,  dass  starke  Differenzen  in  Ertrag  und  Wachstumsmög-
lichkeiten der Bereiche zu ineffizientem Verhalten der Bereichsleiter führen können. 
Im ökonomischen Equilibrium legen Unternehmen die organisatorischen Grenzen 
zwischen  ihren  Geschäftsbereichen  so  fest,  dass  das  daraus  resultierende  nicht-
kooperative Verhalten so niedrig wie möglich gehalten wird. Da sich die einzelnen 
Märkte der Unternehmensbereiche jedoch im Laufe der Zeit unterschiedlich entwi-
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ckeln können, bleiben die durch das Leistungsprofil der Bereiche hervorgerufenen 
Anreize zu ineffizientem Verhalten nicht zwangsläufig dieselben. Um den daraus 
resultierenden Fehlallokationen vorzubeugen, können Unternehmen die Organisa-
tion der Geschäftsbereiche neu einteilen, um dadurch die ökonomischen Profile der 
Bereiche zu verändern, womit die Anreize zu ineffizientem Verhalten eingedämmt 
werden.  Unternehmen  können  derartige  Umorganisationen  durch  Neuzusam-
menstellung des Portfolios der diversen Geschäftstätigkeiten pro Bereich erreichen. 
Beispielsweise können ein starker und ein schwacher Unternehmensteil in einen ge-
meinsamen Bereich überführt werden, um dessen durchschnittliche Wirtschaftlich-
keit  den  restlichen  Unternehmensbereichen  anzupassen.  Die  Wahrscheinlichkeit 
einer Umstrukturierung der Geschäftsbereiche sollte daher höher bei Firmen sein, 
deren  Kapitalallokationen  relativ  ineffizient  sind.  Darüberhinaus  ist  zu  erwarten, 
dass die interne Kapitalallokationseffizienz nach derartigen Organisationsverände-
rungen steigt. 
Diese Hypothesen werden mit einem Datensatz US-amerikanischer, börsen-
gelisteter  Firmen  mit  mehreren  Geschäftsbereichen  in  dem  Zeitraum  1998-2007 
untersucht. Wie in Kapitel 2 macht sich diese Studie dabei zunutze, dass die Rech-
nungslegungsvorschriften in diesen Jahren eine Anpassung der Berichtssegmente an 
die tatsächliche Organisationsstruktur vorschreiben. Veränderungen in dieser Struk-
tur  machen  sich  daher  in  einer  veränderten  Präsentation  der  Berichtssegmente 
bemerkbar. Um sicher zu gehen, dass es sich bei diesen Veränderungen tatsächlich 
um Neuorganisationen der Bereiche und nicht um anderweitige Ereignisse wie z.B. 
Veräußerungen oder Fusionen handelt, wurden die 10-k Formulare der SEC heran-
gezogen, da hier die Gründe der Veränderungen in der Segmentberichterstattung ge-
nannt  sind.  Der  sich  aus  dieser  Prozedur  ergebende  Datensatz  untermauert  die 
Hypothesen dieser Studie. Erstens haben Firmen mit niedrigerer Allokationseffizi-
enz eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit, ihre Geschäftsbereiche neu zu gliedern. Zwei-
tens verbessern sich sowohl die Effizienz der internen Kapitalverteilung als auch die 
Wertentwicklung des von den Anteilseignern investierten Vermögens in den Folge-
jahren dieser Neugliederungen. 
Der  Großteil  der  akademischen  Untersuchungen  zur  internen  Kapital-
allokationseffizienz  basiert  auf  Daten  der  externen  Rechnungslegung  statt  auf 
tatsächlichen  internen  Kapitaltransferdaten.  Zu  einem  Großteil  liegt  dies  an  der 
Zurückhaltung  vieler  Firmen,  interne  Daten  zu  Forschungszwecken  freizugeben. 
Dies führt allerdings dazu, dass zum einen die internen Kapitalallokationen zumeist 
nur  näherungsweise  bestimmt  werden  können.  Zum  anderen  müssen  so  viele 
Fragestellungen  in  Bezug  auf  den  zu  Grunde  liegenden  Allokationsprozess 
unbeantwortet bleiben. Durch die Kooperation mit einem börsengelisteten Konzern 
und die direkte Auswertung von Daten des Investitionsbudgetprozesses unterliegt 
die dritte Studie dieser Dissertation in Kapitel 4 nicht diesen Einschränkungen. 
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Der Fokus der dritten Studie liegt dabei auf dem Auftreten von Budgetanfra-
gen, die den tatsächlichen Kapitalbedarf eines Investitionsprojekts übersteigen. Ge-
schäftsbereichsmanager nutzen diese überhöhten Anfragen um mehr Kapital für ih-
ren Geschäftsbereich zu erhalten. Diese Budgetüberschüsse können auftreten, wenn 
die  kapitalbewilligende  Stelle,  d.h.  der  Prinzipal,  den  exakten  Kapitalbedarf  des 
anfragenden Bereichsleiters, d.h. des Agenten, nicht genau überprüfen kann. Viel-
fach werden in den bisherigen Arbeiten dabei vereinfachte Budgetprozesse mit nur 
einer Verhandlungsrunde zwischen Agent und Prinzipal untersucht. Erstens umfas-
sen jedoch reale Budgetprozesse zumeist mehrere Investitionsperioden, zu denen der 
Agent das angefragte Budget neu verhandeln kann. Diese Möglichkeit wird dem 
Agenten eingeräumt, da sich ein Investitionsprojekt während seiner Laufzeit anders 
als ursprünglich vom Agent vorhersehbar entwickeln kann. Zweitens wird in den 
meisten  Studien  eine  vereinfachte  Delegationsstruktur  angenommen,  bei  der  ein 
Agent Projekte anfragt und ein Prinzipal die Bewilligungsrechte hält. In tatsächli-
chen Budgetprozessen gestaltet sich die Bewilligungsstruktur zumeist differenzier-
ter: Nicht alle Projekte werden zentral von einem Prinzipal begutachtet, sondern je 
nach Projekt auch in Abstufungen in tieferen Managementebenen. Kapitel 4 widmet 
sich  speziell  dem  Zusammenspiel  dieser  beiden  Aspekte.  Eine  der  untersuchten 
Hypothesen besagt dabei, dass Agenten die Nachverhandlungsoption stärker ausnut-
zen, um nach Bewilligung eines Projektes zusätzliche, überhöhte Kapitalforderun-
gen zu ihrem eigenen Nutzen zu stellen je mehr der Prinzipal die Bewilligungsrechte 
delegiert, d.h. je weniger direkte Kontrolle er über das Investitionsprojekt ausübt. 
Eine weitere Hypothese ist, dass der Agent stärker versucht, die Budgetüberschüsse 
innerhalb eines Projektes zwischen den Investitionsperioden vorzuverlegen oder zu 
verzögern  je  mehr  die  Bewilligungsrechte  delegiert  werden.  Dem  Agent  nutzen 
diese intertemporalen Verschiebungen, falls sich Investitionsprojekte nicht gemäß 
seinen Erwartung entwickeln und der Agent die ursprüngliche zeitliche Verteilung 
von Budgetüberschüssen seinen Konsumpräferenzen neu anpassen möchte. 
Zur  Untersuchung  dieser  Hypothesen  greift  Kapitel  4,  wie  weiter  oben  er-
wähnt, auf Daten des Budgetprozesses eines weltweit agierenden, börsengelisteten 
Konzerns zurück. Die Resultate bestätigen, dass Bereichsleiter stärker überschüssi-
ges Budget für ihren Geschäftsbereich nachverhandeln und mehr dieser Überschüsse 
zu ihrem Vorteil intertemporal verschieben, je mehr die Konzernleitung die Bewilli-
gungsrechte  zu  Investitionsprojekten  delegiert,  d.h.  je  weniger  direkte  Kontrolle 
ausgeübt wird. Die Ergebnisse zeigen darüberhinaus, dass angefragte Budgetüber-
schüsse vor allem in der Anfangsphase von Projekten höher ausfallen, wenn es für 
die  Bewilligungsstelle  besonders  schwierig  ist,  die  Anfragen  zu  überprüfen.  Ein 
weiterer Befund ist, dass Agenten Budgetüberschüsse zu dem Zeitpunkt ausgepräg-
ter  verschieben,  wenn  sie  selber  ihre  eigenen  Konsumpräferenzen  von  Budget-
überschüssen besser einschätzen können. 
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Die drei Studien dieser Dissertation liefern diverse Erkenntnisse über die Kapi-
talallokationsprozesse in diversifizierten Unternehmen, die sowohl für Theorie als 
auch Praxis relevant sind. Die erste Studie in Kapitel 2 zeigt, das aktienbasierte Ge-
haltsverträge  für  Geschäftsbereichsleiter  für  eine  Verbesserung  der  Kapital-
allokationseffizienz sorgen können. Konventionell werden derartige Verträge jedoch 
nur angewendet, wenn die Geschäftsfelder des Unternehmens einander beeinflussen, 
um somit die Kooperation im operativen Geschäft der Bereichsleiter zu fördern. 
Diese Dissertation zeigt, dass derartige Verträge auch von Vorteil sind, um inner-
betriebliche Kooperation nicht nur im operativen Bereich sondern auch in Finanzie-
rungsfragen zu fördern. In der ersten Studie wird weiterhin eine neue Methode ent-
wickelt, um die Allokationseffizienz zu messen. Im Gegensatz zu bestehenden Ver-
fahren greift diese Methode u.a. auf mehrere Messfaktoren zurück und ist dadurch 
weniger abhängig von der Sensitivität einer einzelnen Bezugsgröße. Die zweite Stu-
die in Kapitel 3 zeigt, dass nicht nur Veränderungen in der Gehaltsstruktur sondern 
auch in der Zusammenstellung der Geschäftsfelder je Unternehmensbereich zu einer 
Verbesserung  der  Kapitalallokationseffizienz  führen  können.  Der  Effekt  von 
Organisationsstrukturen auf die Allokationseffizienz ist in der bisherigen Literatur 
noch nicht berücksichtigt worden. Die Studie verdeutlicht, dass Unternehmen nicht-
kooperatives  Verhalten  der  Bereichsleiter  durch  Neuordnung  der  Geschäftsfelder 
verbessern können, ohne zu drastischeren Maßnahmen wie der Veräußerung von 
Bereichen greifen zu müssen. Die dritte Studie in Kapitel 4 legt dar, dass sich die 
Delegierung von Bewilligungsrechten über Investitionsprojekte nachteilig auf die 
Kostenentwicklung auswirken und zu überschüssigen Budgetanfragen und Budget-
verschiebungen führen kann. Die Rolle von Neuverhandlungen bei Budgetanfragen 
ist in der bisherigen Literatur noch nicht eingehend untersucht worden. Weiterhin 
zeigt diese Studie, dass eine umfassende Budgetkontrolle auch die Kostenentwick-
lung  der  vergangenen  Perioden  einschließen  sollte.  Häufig  werden  Budget-
entwicklungen  jedoch  nur  von  der  laufenden  zur  nächsten  Periode  kontrolliert, 
wodurch z.B. akkumulierende Kostenneuanfragen nicht direkt identifiziert und ver-
hindert werden können. Diese und weitere Schlussfolgerungen dieser Dissertation 
werden in Kapitel 5 behandelt. Kapitel 5 schließt mit Empfehlungen, wie die For-
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